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Abstract  
South Africa is a regional hub for international immigration and the country currently hosts at 
least two million international migrants. Public opinion surveys in South Africa have shown 
clear evidence of the public’s animosity towards international immigrants and immigration.  
Non-quantitative researchers have highlighted the role of nationalism and racial alienation in 
shaping these attitudes. But the influence of these factors has not been tested using 
quantitative public opinion data. Existing quantitative attitudinal research on international 
migration in the country is instead mainly focused on discerning changes in public opinion. 
As a result, significant gaps in the scholarship have emerged that impair our understanding of 
how attitudes towards immigrants and immigration form in post-apartheid South Africa. 
 
The aim of this study is to investigate what micro-level sociological indicator factors are 
shaping attitudes. The study examines four different types of attitudes: (i) general 
evaluations; (ii) prejudice; (iii) perceived threat; and (iv) policy preferences. The thesis 
expands on previous public opinion research by using quantitative research methods to 
quantify different determinants of these attitudes. Nationally representative public opinion 
data from the South African Social Attitude Survey was used. The study examines how adult 
South African public’s attitudes towards international migrants are affected by three key 
clusters of micro-level sociological indicators: (i) socio-economic status; (ii) group identities; 
and (iii) intergroup contact. This thesis provides new insight into how we understand anti-
immigrant sentiment in the country and sheds new light on areas that past academic literature 
has either neglected or overlooked. 
 
The study follows the 'papers model' and consists of five peer-reviewed research articles. 
Each paper uses quantitative research methods to discern what micro-level sociological 
indicators are influencing attitudes towards foreign nationals in post-apartheid South Africa. 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from the study. First, individual socio-economic status 
was not a central driver of attitudes towards international migrants and immigration. Second, 
intergroup contact and group identities (and the key factors related to group identity) tend to 
be better drivers of attitudes. The most influential group identity factors driving attitudes are: 
(i) social ties with neighbours; (ii) national identity; (iii) societal interest; and (iv) racial 
alienation. The results of this study suggest that anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa can 
be confronted by changing patterns of intergroup contact and group identifications. This will 
require a war of ideas, a battle for ordinary South Africans’ hearts and minds.  
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Glossary of Key Terms  
 
This glossary acts as a guide and provides simplistic dictionary definitions of many of the 
terms used in the thesis for the assistance of the reader. 
 
Attitude object: Everything that can be thought of and be evaluated can function as an 
attitude object. Attitude objects may be abstract or concrete, individual or collective.  
Bivariate analysis: An analysis which has two variables (one independent variable and 
one dependent variable) under examination. 
Causality: The relation between cause and effect. 
Continuous Variable: A variable that can have any value between its minimum and 
maximum value (i.e. a variable with fractional values such weight or time). 
Correlation: A common statistical measure (usually abbreviated as r) that measures 
the degree of the (often linear) relationship between a pair of variables in a sample. 
Data: A set of recorded observations, typically in numeric (if quantitative) or textual (if 
qualitative) in nature. 
Dependent Variable: A variable whose value depends on (or responds to) that of 
another (i.e. independent) variable.  
Ethnocentrism: Officially, a viewpoint in which the world is understood from the 
perspective of the person’s ingroup. It is frequently employed to signify a prejudiced attitude 
towards outgroups in general. 
Factor analysis: A form of statistical analysis that is used to discern variability among, 
correlated variables in terms of a possibly lower number of unobserved variables known as 
factors.  
Group identification: The degree to which individuals see themselves as: (i) belonging 
to a group; (ii) their appraisal of that group; and (iii) their emotional commitment to that 
group. 
Hypothesis: A formal declaration about the anticipated relationship between variables 
in a scientific research study, which is (usually) then subsequently tested by the researcher.  
Independent variable: A variable whose value does not depend on (or respond to) that 
of another variable.   
Ingroup: In social psychology studies, as well as sociology, ‘ingroup’ denotes a social 
group with which an individual psychologically identify as a member.  
Linear relationship: A situation where any change in the independent variable will 
result in a corresponding change in the dependent variable.  
Longitudinal study: A research method within data is collected the same research 
subjects at different points in time.  
Ordinal Variable: A variable is a categorical variable in which the possible values are 
ordered –it is the order of values that is significant but not the distance between values. 
Outgroup: In social psychology studies, as well as sociology, ‘outgroup’ represents a 
social group with which an individual does not psychologically identify as a member.  
Majority group: The larger (in terms of population) of the different groups in a social 
context.  
Mediator: A variable which can help to explain the effect of an independent variable 
on the dependent variable. 
Minority group: Literally the smaller of two (or more) groups in a social context 
Moderator: A variable that affects (sometimes we say moderate) the strength of the 
correlation between an independent variable on the dependent variable. 
Multivariate analysis: Denotes any statistical technique that analyses the 
interrelatedness between and within a set (i.e. more than one) of variables. 
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Nationalism: A form of group identification which emphasises positive attachment to a 
country and also includes the concomitant denigration of other countries. 
Patriotism: A form of group identification which emphasises positive attachment to a 
country but does not include the denigration of other countries. 
Realistic threats: A perception that an outgroup proposes realistic threats to the 
wellbeing of the ingroup, usually economic in nature but can include threats to physical 
security or political power of the ingroup. 
Stereotyping and stereotypes: The ascription of a trait (or numerous traits) to 
individuals on the basis of their membership of a particular group. 
Symbolic threats: A perception that an outgroup proposes a challenge to the morals 
and cultural practices which symbolise the identity of the ingroup.  
Validity: A measure can be labelled valid if it offers a suitable approximation or 
indication of the construct it is purporting to measure. 
Variable: An observable attribute that describes anything that can be measured or 
countered. The value of the variables in a sample can vary.   
Variance: A measure used to designate how widely individuals in a sample vary. 
Variation within a distribution can be calculated by averaging the squared deviations from the 






A diverse and vibrant population of international migrants live within the borders of 
South Africa. This introductory chapter will outline how public opinion surveys in 
South Africa have shown clear evidence of the public’s animosity towards international 
immigrants and immigration.  The chapter will then discuss the significant gaps in the 
scholarship that have emerged and how these gaps impair our understanding of how 
attitudes towards immigrants and immigration form in post-apartheid South Africa. 
This goal of the thesis is to provide new insights into our understanding of anti-
immigrant sentiment in the country and explore areas that past academic literature has 
either neglected or overlooked. The dissertation follows the 'papers model' and consists 
of five peer-reviewed research articles. The introductory chapter will describe this 
model and explain the structure of the dissertation. 
 
1.1 Introduction  
 
In November 1894, Constantine P. Cavafy wrote a poem, ‘Waiting for Barbarians’, 
portraying the state’s and the people’s reaction to an approaching barbarian horde. The poem 
ends with news that there are no barbarians and no one is coming. In the last lines of the 
poem, Cavafy writes:  
“And now, what’s going to happen to us without barbarians? 
They were, those people, a kind of solution”. 
The poem helps us reflect on the term barbarian, from the word barbaros used by the ancient 
Greeks to distinguish themselves from non-Greek speakers1. By the time of Aristotle, the 
term barbaros had acquired implications of inferiority and was a fundamentally hostile term. 
Prominent Greek philosophers (like Aristotle) stigmatised the mingling of Greek and 
barbarian cultures as a grave mistake and supported urban designs that kept Greeks separate 
from barbarians. Historical investigations reveal that the attitudes of ancient Greeks to 
foreigners were largely hostile (Harrison, 2002). The 3
rd
 century (BC) mathematician, 
geographer and astronomer Eratosthenes railed against the unnatural division of the world 
into barbarian and Greek in his Geographica. Eratosthenes was objecting to the unnatural 
fear and hatred of xenoi (foreigners) in his society –what the ancient Greeks called 
xenophobia, from the Greek xenos and phobos (fear)2.  
                                                          
1 Barbaros is thought to originate from the supposed (and pejorative) description of foreign 
languages to Greek ears (i.e. ‘their language sounds like ‘bar bar bar’). In an ironic 
coincidence, a similar derogatory neologism for ‘foreigner’ (‘makwerekwere’) has developed 
which describes the mimicking of the sound of ‘foreign’ language to South African ears. I 
have heard it said that “makwerekwere " is more than a derisive parody of foreign languages. 
Makwerekwere has been called an onomatopoetic term meant to imitate the chirping of 
queleas, a genus of passerine birds that are tremendously destructive when they flock 
together. 
2 The common dictionary definition of xenophobia is the “hatred or fear of foreigners”. In this 
dissertation, I use the common dictionary definition of the word ‘xenophobia’ Many scholars 
studying anti-immigrant attitudes have used this dictionary definition (see, for instance, 
Wimmer, 1997; Brown, 2011). I acknowledge, however, that there are other definitions in use 
and over the years the term has been inconstantly applied. Some scholars prefer, for example, 
a broader interpretation and have used the term to define hatred of groups other than 
foreigners (see, for instance, Watts, 1997; Hjerm, 1998). 
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In the latter part of the 20
th
 century, South Africa has become a regional hub for international 
migration (Crush and Dodson, 2007; Crush, 2012). Discourses on immigrants and 
immigration in the country have typically brought forth very fervent public responses. Such 
discourses are often characterised by persistent calls from the public to exclude foreigners 
from South African society. It would be fair to say that international migrants have come, in 
the eyes of some South Africans, to be seen as modern ‘barbarians’. Eratosthenes would have 
as much reason to criticise the situation in contemporary South Africa as he had to criticise 
the Greek politai (citizens) of his own day. But criticism alone will not provide us with the 
information needed to understand the drivers of public attitudes toward immigrants and 
immigration in the country.  
 
There is no need to underscore the ongoing reality of anti-immigrant sentiment in South 
Africa. Since the mid-1990s public opinion scholars inside the country have tracked the 
presence of negative public attitudes towards international migrants and migration (see, for 
example, Mattes et al., 1999; Crush and Pendleton, 2007; Crush et al., 2008). Labels have 
power and labelling an event or an individual xenophobic can result in a legitimate demand 
for institutional action3. But simply labelling an individual or an event xenophobic can be 
reductive. We should not force a binary answer (i.e. xenophobic or not xenophobic) onto 
multifaceted phenomena. In order to effect real change in South Africa, we need more 
nuanced attitudinal scholarship. 
 
This dissertation will identify key determinants of attitudes and seek to obtain a multifaceted 
understanding of the public’s opinions (both positive and negative) of international 
immigrants and immigration. The study is structured according to the ‘papers model’ –a 
dissertation comprising of five published papers. The thesis will use quantitative research 
methods to assess what ascriptive, attained or attitudinal micro-level sociological indicators 
factors are shaping attitudes on international migrants in South Africa. The study will look at 
a range of different attitudes. In the course of this dissertation, I will consider general 
evaluations of international migrants and prejudice4 towards migrants, as well as public 
                                                          
3 Consider the label ‘refugee’. In a thoughtful essay, Zetter (1991) discusses the power of this 
label. Such a label defines the rights (i.e. shelter and security) afforded to the labelled group. 
Labelling an individual a refugee confers an entitlement to certain protection and aid. But 
Zetter (1991: 40) argues against focusing overmuch on legal definitions of any label as the 
“apparent simplicity of a de minimis legal label very quickly evaporates” when states are 
confronted by the responsibilities implied by the ‘refugee’ label. It is necessary, for Zetter, to 
be cognisant of the extent to which political interests play a role in determining how refugees 
are defined. As a result of the perceived costs of this ‘entitlement’, many governments have 
treated “refugee status” as a scarce, valuable and finite resource (also see Zetter, 2007).   
4 Prejudice can be defined as any attitude, emotion or behaviour towards members of a group, 
which directly or indirectly implies some negativity or antagonism towards that group. 
Allport defined prejudice as an ‘antipathy’ and he emphasised negative emotions as the main 
element of intergroup relations. It has been argued by Eagly and Diekman (2005) that 
Allport’s focus on antipathy led attitudinal scholars to focus on those types of prejudice that 
produce violence to the detriment of those more subtle types of prejudice (also see Brown, 
2011). This is particularly a problem in South Africa where the academic focus of 
xenophobia is often exclusively characterised as violent. Prejudice, however, comes in many 
different configurations that disadvantage groups without overt antipathy. 
P a g e  | 3 
 
preferences for different immigration policies. I hope that this nuanced approach will provide 
an empirical basis for policy recommendations. 
 
This introductory chapter outlines the structure of, and the basis for, this dissertation. The 
rationale for the study will be sketched out in section 1.2. Following this, the research 
questions will then be outlined in section 1.3. The place of this study within the broader 
South African public opinion literature will be described in section 1.4 and, subsequently, the 
contribution of the thesis will be discussed in section 1.5. Finally, the structure of the study 
will be presented and brief summaries of each chapter provided.  
 
1.2 The Rationale for the Study  
 
To quote the influential sociologist Peter Berger, the interest of the sociologist is primarily 
theoretical. In his classic Invitation to Sociology, Berger (1963: 4) clarifies, saying that the 
sociologist “is interested in understanding for its own sake”. But I recognise that the results of 
this work can, and should, have real policy implications. I feel it is necessary to state that 
there is a genuine need to target and reduce prejudice against international migrants in South 
Africa. Existing knowledge gaps on the influence of certain important micro-level 
sociological indicators limit our ability to make generalising claims about what are the 
drivers of public attitudes towards international migrants.  Understanding the relative strength 
of different micro-sociological drivers in attitude formation can help inform efforts to reduce 
prejudice. The study will not, however, engage directly with existing anti-xenophobia 
policies in South Africa. Nevertheless, I hope that the results can provide a basis to judge the 
efficacy of existing policies and can be used to inform the design of future policies.   
 
The goal of this study is to better understand what drives the attitudes of the mass public. 
Understanding this ‘what’ cannot easily be achieved if we would rely on expert interviews or 
focus groups. The issue of representativity would be a constant danger for the researcher and 
undermine any generalising claims made. The study will adopt a quantitative approach and 
use public opinion survey data to make generalising claims about attitudes. I believe that 
quantitative research is an effective tool that will allow me to find out how a whole 
population feels about a certain issue. I acknowledge, however, that the researcher cannot 
observe the world as a totally objective and impartial outsider. Rather than concentrating on 
absolute certainty, this study uses quantitative methods to focus on confidence, asking how 
well do certain factors (e.g. educational attainment) predict certain outcomes (e.g. the holding 
of negative attitudes)? 
 
The outcomes of this dissertation may have tangible implications for the South African case, 
but will also provide theses that could be transferred and tested in other geographical 
contexts. As will be discussed in this chapter, most studies on the determinants of anti-
immigrant sentiment concern attitudes in Europe and North America. By using South Africa 
as the site of study, this thesis will produce tested findings that are more applicable for the 
socio-economic realities of Sub-Saharan African countries rather than those produced outside 
the continent. My work develops tested hypotheses that could more readily be applied and re-
tested in other countries. This will advance the emerging tradition of non-Western 
(particularly Sub-Saharan African) quantitative attitudinal research on international migrants 
and immigration. There may also be implications for countries outside of Sub-Saharan Africa 
who may benefit from an outsider perspective.  
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1.3 The Research Questions of the Study  
 
In this dissertation, xenophobia is investigated through the prism of public opinion. The 
purpose of this study is to explore the association between key micro-level sociological 
factors and attitudes towards international migrants in modern South Africa. The main task of 
this dissertation is to weigh the validity of these micro-sociological drivers. The study will 
look at both attitudinal (e.g. attachment to the national community) and non-attitudinal (e.g. 
educational attainment) drivers. The focus will be on three core micro-level sociological 
indicators: (i) socio-economic status; (ii) group identities; and (iii) intergroup contact. In 
addition to pursuing this focus, this study will seek to discern how public attitudes in South 
Africa towards foreign nationals have changed over the period 2003-2012. This period is 
considered crucially important because it is not covered as comprehensively as the late 1990s 
when multiple studies (e.g. Schutte et al., 1997; Mattes et al., 1999; McDonald et al., 2000) 
published public opinion data on anti-immigrant sentiment in the country.  
 
In order to fulfil the aims of the thesis, as outlined above, the study poses the following 
research questions:  
 
(i). How have attitudes towards international migrants changed over the recent modern 
(2003-2013) period?  
(ii). Are individual socio-economic characteristics associated with holding positive and 
negative attitudes towards international migrants?  
(iii). How do people in South Africa view the consequences of international migration and 
how do those views influence their attitudes?  
(iv). Do differing levels of contact with international migrants change the attitudes of 
South African citizens towards migrants? 
(v). How do different conceptions of group identity influence public opinion on 
international migration and migrants? 
 
The ‘object’ of study that concerns this dissertation is attitudes (both positive and negative) 
towards international migration and migrants. The study will look at four different types of 
attitudes: (i) general evaluations; (ii) prejudice; (iii) perceived threat; and (iv) policy 
preferences. The dissertation will also look at the hierarchy of individual preferences between 
different immigrant groups. Such an investigation of preferences has only been imperfectly 
done by existing research and would be a boon to our understanding of attitudes towards 
international migrants in South Africa. 
 
1.4 How to Study Public Opinion and Attitudes  
 
The use of public opinion data to understand anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa is not 
unique. Researchers at the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) included questions on 
undocumented immigration in the 1994 October Omnibus Survey. The HSRC was 
responding to a perceived increase in tensions between immigrants and citizens in the country 
during the 1994 period. These tensions were so palpable that on 2
nd
 September 1994 the New 
York Times published a story by Bill Keller on xenophobia in South Africa. In the article, 
Keller wrote: "More than ever, South Africa has become a mecca for the continent's destitute. 
But more than ever, it is a place of uncertain welcome". The article went on to note that many 
people blamed incoming immigrants for stealing jobs and business, and wanted the 
government to "sniff them out and send them home". This shift in mood was picked up by 
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parliamentarian Robert Davies who talked about a rising tide of intolerance against foreigners 
during an interview with the press later that month (Mail & Guardian, 23/09/1994). 
 
In December 1994, protesters in Alexandra Township marched on their local police station to 
demand that all Malawians, Mozambicans and Zimbabweans ‘go home’. Anger over this 
issue soon morphed into the anti-immigrant riots known as ‘Operation Buyelekhaya’ (Go 
Back Home) in December 1994 and January 19955. These riots provoked a new interest in the 
attitudes of ordinary citizens towards international migrants and immigration. Supported by 
the HSRC and the Institute for Security Studies, Schutte et al. (1997) conducted the first 
large-scale post-apartheid public opinion survey with a core focus on international migration 
in 1997. Work by Schutte and his colleagues was followed up by the Southern African 
Migration Project (SAMP) which was led by prominent scholars like Jonathan Crush and 
Wade Pendleton. The SAMP conducted two public opinion polls in South Africa in 1997 and 
1999 which supported the findings of Schutte et al. (1997). Since the late 1990s, SAMP has 
helped conduct some follow-up surveys in South Africa, as well as with citizens of Southern 
Africa.  
 
It is impossible to discuss anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa without acknowledging 
the existence of anti-immigrant violence in the country and recognising that such violence 
has occurred frequently in South Africa.  A significant number of academics are interested in, 
and are researching, collective xenophobic violence in South Africa. As a result, a 
noteworthy academic literature on collective violence towards international immigrants has 
developed in the country (see, for instance, Hassim et al., 2009; von Holdt et al., 2011; 
Hayem, 2013). Here, the concern is with the rationale or motivations behind violent 
xenophobic behaviour rather than attitudes towards international migrants. This parallels a 
growing scholarly interest in xenophobic violence in Sub-Saharan Africa more generally. 
Most of the research on xenophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa (e.g. Dunn, 2009; Adida, 2014) 
has focused on the political economy of collective violence. Most have eschewed 
investigations of mass public opinion. The literature on xenophobic violence in South Africa 
(and Sub-Saharan Africa more broadly) can offer some interesting insights into how attitudes 
form. But often this literature is too narrowly focused in its analysis to allow us to fully 
understand attitudes towards migrants more generally.  
 
As outlined briefly above, there is an established body of research on attitudes towards 
international migrants and immigration in South Africa. But much remains unknown about 
what is driving public opinion on international immigrants in the country. SAMP researchers 
have been most interested in monitoring changes in the pulse of public opinion and their 
publications (e.g. Crush et al., 2008; 2013) have sought to emphasise volatility or stability in 
the holding of certain attitudes towards immigration. Although some scholars have tested the 
determinants of attitudes towards immigration in South Africa (e.g. Dambrun et al., 2006; Du 
Toit and Kortze, 2011; Facchini et al., 2013), the influence of socio-economic self-interest, 
collective identities and intergroup attitudes has not been comprehensively tested. There is an 
extensive amount of non-quantitative academic scholarship on xenophobia in South Africa 
(Nyamnjoh, 2006; Dodson, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010; Matsinhe, 2011). This work has 
                                                          
5. During the so-called Operation Buyelekhaya, mobs in the Alexandra Township attacked 
foreigners. Minnaar et al. (1996) describe how international immigrants (and suspected 
immigrants) in the township were targeted. Mobs looted the homes of foreign nationals and 
vandalised their businesses. Some of the mob rounded up foreigners and demanded that the 
local police take them back to their country of origin. 
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speculated about the effect that nationalism and racial alienation may have on attitudes. Much 
of the academic research on xenophobia in South Africa has focused on philosophical 
arguments and suppositions. There has been little quantitative analysis of attitudinal data, a 
lacuna this thesis attempts to address. 
 
A substantial body of public opinion research on attitudes towards immigration and 
immigrants has developed outside South Africa. Some of the major themes of this literature 
deal with the role that the following key micro-level sociological indicators play in predicting 
attitudes towards international migrants: (i) socio-economic status; (ii) collective identities; 
and (iii) intergroup contact (Wimmer, 1997; Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller and 
Hopkins, 2014). Most of these scholarly analyses of opinion have focused on attitudes in 
Europe, North America and Israel. This emphasis on the Global North has been criticised by 
a number of scholars, including Lawrence (2011), Miller (2012) and Whitaker and Giersch 
(2015). As a result of this overemphasis on the Global North, it is difficult to know if findings 
from this body of work can offer useful insights for the South African environment. In order 
to adequately understand what micro-level sociological indicators are correlated with anti-
immigrant sentiment in South Africa, there is a need for further in-depth quantitative public 
opinion research. 
 
1.5 The Research Approach and Thesis Contribution 
 
When completing a doctorate, the so-called 'papers model' thesis has become common in 
what is sometimes called the ‘technical’ social sciences. The ‘papers model’ requires the 
researcher to write a thesis that is shorter in length than the classic dissertation and usually 
comprises five papers which are published in accredited publications. During the last four 
years, I have had a number of papers accepted for publication and I have selected five to be 
included in this thesis. Each of these papers has been peer-reviewed by accredited 
publications and each has been (or is in the final stages of) publication. Each should be 
considered a stand-alone piece of work.  These articles have already contributed to the 
existing field of knowledge on attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa.  
 
As already discussed, the focus of this study will be on the relationship between different 
attitude types and individual (or micro) level factors. The thesis will design testable 
hypotheses to evaluate the correlation between the core micro-level sociological indicators 
and the different types of attitudes outlined in the previous section. To test these hypotheses, 
a number of multivariate and bivariate methods will be employed throughout this 
dissertation. The study will use the public opinion data from the South African Social 
Attitudes Survey (SASAS). This dataset captures the opinions of a nationally representative 
sample of all adults living in South Africa, rich and poor, black and white. The SASAS 
dataset was chosen because it contains data on the different attitudinal and non-attitudinal 
factors that I wanted to explore.  
 
This dissertation will contribute to the existing body of knowledge on attitudes towards 
international migrants in South Africa in a number of different ways. The study will argue 
that South Africans do not base their attitudes towards international migrants and migration 
primarily on the putative influence exerted by socio-economic status. This would suggest that 
attitudes are not predominantly the product of rational evaluations of economic self-interest. 
The thesis will show that non-economic factors are key drivers of attitudes. Group identities 
(and the key factors related to group identity) are particularly prominent drivers of attitudes. 
The most influential group identity factors are: (i) social ties with neighbours; (ii) national 
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identity; (iii) societal interest; and (iv) racial alienation. In addition, the study will also 
present data on how the perceived consequences of international migration (which circulates 
in society via formal and informal channels) play a prominent role in shaping attitudes. I hope 
that knowledge of these attitudinal drivers can (and should) help inform design policies and 
programmes that aim to reduce anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa.   
 
1.6 Structure of the Dissertation  
 
As discussed in the previous section, this study is structured according to the 'papers model'. 
As such, there is not a ‘standard’ methodology or a literature review chapter in this thesis. 
Instead, the study is made up of five papers which have been peer-reviewed and are now 
accepted for publication in accredited publications. In addition to the five papers and this 
introduction, there are two chapters included in the dissertation that are not peer-reviewed: (i) 
a review of the key literature on attitudes and their importance; and (ii) a conclusion. 
Descriptions of all the chapters included in this dissertation are provided below. 
 
It is almost a cliché to speak of the crucial normative role that public opinion surveys perform 
in a democratic society. Although the concept of ‘attitudes’ has been a fundamental one in a 
number of academic fields (especially social psychology) for decades, as Eagly and Chaiken 
(2007) admit, there remains some confusion about what constitutes an attitude and why 
attitudes are important (also see Greenwald, 1989; Zaller, 1992; Eagly and Chaiken 1993; 
Wilson, 2013). Chapter 2 of this dissertation will review the literature on attitudes and 
consider why they are of scholarly importance and how they form. The function of this 
chapter is to appraise the main arguments surrounding these questions and provide a general 
overview of the underlying factors that inform attitude formation. 
 
Chapter 3 will describe the dataset used in this study. This chapter provides a detailed 
account of this dataset and its limitations. 
 
Chapter 4 presents public opinion on international migration between 2003 and 2012. The 
chapter will also focus on citizens’ preferences for different immigrant groups and will 
discern which foreign groups are favoured least by citizens. This will provide an opportunity 
to determine whether such preferences vary across important socio-economic groups in South 
Africa. The chapter will use this data to make judgements about the government’s attempts to 
combat xenophobia over the recent ten years. 
 
Chapter 5 examines positive evaluations of international migrants (i.e. the extent to which 
foreigners living the country are viewed as positive and friendly). The chapter will explore 
the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and pro-immigrant sentiment. Separate 
analyses will be conducted for each of Hadley Cantril’s three classic wellbeing ladder groups: 
(i) Low; (ii) Medium; and (iii) High to understand the effect of subjective wellbeing on pro-
immigrant sentiment. This chapter will conclude by discussing how quality of life research 
can be used to better understand prejudice in countries like South Africa and beyond. 
 
Chapter 6 analyses public tolerance towards living in proximity to international migrants. 
This chapter will assess the effects of interpersonal trust, social bonds with neighbours and a 
sense of community on tolerance. This is the first study that conducts such a test in the South 
African context. The relationship between tolerance and political tolerance will also be tested. 
The chapter concludes with a discussion of what programmes are required to reduce anti-
immigrant sentiment in South Africa.  
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Chapter 7 examines public perceptions about the negative consequences of immigration. The 
chapter questions whether such perceptions are correlated with a sense of interracial 
competition and threat. The effects of interracial contact on attitudes are also tested. The 
factors that predict these public perceptions may differ by race group, hence each of the four 
major race groups are examined separately. The chapter concludes by arguing that fighting 
xenophobia is connected to the larger problem interracial disharmony in South Africa. 
 
Chapter 8 examines public support for policies that would exclude international migrants 
from the country. The chapter assesses attitudes towards: (i) granting legal immigrants the 
same rights as citizens; (ii) excluding illegal immigrants from the country; (iii) granting legal 
immigrants the same access to public education as citizens; (iv) prohibiting immigrants 
buying land in the country; and (v) closing the borders to immigrants and refugees. The 
chapter focused on understanding the predictive power of Group Threat Theory in 
understanding support for these policy proposals. The chapter concludes that programmes 
designed to promote a nationalism characterised by inclusive multicultural civic patriotism 
will improve public support for the inclusion of international immigrants. 
 
The final chapter reviews the arguments and findings of the dissertation and discusses the 
scholarly and policy implications. It also identifies areas for further research.  
  




The concept of ‘attitudes’ has been essential to the quantitative study of intergroup 
relations. However, there remain some misperceptions about what comprises an attitude 
and how attitudes form in a given population. This is particularly true in South African 
academia where attitudinal analysis has been criticised by scholars on the left as 
reductive. In an attempt to correct these misperceptions, this chapter will review the 
literature on attitudes as it pertains to the topic of this dissertation. The aim of the 
review is to evaluate the main arguments surrounding attitudinal analysis and present a 
broad outline of the primary factors that drive attitude formation. The review will 
grapple with the South African experience and make reference to current policy 
approaches to xenophobia and anti-immigrant violence.  A considerable academic 
literature exists on attitudes and, as a result, the chapter will be very selective in the 
works that are reviewed. 
 
2.1 Introduction  
 
In determining the research plan for this dissertation, both quantitative and qualitative 
methods were considered. As discussed in the first chapter, the former was selected. 
Although the use of public opinion data to understand anti-immigrant sentiment in South 
Africa is not unique, such a positivist approach is relatively uncommon. I recognise that a 
positivist approach has its disadvantages, but I would agree with Turner (1993) that a 
quantitative analysis can provide insight for the social sciences. For Turner, the key to 
conducting meaningful quantitative research is having a clear understanding of the unit of 
analysis. In this case, the unit of analysis is ‘attitudes’. But this answer provokes further 
questions: what is an attitude and why should we concern ourselves with studying attitudes? 
 
Attending a 2014 seminar on xenophobia in Pretoria, I began to present quantitative data 
from a recent public opinion survey. A member of the audience challenged my use of 
quantitative attitudinal data, asking what value studying attitudes had in the study of 
xenophobia in South Africa. Attitudinal analysis is a highly respected avenue of scholarship, 
but its implicit value may not be readily apparent. Indeed, most scholars investigating 
xenophobia in South Africa do not use public opinion survey data. This chapter seeks to 
provide a detailed and comprehensive answer to the question of why studying public attitudes 
in South Africa matters. To answer that question, this chapter will consider first what 
attitudes are and how attitudes relate to behaviour and policy. 
 
Section 2.2 will present evidence that attitudes can and should influence the policies of a 
democratic state as well as individual behaviour. If we accept the premise that attitudes are 
worthwhile objects of study, then we arrive at the implicitly vital question: how do attitudes 
form? This is a passionately debated question that has produced a substantial quantity of 
academic literature (as reviews of the literature by Zaller, 1992; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; 
and Sniderman et al., 1993 show). There is no simple answer to this question other than to 
say that there are multiple factors at play. Section 2.3 will offer an outline of the main 
relevant arguments about what drives attitude formation.  Although this review will discuss 
attitudes in general, it will primarily focus on those arguments that are related to the study of 
prejudicial attitudes.  
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2.2 Why Studying Attitudes is Important   
 
Social researchers have considered attitudes as important units of analysis for almost a 
century. Allport (1935: 798) argued that “the concept of attitudes is probably the most 
distinctive and indispensable concept” in social psychology. But what is an ‘attitude’? 
Greenwald (1989: 432) defined an attitude as “the affect associated with a mental object”. 
However, some have considered this definition too vague (for an overview of these 
detractors, see Eagly and Chaiken, 2007). Eagly and Chaiken (1993: 1), evaluating the 
various definitions and metaphors used to describe ‘attitudes’ over the decades, arrive at a 
general definition: “a psychological tendency that is expressed by evaluating a particular 
entity with some degree of favour or disfavour”. Although this is a cogent definition, it does 
not tell us why examining attitudes may be important to the study of xenophobia.  This 
section will attempt to provide an answer to that question. 
 
Subsection 2.2.1 reflects on whether in South Africa we can consider xenophobia an attitude. 
Following this discussion, subsection 2.2.2 will examine the relationship between attitude and 
behaviour, noting how this relationship is often non-linear. According to empirical theories of 
democracy, a modern democratic state (like South Africa) must be responsive to the 
preferences of its citizenry. Given this theoretical underpinning, and moving beyond 
behaviour, subsection 2.2.3 will consider the relationship between public policy and public 
attitudes. Then subsection 2.2.4 assesses whether attitudes can be measured. Finally, 
subsection 2.2.5 presents a brief history of the use of quantitative public opinion data to 
investigate attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa.  
 
2.2.1 In South Africa, is Xenophobia an Attitude?  
In front of the South African Parliament in April 2015, President Jacob Zuma denied that 
people in South Africa are xenophobic, condemning violent attacks by mobs on international 
migrants as “shocking and unacceptable” (News24, 16/04/2015). The President was 
denouncing violent riots that had occurred in several urban areas of KwaZulu-Natal and 
Gauteng in April 2015. President Jacob Zuma subsequently reaffirmed his position on 
xenophobia in a June 2015 address to the African Union: “South Africans are not 
xenophobic. We do not believe that the actions of a few out of more than 50 million citizens 
justify the label of xenophobia” (News24, 14/06/2015).  The President’s response to the April 
2015 attacks reflects a definition of ‘xenophobia’ that is centred on collective violence. Under 
this definition, xenophobia is not fear, antipathy or hatred of foreigners but rather a violent 
act.  
 
The Zuma Administration established two committees to investigate the motivations behind 
the April 2015 attacks. The first was the Parliament’s Joint Committee on Probing Violence 
against Foreign Nationals. The Co-Chair of this committee (and Member of Parliament), 
Tekoetsile Motlashuping, went even further than the National President in distancing South 
Africans from the label ‘xenophobic’. Co-Chair Motlashuping told the press that the label did 
not apply to South Africans and warned the media not to use that word (IOL, 10/07/2015). 
The conclusions and recommendations made by the Joint Committee in their final report 
(published in November 2015), did not mention the term ‘xenophobia’. The second 
committee was the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration which had a larger mandate in 
that it was tasked with addressing concerns raised by the public with regards to international 
migration. When the Committee Chairman (and Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development) Jeff Radebe published the committee’s findings in late 2015, he confirmed in a 
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press briefing that there was no evidence that a hatred of foreigners was behind the April 
attacks (EyeWitness News, 11/11/2015). 
 
In the face of the April 2015 attacks, the press criticised the Zuma Administration for 
xenophobic ‘denialism’ (see, for example, Mail & Guardian, 12/06/2015; IOL, 17/04/2015a). 
Similar accusations were made against former National President Thabo Mbeki when he was 
confronted by mass anti-immigrant violence in May 2008. Sandwith (2010) provides a 
thoughtful exploration of media debates and narratives on the May 2008 violence that 
emerged. Sandwith’s analysis gives special emphasis to what this choice reveals about 
national myth-making, the production of consensus and modalities of power in the post-
colonial South African state (also see Gibson, 2012). Since 2008, the South African 
government has developed an official narrative that a small criminal element was solely 
responsible for xenophobic violence and the South African public were not xenophobic 
(Crush and Ramachandran, 2014). The government’s choice of the crime narrative as the 
dominant interpretive scheme of xenophobic violence was particularly evident during the 
April 2015 attacks. 
 
Debates about xenophobic violence in South Africa can devolve into a lengthy debate about 
what is meant by the term ‘xenophobia’. The Joint Committee on Probing Violence against 
Foreign Nationals, for example, made a deliberate decision not to define ‘xenophobia’ as the 
holding of negative attitudes (or prejudices) towards international migrants when compiling 
its final report. Xenophobia was, instead, defined primarily in terms of violence against 
international migrants. Reading the minutes of the final meeting of the Joint Committee, 
particularly the discussion between Committee Co-Chairperson Nozabelo Bhengu and 
Committee members Zephroma Dlamini-Dubazana and Roger Chance, the intentionality of 
this decision is clear (Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2015). Framing the analysis of anti-
immigrant prejudice in terms of collective violence, rather than attitudes, is reductivist. It 
leads us to rely on manifestations of violence as our lone metric of xenophobia, ignoring 
other observable actions inspired by anti-immigrant sentiment. 
 
Non-violent collective actions may be just as disruptive to the peaceful integration of 
international migrants into South African communities as violence. Consider, for example, an 
incident that occurred in Gauteng in mid-October 2011. Throughout the township of 
Alexandra, residents put up posters on street lamps warning foreigners to evacuate 
government housing (Mail & Guardian, 19/10/2011). Pamphlets were distributed which read: 
“We demand that you vacate at your own free will without being pushed like animals or 
aliens”. Such mass actions, although directed against international immigrants and harmful to 
social cohesion, tend to attract little attention from the media or the academia. This thesis 
does not adhere to the view that xenophobia can be defined solely within the confines of 
violent behaviour. This study looks at the attitudes of individuals and contends that attitudes 
are an important subject of study.  
 
2.2.2 The Attitude-Behaviour Relationship 
For early social psychologists like Thurstone (1929), attitudes were particularly important 
because they could be used to predict and motivate social behaviour. Allport (1935: 820) 
argued that attitudes exercise “...a directive or dynamic influence upon the individual’s 
response to all objects and situations with which it is related”. In fact, Triandis (1991: 485) 
went so far as to define attitudes in terms of a behavioural predisposition, saying attitudes 
were "a state of a person that predisposes a favourable or unfavourable response to an object, 
person, or idea" (also see Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975). Reflecting on the importance of 
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conducting attitudinal research in South Africa, Mattes (2013: 491) asked what is public 
opinion research “if not the attempt to identify the values, beliefs and understandings that 
inform actions”. The word ‘inform’ used by Mattes is telling, as there is no clear linear 
relationship between attitude and behaviour.  
 
There is a significant and growing literature on when attitudes predict behaviour and how this 
process may occur. Much of the literature is based on the Theory of Planned Behaviour 
which hypothesises that attitudes are the major determinants of behavioural intentions (Ajzen 
and Fishbein, 2005). Although this theory emphasises the effect attitudes have on behaviour, 
the theory concedes that situational, normative and individual characteristics also have effects 
on behaviour (also see Fishbein and Ajzen, 1975; Fazio, 1986; Petty et al., 1997). In other 
words, the correlation between attitudes and behaviour is mediated by both internal and 
external factors. This is especially true if we consider the relationship between prejudice and 
behaviour. Prejudice can be suppressed by anti-prejudiced norms as well as personal 
standards, beliefs and values (Dovidio and Gaertner, 2004). Prejudice’s manifestation in 
actions depends on a justification that allows the individual to express prejudice without 
facing sanction. Interestingly, anything –a piece of information, say, or an external event –
can be seized on as a justification for prejudicial behaviour. 
 
The degree to which the attitude-behaviour relationship is consistent is assumed to be 
moderated by factors related to the characteristics of the attitude itself, the individual 
performing the behaviour and the environment within which it is performed (Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 2005). The influence of attitude (affect) on behaviour through mediating cognitive 
processes involves the individual's perceptions of and cognitions about the attitude’s ‘object’ 
(also see Greenwald, 1989; Ajzen and Fishbein, 2000). In the 1990s, meta-analytic 
summaries of the prejudice-behaviour relationship came to a rather optimistic view about the 
strength of the relationship6. These scholarly investigations concerned themselves with when 
and how prejudice directed at an outgroup translates into behavioural discrimination. 
Although there is still some debate, the consensus seemed to be that a relationship between 
prejudice and discrimination exists, but that the relationship depends on several moderators.  
 
Attitudes towards an object can be related to behaviour that does not directly involve the 
attitude’s ‘object’. Consider, for instance, how negative attitudes towards an outgroup (e.g. 
international migrants) may impact on the behaviour that occurs within groups of individuals 
who share the same prejudice. Individuals harbouring anti-immigrant attitudes, for instance, 
may not engage in behaviour that directly affects foreigners but may express that prejudice in 
other ways. Such attitudes may lead them to adopt intermediate positions that allow them to 
express prejudice in more socially-acceptable ways (for a discussion on aversive racism, see 
Dovidio and Gaertner, 2004). They may choose to support a political party or a political 
programme dedicated to deporting most or all of international migrants back to their ‘home 
country’ –what Watts (1997) has called ‘political xenophobia’. They may refuse to 
participate in (or support) efforts to integrate international migrants into the host society. 
Although these examples of behaviours are not directed at international migrants, they do 
affect them indirectly and are evidence of a prejudice-discrimination relationship.  
                                                          
6 Based on an examination of 60 independent studies, Schütz and Six (1996), for example, 
found a significant mean correlation (r = 0.36) between prejudice and behaviour and an even 
stronger correlation (r = 0.45) between prejudice and behavioural intentions. A similar result 
was found by Dovidio et al. (1996) using an analysis of 23 studies. These meta-analytic 
summaries show that prejudice and discriminatory behaviour correlate. 
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2.2.3 The Relationship between Public Opinion and Public Policy  
Aside from the attitude-behaviour relationship described in subsection 2.2.2, the attitude-
policy relationship must also be considered. In the modern world, the responsiveness of 
government policies to the preferences of citizens is an essential concern of most normative 
and empirical theories of democracy (Dahl, 1973). But the idea that public opinion influences 
public policy has a long history. Considering the historical development of public opinion 
research, Wilson (2013) argues that public opinion has been an "orderly force," contributing 
to social and political life for thousands of years. For Wilson, the idea of public opinion can 
be found in the Ancient Athenian belief in citizen participation in political decision-making. 
The correlation between public opinion and public policy is considered to be a moral good, a 
crucial characteristic of successful democratic governance. Scholars in modern democracies 
have expressed shock and alarm when they do not detect a strong relationship between public 
opinion and public policy7.  
 
The policy-attitude relationship is not perfectly linear and the relationship’s direction of 
causality can be, at times, difficult to detect. Studies (e.g. Page and Shapiro, 1983; Soroka 
and Wlezien, 2010) have acknowledged this reality but still argue that it is a relationship 
between public opinion and policy formation in some democracies. It could be argued that 
public opinion may not influence public policy in South Africa in the same way that it does in 
Western Europe or North America. For most of the country’s democratic period, the political 
arena has been characterised by single-party dominance and elections are uncompetitive.  The 
ruling African National Congress controls most of the country’s local and district 
municipalities and has a clear majority in the National Parliament. Under a system where a 
single-party is dominant, it could be contended that there is less room for public opinion to 
influence policy. However, the party dominance ‘theory’, at least as it applies to South 
Africa, has come under criticism of late (see, for example, Suttner, 2006). There is evidence 
to suggest that government has at least to consider the opinion of the general public when 
making decisions.  
 
Let us consider the recommendations made by the Joint Committee on Probing Violence 
against Foreign Nationals in their November 2015 report. The report proudly states that its 
findings and recommendations are based on consultations with the communities affected by 
the violence. The Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration also boasted of broad public 
consultations during the launch of their final report (also published in November 2015). Both 
committees’ reports make frequent references to the harm being done to South Africa by 
international migrants8. The Joint Committee on Probing Violence against Foreign Nationals 
                                                          
7 In an influential article on democracy and public opinion in the United States, Lax and 
Phillips (2012) were appalled to find that State governments translated public opinion into 
policy only about half the time and labelled this a ‘democratic deficit’. 
8 Let us reflect on the findings of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Migration report in 
particular. In a speech laying out the committee’s main findings, the Committee Chair 
Minister Jeff Radebe linked the April 2015 attacks to the high number of foreign nationals in 
South Africa as well as poor border management and immigration controls (SA News, 
10/11/2015). Minister Radebe promised that the government would review immigration 
policy to tighten border controls. On a related matter, the Committee Chair has said that the 
government intends to audit and license informal businesses in townships, in response to 
complaints that foreigners were ‘unfairly’ competing with locals (SA News, 11/11/2015). He 
described foreign-owned spaza shops as “cartel-like” and expressed alarm that millions of 
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report, for instance, made repeated references to foreigners unfairly challenging locally-
owned businesses and expressed distress over the number of small-scale, foreign-owned 
businesses in South African communities. Recommendation 5 of the report clearly stated that 
there needs to be an emphasis on the responsibilities of international migrants in perpetuating 
the April 2015 violence.  
 
An even better example of the likely relationship between public opinion and policy could be 
the multidisciplinary interdepartmental Operation Fiela (in Sesotho, Fiela can be translated as 
‘sweep clean’). Acting Cabinet Spokesperson Phumla Williams proudly announced in May 
2015 that the operation was launched after a number of engagements with communities 
affected by the April 2015 attacks (including 77 events being held in the week following the 
April attacks). Speaking to the press about these engagements, Spokesperson Williams said: 
“Out of those consultations, one of the things that consistently came across was the 
criminality […] These areas that keep being pointed might be having a lot of foreign 
nationals” (SA News, 14/05/2015). The operation, which included components of the army 
and the police, was designed to focus on undocumented migrants, human trafficking, 
unlicensed businesses, the illegal occupation of land and prostitution. One of the clear 
motivations of the Operation Fiela was to appease public opinion. When the operation was 
launched, Minister Jeff Radebe described the motivation behind Operation Fiela as follows: 
“We want to sweep our public places clean so that our people can be and feel safe” (SA 
News, 28/04/2015). 
 
A coalition of non-governmental organisations against xenophobia has criticised Operation 
Fiela for “harassing and arresting [international migrants] on a mass scale” (Mail & 
Guardian, 18/05/2015). Members of the coalition have gone so far as to allege that the 
Operation was, in effect, “state-sponsored xenophobia”. Referencing the strong support 
Operation Fiela has received from communities, the government has rejected calls to cancel 
the Operation. Speaking in the community of Eersterust (east of Pretoria), Spokesperson 
Phumla Williams said: “The support we have received from the Eersterust Community 
Policing Forum and concerned residents has been instrumental in the success of our 
operations” (SA News, 06/11/2015). In an article for the press, the academic Loren Landau 
called Operation Fiela an appeasement of the “most exclusionary fears among the citizenry” 
and “placating angry citizens by arresting foreigners” (Washington Post, 11/05/2015). 
Indeed, it would be difficult to describe Operation Fiela as a policy initiative that is unpopular 
amongst the general public.  
 
South African communities have been known to try and force congruence between attitudes 
and policy. Consider, for example, an incident that took place in Gauteng towards the end of 
2011. In November of that year, business owners, religious groups and a number of residents 
from Ekurhuleni marched on Johannesburg against foreign-owned shops in local townships 
(Mail & Guardian, 03/11/2011). A spokesman for the group, Baznaar Moloi, demanded that 
action be taken against these businesses which he accused of “running down” the businesses 
of locals. A memorandum stating the grievances of the marchers was delivered to the office 
of the province’s Premier. Even non-governmental advocates for policy change are 
constrained by public opinion. In her study of migrant, refugee and asylum-seeker advocacy 
organisations, Pugh (2014) highlights the substantial difficulties faced by these organisations 
because of the unpopularity of the groups they represent. Although the relationship between 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
foreigners had been permitted to ‘settle’ in the country. It would be difficult to say that the 
Minister is not pandering to popular prejudices about international migration.  
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public opinion and policy may not be perfectly linear, the examples provided here suggest 
that there is some connection. In summation, I feel that the analysis of mass public opinion 
has a particularly palpable importance in South Africa. 
 
2.2.4 Attitude Can Be Measured 
In the opening decades of the 20
th
 century, Thurstone (1929) infamously stated that “attitudes 
can be measured” and could be measured using structured questionnaires. Likert’s 1929 
dissertation noted that quantitative practices in intelligence measurement could be applied to 
attitudinal surveys (for an overview of the first era of public opinion research, see Groves, 
2011). Attitudinal research techniques were a boon to the study of intergroup relations and 
prejudice. In the 1950s, Gordon Allport underlined the importance of outgroup stereotypes 
(i.e. rumours about outgroups) in understanding the nature of prejudice towards a group (i.e. 
the attitude’s ‘object’). As noted in the introduction, Allport (1954: 10) defined prejudice as 
“an antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalisation” in his famous The Nature of 
Prejudice. In its fullest form, prejudice embraces the belief that another group is both innately 
inferior and threatening to the ingroup (also see Eagly and Diekman 2005). Under this useful 
definition, prejudice involves affect, evaluation and cognition. According to Eagly and 
Chaiken (1993), most attitudes involve cognition, affect, and behaviour –what is sometimes 
called the ‘tripartite model’ (also see Petty et al., 1997; Wilson, 2013).  
 
The most common method for measuring attitudes is self-reporting questionnaires. This 
involves asking people to rate the attitude object on bipolar evaluative dimensions (e.g. agree 
versus disagree) on questionnaires. Let us take the work of Ian Douglas MacCrone as an 
example. In the 1930s and 1940s, MacCrone was interested in how South Africans viewed 
each other and how these views are shaped by racial attitudes. He used self-reporting 
questionnaires to capture the attitudes of Black African students in tertiary education. In his 
1937 book, Race Attitudes in South Africa: Historical, Experimental, and Psychological 
Studies, he identified feelings of antagonism towards Whites among Black Africans. He 
characterised this antipathy as “Boer phobia”, a response to the political domination of Black 
Africans by the white minority (also see MacCrone 1947). His work was highly important for 
future generations of attitudinal scholars labouring on intergroup relations in South Africa. 
 
MacCrone was interested in what the general public thought about race relations in South 
Africa. But he used student samples which can be convenient but also problematic for 
intergroup research. The use of student samples has been particularly critiqued by Henry 
(2008). He noted that the high internal validity offered by student samples is achieved at the 
price of external validity. He was concerned about the artificial conditions under which 
students functioned as research subjects. In addition, university students tend to have less-
developed attitudes, weaker senses of self, stronger cognitive skills, stronger tendencies to 
conform to authority, and more unstable peer-group relationships. The ability of studies using 
student samples to generalise their findings to situations outside that of the experimental 
context of the university or laboratory is heavily circumscribed. To better understand 
attitudes, scholars like MacCrone needed to develop tools to measure attitudes on a much 
larger scale. 
 
In the early 20
th
 century, a group of scholars began experimenting with the first systematic 
largescale attitudinal surveys. This work, based in the United States, was credited with 
pioneering the 'public opinion poll', but we should be clear about what is meant when we use 
the term 'public opinion’. Early public opinion scholars, like George Gallup and Elmo Roper, 
understood that the “public” was comprised of nothing more than a group of individuals with 
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varied opinions and ideas (Zaller, 1992). These scholars used an approach whereby attitudinal 
data was gathered from a systematic sample of a pre-defined population (Groves, 2011; 
Wilson, 2013). In addition to this central innovation on sampling, the other key features of his 
approach were: (i) the employment standardised “closed” questions to measure subjective 
attitudes of respondents; (ii) interviewing respondents face-to-face; (iii) using trained 
interviewers; and (iv) utilising quantitative analysis to understand respondents’ answers. 
Cognitive psychological theories of comprehension, memory and processing were applied to 
question wording and questionnaire construction (for an overview, see Sudman et al., 2010). 
The pioneering work by Gallup, Roper and others cemented the public opinion survey as an 
important and powerful research tool for scholars and academics by the 1960s.  
 
The modern public opinion research movement had an important impact on the study of 
intergroup relations. But opinion surveys are expensive, technically complex and logistically 
difficult. For most of the 20
th
 century, the kind of inclusive mass public opinion surveys 
envisioned by George Gallup and Elmo Roper were not put into the field in South Africa9. 
But data availability alone was not the reason that many scholars in South Africa discounted 
public opinion surveys as a tool of study. The succeeding subsection will discuss some of the 
reasons why South African academia did not favour the public opinion survey as a research 
tool.  
 
2.2.5 Criticism of Public Opinion Research in South Africa  
Surveys of the mass population were conducted in South Africa at various points in the 20
th
 
century. Most were either household surveys used to gather data on occasional production or 
consumption or national censuses.  Christopher’s (2009) work on the country’s national 
censuses shows that white politicians and technocrats in South Africa saw surveys, 
particularly national censuses, as a mechanism to classify and demarcate the non-white 
population. Christopher argues that these attitudes were informed by the racist animus of the 
times and census data were routinely manipulated to meet the political demands of the 
moment (also see Maré, 2011). Within the country’s white population group, some attitudinal 
surveys were conducted. Lever (1974), for example, focused on political and racial attitudes. 
Attitudinal surveys that focused on the non-white population, when they were done, were 
concentrated in a limited geographic area and were not representative of the entire non-white 
population (see, for example, Schlemmer, 1976).  
 
During the 1970s, in South African academia, modernisation theory came under attack from 
proponents of dependency ideas and neo-Marxism. It was alleged that survey research 
methods were steered by modernisation theory and the methodological tool was tarnished 
(Seekings, 2001). During this period, most left-leaning South African academics chiefly 
depended on historical and qualitative methods in their research and were generally hostile to 
research techniques associated with "bourgeois social science" (Jubber, 2006). The idea that 
‘attitudes’ could be measured using surveys was seen at best as a naïve (but invalid) bid to 
imitate physical scientists and at worst crass, culturally inauthentic and reductive (also see 
Mattes, 2013). The very first largescale opinion survey amongst black South Africans was 
conducted by a team of sociologists and political scientists from Germany (Hanf et al., 1981). 
The recommendations of Hanf and his colleagues were used to support the apartheid 
                                                          
9 This stands in contrast to other countries in the Global South like India where a notable 
tradition of opinion research on political attitudes had evolved in the late 1960s (for an 
overview of opinion public research in India, see Kumar and Rai, 2013). 
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government policy of racial segregation. This further discredited the opinion survey as a 
research tool amongst liberal South African academia.  
 
Since the early 1980s, the winds of political liberalisation have warmed the climate for 
survey research in South Africa. The Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), for 
instance, funded a survey that included Coloured and Indian South Africans as well as white 
people in 1982. Although the sample was restricted to residents of what is now the Gauteng 
province, the first HSRC opinion survey that included a large Black African sample was 
fielded in 1984 (de Kock et al., 1985). As funding for public opinion surveys became more 
readily available, some researchers welcomed the opportunity to measure public opinion and 
better understand intergroup relations. A number of South African scholars made significant 
advances in how we understand interracial relations in South Africa (for an overview of this 
work, see Seekings, 2001; Bornman, 2011; Mattes, 2013). Public opinion scholars who 
focused on international migration and migrants did not have the same impact on South 
African academia, however. 
 
Research that employs attitudinal surveys still faces opposition in some quarters of South 
African academia. In the early 2000s, Gouws and Gibson argue that there is a prevalent “bias 
against the supposedly ‘positivist’ study of attitudes, under the mistaken assumption that 
these types of studies are ignorant of human complexity and context” (cited in Seekings, 
2001: 5). Writing more than ten years later, Mattes (2013) contended that this bias continues 
and complained that systematic public opinion survey research is not taught widely at South 
African universities. He highlighted that there was an invasive lack of training in the basic 
logic of systematic empirical research methodology in the disciplines of sociology and 
political science in the country. Of course, critiques of positivist research methods in the 
social science are not a purely South African phenomenon10. However, an anti-positivist bias 
seems particularly strong in the country’s social sciences.  
 
Researchers seeking to understand xenophobia in the country tended to favour qualitative 
research methodologies (see, for example, Nyamnjoh, 2006; Dodson, 2010; Landau, 2010; 
Neocosmos, 2010; von Holdt et al., 2011; Matsinhe, 2011). Scholars like Francis Nyamnjoh 
and Michael Neocosmos, using the methodological and theoretical guidelines of Frantz 
Fanon and Alain Badiou, have led the field in this area. Funding for researchers studying 
xenophobia in South Africa has tended to flow through independent research organisations, 
like the African Centre for Migration and Society and the Society Work and Development 
Institute, which favour case study research. These academic investigations tend to be 
dominated not so much by an attempt to understand attitudes, but by efforts to understand 
collective violence motivated by xenophobia. This trend has gone so far that a number of 
studies frame xenophobia almost exclusively in terms of collective violence (see, for 
instance, Hassim et al., 2009). This has led to a number of digressions about whether the 
motivations behind certain incidences of mass violence can be classified as ‘xenophobic’, 
racism, ‘Afrophobia’ or anti-outsiderism. 
 
                                                          
10
 For a review of the main anti- positivist arguments made by scholars outside of South 
Africa, see Turner (1993) and Heidtman et al., (2000). For a more indepth critique of public 
opinion polls, see Ginsberg (1993) and Bourdieu (1982). These respected scholars have 
scrutinise the construction and operation of public opinion polls in society, examining the 
some of the problematic assumptions associated with the practice of polling (also see 
Osborne and Rose, 1999). 
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The use of quantitative public opinion data to investigate attitudes towards immigrants and 
immigration in South Africa remains a minority tradition. A few studies (e.g. Dambrun et al., 
2006; Facchini et al., 2013) have explored the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment in 
the country using public opinion data. But the existing literature neglects many important 
areas, such as the influence of important group identity variables (like racial alienation or 
patriotism) on attitudes towards international migrants. The limited nature of the work on 
anti-immigrant sentiment has, for instance, prevented us from understanding if the theoretical 
and empirical insights obtained from studies in other geographical contexts are valid in South 
Africa. As a result, significant gaps in the scholarship have emerged that impair our 
understanding of how attitudes towards immigrants form in the post-apartheid nation. This is 
unfortunate given that, unlike many other African countries, there is widespread public 
opinion data on attitudes towards immigrants in the country. 
 
2.3 How Do Attitudes Form?   
 
Accepting the importance of attitudes, we need to ask ourselves how attitudes form. The 
South African government has tended to endorse the view that negative attitudes towards 
immigrants in the country are the product of economic competition. The government’s Inter-
Ministerial Committee on Migration, for example, cited socio-economic conditions as 
significant drivers of hostility towards foreigners in their final report (EyeWitness News, 
11/11/2015). Traditionally, after an episode of collective anti-immigrant violence, left-
leaning academics and civil society leaders have linked hostility towards international 
migrants amongst the South African public with poverty and unemployment. The pro-poor 
explanations presented in the media following the May 2008 attacks, for instance, generally 
adhered to this line of thinking (Sandwith, 2010). These explanations told a story of ordinary 
law-abiding South Africans who suddenly turned violent and hateful under conditions of 
extreme economic stress11. These explanations tended to be accompanied by the language and 
images of economic crisis and failure and often serve as critiques of the country’s 
contemporary capitalist society.  
 
How attitudes form remains a subject of expanding debate as researchers incorporate 
knowledge from related fields (such as social cognition) into their theoretical models. Public 
opinion theorists, like Zaller (1992), Sears (1993) and Wilson (2013), tend to favour reasons 
other than economic self-interest in explaining the formation of attitudes. These scholars, of 
course, do not argue that economic characteristics play no role in driving attitudes towards a 
particular object. But scholarly interest has been moving away from material self-interest as a 
prime driver of attitudes and has focused more on non-economic drivers in recent decades. 
Growing emphasis has been placed on social identity and societal interest. These trends serve 
to remind us of the complexity of trying to understand how attitudes form. 
 
                                                          
11 There is a tendency amongst Neo-Marxist scholars seeking to explain xenophobia and 
xenophobic violence in South Africa in terms of material economic dispossession. In a 
review of this argument, Crush and Ramachandran (2014) argue that these scholars seek an 
economic justification for xenophobic violence in the country. These scholars identify 
structural economic inequalities, under the propagation of economic neo-liberalism, as the 
main causes of xenophobia in South Africa. The authors label this argument as ‘xenophobia 
minimalism’. For Crush and Ramachandran, ‘xenophobia minimalism’ legitimates the idea 
that the presence of migrants and refugees constitutes an enduring threat to alleged 
autochthons. 
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This section will provide a brief review of the existing literature with the aim of identifying a 
few key trends in the expanding debate. I will discuss the most relevant literature on self-
interest as a driver of attitudes, as well as the possible alternative drivers which include: (i) 
information, (ii) symbols and values; and (iii) collective identity. Given the volume of 
literature that has been published on these subjects, and the space available, the chapter is 
highly selective in the works that are discussed and cited. This section focused on those 
works which were perceived to be important for the development of the field and which had 
the most relevance for the dissertation’s topic.  
 
2.3.1 Information, Memory and Heuristics 
One of the most important factors driving the formation of attitudes is information. Indeed, 
attitudes have been categorised as knowledge structures or what Kruglanski (1989: 139) 
called "a special type of knowledge, notably knowledge of which content is evaluative or 
affective".  For Kruglanski, attitudes are represented in memory as associative networks of 
interrelated beliefs and evaluations. Attitudes in the present are formed using information 
stored in memory. The ease with which information can be retrieved from memory should, 
therefore, influence attitudes (also see Fazio, 1990). In the attitudinal literature, one of the 
oldest theses is that individuals find information supporting their preconceived attitudes 
easier to absorb and memorise than information challenging their predetermined attitudes 
(Eagly and Chaiken, 1993). Studies investigating preferential recall of attitude-consistent 
information have shown this thesis to be largely valid (Pratkanis and Greenwald, 1989).  
 
Consider the following example of how information may inform attitudes. In early October 
2015, rumours began spreading that an “Arab man with a beard” was responsible for a series 
of murders in the Eastern Cape town of Grahamstown. In a press statement, the Unemployed 
People’s Movement discussed the rumours:  
“…[people] have said that all the bodies were mutilated‚ that more bodies have been 
found and have blamed the murders on a shopkeeper from Pakistan. It was rumoured 
that body parts were being stored in his fridge” (TIMES Live, 24/10/2015).   
Processing this information about a ‘murderous foreigner’, some individuals may begin to 
form negative attitudes towards international migrants in Grahamstown. This seemed to be 
how the situation played out, and the rumours appeared to heighten prejudices amongst local 
communities against foreign Muslim shopkeepers, including those from Bangladesh‚ 
Ethiopia and Somalia. On October 16
th
 2015, people began looting shops owned by Muslim 
foreigners (although the violence soon spread to all foreign-owned shops). 
 
Accepting memory as an important part of attitude formation, we should remember that 
memory is not merely an individual affair but is socially structured. Memories can also be 
collective, containing representations of group experiences –whether that ‘group’ be 
subnational, national or other. A number of scholars, like Halbwachs (1992) the founding 
father of collective memory analysis, have documented how representations of the past are 
selectively organised and deployed (though often not entirely invented) to serve the interests 
of present-day elites. But a growing body of public opinion research has revealed that 
ordinary people (non-elites) also selectively represent their groups’ shared pasts (e.g. 
Schwartz and Schuman, 2005; Griffin and Bollen, 2009). These studies have shown that 
ordinary individuals may remember their groups’ collective past in ways that are distinctly 
different from elite or even official representations. Moreover, these studies suggest that 
individuals may use their memories of groups’ collective past in assembling their present-day 
attitudes. 
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To better comprehend how people use information to formulate attitudes, public opinion 
scholars have borrowed the psychological concept of ‘schema’. This adoption, in the 1980s, 
revolutionised how we understand the relationship between information and attitude 
formation (Pratkanis and Greenwald, 1989; Fiske and Taylor, 1991). Schemas are basically 
cognitive structures of attitudes and their relationships to others. Schema theorists propose 
that opinions are structured by cognitive frameworks of knowledge about a group, an event, a 
person or an abstract concept, which include both knowledge of concept and associations to 
related concepts. Pratkanis and Greenwald (1989) argue that attitudes provide simple 
strategies for problem-solving, organising memory for events, and sustaining a positive self-
image (also see Sudman et al., 2010). Attitudes were, in other words, cognitive 
representations of evaluations which play a central role in helping individuals comprehend 
their social world. This social-cognitive approach acknowledges that individuals are under a 
constant barrage with new stimuli entering the brains from moment to moment. 
 
In as much as we use schemas to help efficiently organise our attitudes, often people have 
limited information about a subject. Sniderman et al. (1993), using sophisticated experiments, 
found that people make sense of the world using heuristics (or mental cues and shortcuts). 
Instead of engaging in exhaustive attention to and processing of information, individuals used 
cognitive heuristics to categorise the limited information accessible to them and simplify 
attitude formation (also see Fiske and Taylor, 1991; Petty et al., 1997). Cognitive heuristics 
are especially used when individuals are asked to frame attitudes towards complex policy 
issues. Cognitive heuristics can include general assumptions about human nature or political 
predisposition or even elite clues (Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000).  By using these cognitive 
heuristics, individuals can form attitudes that are ‘rational’ in the sense that these attitudes are 
internally consistent. This, as Sniderman et al. (1993) argued, is a very limited conception of 
rationality as it ignores any deeper rationality requirements for the content of attitudes. 
 
2.3.2 The Assumed Power of Self-Interest  
For much of the 1950s and the 1960s, public opinion scholars tended to view attitude 
formation through the prism of self-interest. The Rational Choice school of thought was 
introduced into attitudinal analysis by Anthony Downs in his pivotal work An Economic 
Theory of Democracy (1957). His economistic perspective essentially argues that the 
individual approaches opinion formation as a cost-benefit analysis. Rational choice theorists 
tend to give materialistic motives a superordinate role in attitude formation. To put it another 
way, a desire to acquire material wealth and prosperity is thought to have a powerful impact 
on attitude formation. In stressing self-interest as the dominant human motive, we are 
building on the philosophical work of Thomas Hobbes as well as the neo-classical 
economists (Mansbridge, 1990). During the 1950-1990 period, given its simplicity and its 
ostensible explanatory power, this rational materialistic model appealed to many in academia. 
Completing his review of the attitudinal literature on self-interest, Sears and Funk (1991: 3) 
argued that it was “not unfair to say” that the leading modern psychological theories of 
motivation have been essentially egoistic and hedonistic. 
 
In those societies and nations where ideologies of individualism have distinct political 
support and funding, the assumption that self-interest is a prime motivator tends to have wide 
currency. Tracing the rise of the idea from its roots in Greek civic life, Mansbridge (1990) 
shows the continuous use of self-interest to understand political life in Western Europe and 
(later) North America. In the last thirty years, however, a growing amount of the social 
science research on public opinion had demonstrated the inadequacy of self-interest in 
explaining attitude formation. Sears and Funk (1990; 1991), for example, have shown that 
P a g e  | 21 
 
self-interest is only a weak determinant of attitudes. Later case study research by Miller and 
Ratner (1996; 1998) only replicated this general finding. However, what was interesting 
about the work of Miller and Ratner (1998) was how their research participants used self-
interest to predict the actions of others. For example, participants who thought women had a 
greater vested interest than men in a hypothetical medical plan expected women to have more 
positive attitudes toward the plan. It appears that both experts and ordinary people over-
exaggerate the power of self-interest in predicting attitude formation. 
 
There are several reasons why scholars have assumed that self-interest drives attitude 
formation. The first is hedonic –for egoistic reasons, individuals’ attitudes should be highly 
responsive to those emotions (e.g. fear, pleasure etc.) that affect them most intensely. The 
second is accessibility –we assume that self-constructs are principally more accessible than 
any other social constructs. In effect, we assume that the ‘self’ functions as a background 
setting against which new information is interpreted. The ‘self’ is distinctly salient for any 
individual and can, therefore, function as a reference-point against which an individual can 
evaluate attitude ‘objects’ (for further discussion, see Higgins and Bargh, 1987).  Finally, we 
assume that direct personal experience with an attitude object has a potent effect on the 
individual. Moreover, direct experience provides an individual with more information about 
the object, making the attitude more salient and, therefore, more likely to provoke a 
behavioural response.  
 
One of the major theorems that have developed based on direct personal experience was 
‘Group Threat Theory’ developed by Blalock (1967). In his research, Blalock found that the 
size of an outgroup affected the ingroup’s evaluations of that outgroup. In other words, the 
ingroup’s attitudes were a ‘rational’ reaction to the size of the threat posed by the outgroup. 
Another major theorem to emerge from direct personal experience was 'Contact Theory' 
developed by Gordon Allport (1954). According to this theorem, contact between groups 
generally fosters more favourable intergroup attitudes12. However, Allport’s original 
formulation outlined four basic conditions for successful intergroup contact: (i) equal status, 
(ii) cooperation, (iii) similar goals, and (iv) official endorsement. Determining which of these 
conditions is essential rather than simply significant remains a topic of debate (for example, 
see Pettigrew, 1998b; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Hewstone and Swart, 2011). In a wide-
ranging review, McGuire (1985) argued that direct experience (e.g. contact with people) does 
have robust effects on attitude formation. 
 
2.3.3 Symbols, Values and Ambivalence  
Writing about race in the 1960s, scholars of public opinion adopted the economic perspective 
of rational self-interest and assumed that citizen attitudes towards race ‘issues’ (such as racial 
                                                          
12 I must, as Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) do, acknowledge that it is often not possible to 
discern the direction of causal processes of this relationship. Individuals may deliberately 
avoid contact with groups they associate with social ills, like crime or disease. In other words, 
contact may reduce prejudice (i.e. contact effects) but prejudice may also reduce contact (i.e. 
prejudice effects). A number of studies have used longitudinal data to establish the direction 
of a particular contact-prejudice relationship. Path analyses by Binder et al., (2009), for 
example, produced both lagged contact effects and prejudice effects (see Christ and Wagner 
2012 on the causation problem and methodological issues in longitudinal research). The 
central thesis of Allport’s ‘'Contact Theory’, nonetheless, remains valid as long as 
manipulated contact can be shown to affect attitudes (as it has been done in a number of 
studies, see Hewstone and Swart, 2011). 
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segregation or affirmative action) were determined by their own self-interest. In the late 
1970s, one group of researchers led by David Sears (1993) refuted these assumptions using 
the psychological model of “symbolic politics”. Sears and his colleagues argued that 
individuals’ attitudes to race issues were shaped by "symbolic predispositions" (such as 
nationalism or racism). Sear et al. (1979) suggest that these predispositions tend to develop 
and solidify by the end of early adulthood (although such predispositions are not entirely 
unalterable). Consequently, they are not responsive to the impulses of adult material self-
interests and research work has shown this to be the case (for an overview, see Sears and 
Funk, 1991). For the symbolic theorists, policy issues evoke longstanding affective responses 
that defeat an apparently rational, self-interested, cost-benefit analysis. The notion of 
symbolic politics, in other words, is that symbols activate core predispositions reflexively 
(Sniderman et al., 1993).  
 
More informed individuals are not more influenced by self-interest than the less informed. 
The symbolic racism thesis put forward by Sears (1993) above is one example of how 
attitude formation is explained by the influence of political culture on identity boundaries. As 
research by Sears et al. (1979) suggests, high-information individuals are even more affected 
by symbolic predispositions than by self-interest. Following their research in the late 1970s, 
other studies have found that symbolic predispositions have a far stronger effect on the well-
informed and the influence of self-interest is not heightened by greater information 
(Sniderman et al., 1993). Zaller (1991: 1215) contends that public opinion is a “marriage of 
information and values” —information to produce a mental image of what is at stake and 
values to make a decision about it. A citizen who strongly values humanitarianism, for 
example, is more likely to approve of social welfare policies than a person who values 
individualism (also see Zaller, 1992). Importantly, the influence of an individual's value 
predispositions will be contingent on whether the individual holds the relevant information 
required to translate their values into an evaluation of a particular object, person or policy. 
 
Symbols can be similar to values but are not the same –when public opinion scholars use the 
term values, they are talking about something distinct. Values are usually theorised in public 
opinion scholarship as higher-order evaluative standards, denoting desirable means and ends 
of action and, therefore, serve as ‘abstract standards’ (Rokeach, 1968). A functionalist 
approach suggests that values satisfy psychological needs for the individual because they can 
be used to evaluate specific objects, individuals and policies (Fazio, 1990; Ajzen and 
Fishbein, 2000). Research by Alvarez and Brehm (2002) found that individuals hold a 
number of core values that they rely upon when answering questions on an opinion poll. In 
their book, Alvarez and Brehm (2002: 18) state:  
“The utility of values for the survey respondent arises from the economy of a 
generalised standard that can be used in a wide-ranging set of political domains. Instead 
of maintaining separate political attitudes over diverse questions, respondents need only 
assess the relevance of the questions to a relatively limited set of core values”.  
Hence, work by Alvarex and Brehm (2002) suggests that respondents do not express as much 
ambivalence as may be imagined when answering survey questions. The symbolic racism 
thesis put forward by Sears and his colleagues is just one example of how attitude formation 
is explained by the influence of individual values and suggests the importance of group or 
collective identity.  
 
Adherence to a group identity can help explain attitude formation on a range of issues. For 
instance, Kinder and Sears (1985), in Public Opinion and Political Action, inspected the lack 
of issue consistency in American public opinion and found that group attachments predicted 
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individuals’ political support. Symbolic politics often relate to the social identity of the 
individual. Here personal identity must be separated from social identity –an individual’s 
identity is made up of an assortment of different attributes. Social identity, on the other hand, 
denotes the social categories or components of the self-concept that individuals shared with 
others in their group and define individuals as being similar to others in their group (Brewer 
and Gardner, 1996). Social psychologists have used the concept of identity in their studies of 
behaviour, arguing that group identity strongly influences the attitudes and behaviour of an 
individual (Tajfel, 1981). For the social theorists, social comparison, social identification and 
self-esteem maintenance are important factors driving attitude formation (also see Brown, 
2000).  
 
2.3.4 The Collective Dimension  
Many studies, as discussed in subsection 2.3.2, have been concerned with citizens’ individual 
material self-interest when studying intergroup relations and prejudice. However, individuals 
may consider the interests of others when forming their attitudes towards a particular group 
or when judging a specific policy proposal. According to Brewer and Gardner (1996), there 
are two basic social motives other than self-interest: (i) motives for another's benefit; and/or 
(ii) for the collective welfare.  In explaining collective interests in public opinion formation, 
Funk (2000) uses the term ‘societal interest’ to refer to an orientation towards the collective 
welfare of all. Of course, an individual's perspective on what constitutes the ‘collective’ will 
be subjective. The collective can be thought of as a fluid group boundary that can vary 
depending on the situational context of the individual (Tajfel, 1981). In other words, the 
collective may be a neighbourhood, a racial group or the whole nation.  
 
Attachment to an ingroup can include the belief that the ingroup is superior and its members 
should be in a superordinate position with others.  Festinger’s (1954) theory of social 
comparison and Merton’s (1968) research on reference groups are prominent attempts to 
understand how ingroup versus outgroup considerations influence attitudes. Influential social 
identity theorists seem to imply a connection between ingroup attachments and attitude 
formations (Tajfel and Turner, 1979; Tajfel, 1981). The social psychological approach to 
identity considers prejudice to be the result of individuals' categorisation of the world into 
ingroups and outgroups. But other scholars, such as Allport (1954), argue that ingroup 
favouritism can be correlated with a full range of different attitudes toward outgroups –
everything from hatred to tolerance (also see Brown, 2000). The work of the social identity 
theorists underpins a large degree of the scholarly work on how attitudes towards outgroups 
form13.  
 
To understand what societal interest may look like in practice, consider a speech given in 
South Africa by the isiZulu King Goodwill Zwelithini on the 23
rd
 of March 2015. In a public 
address in the small town of Pongola, the isiZulu King allegedly said that foreigners were 
changing the nature of South African society. In other words, negatively affecting an ingroup 
(i.e. South African nationals) that the King felt strongly attached to. Speaking on the subject 
of moral regeneration, King Zwelithini reportedly urged “all foreigners to pack their bags and 
                                                          
13 One of the most important forms of social identity arises from an attachment to national 
identity, for instance. A love of one’s country has, under certain circumstances, been shown 
to promote prejudice against foreigners (see, for example, de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003; 
Raijman et al., 2008; Pehrson et al., 2009). 
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leave”14. The President’s son Edward Zuma expressed strong agreement with the sentiment 
“all foreigners must go” in a press interview a few days later (News24, 01/04/2015). In the 
interview, Edward Zuma warned that the country was sitting on a “ticking time bomb” 
because foreigners were taking over South Africa. Both the King and the President’s son 
appear to be expressing their concern for the collective rather than their own personal 
position.   
 
Societal interest implies a commitment to considering the interests of the collective when 
evaluating an attitude object.  A robust finding from the public opinion literature on political 
attitudes is that voters rely on what Kinder and Kiewiet (1979) call “sociotropic" concerns 
(i.e. appraisals of national-level conditions) when making political judgements (see, for 
example, Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). Mutz and Mondak (1997) advance the concept 
of “sociotropic justice” to denote how individuals evaluate not fairness to themselves, but 
rather fairness to their group (e.g. their race group or national group). Some have criticised an 
emphasis on societal interest as a factor in the formation of attitudes, calling it self-interest in 
disguise (Mansbridge, 1990). Rational choice theory suggests that citizens consider the 
welfare of others only to the degree that the welfare of others benefits their own self-interest.  
 
Public opinion research into self-interest and societal interest suggests that many individuals 
are willing to sacrifice self-interest for the benefit of the collective.  Laboratory experiments 
have demonstrated that priming group identity can provoke self-sacrificing behaviour from 
participants to the extent that the participants restrict self-interest in the name of the collective 
good (Brewer and Kramer, 1986). Funk (2000) shows that a commitment to societal interest 
drives individuals’ evaluations on a variety of policy positions and can motivate policy 
attitudes (also see Funk, 1998; Mutz and Mondak, 1997). In their evaluations, citizens appear 
able to distinguish between private and public concerns. The tendency to rely on public-level 
considerations in political judgments may be explained by cognitive processes that lead to the 
"morselisation" of private and public experience (Sears and Funk, 1991). Civic norms that 
inspire citizens to evaluate political issues in terms of the collective good may also be a 
contributing factor. 
  
                                                          
14 Some have called King Goodwill Zwelithini’s speech xenophobic. Police Minister Nathi 
Nhleko sought to defend King Goodwill Zwelithini. The Minister said that the isiZulu 
monarch had in fact been urging the government to deport undocumented immigrants and 
had not been inciting xenophobia (News24, 19/04/2015). He said that he was present during 
the king’s speech in Pongola and that Goodwill Zwelithini had only bemoaned the fact that 
there were too many immigrants living in the country. The Minister explained that there was 
no isiZulu word that would accurately translate as ‘deportation’, saying the only manner in 
which ‘deportation’ could be articulated would be “Mabahambe [They must go]" or 
"Mababuyele ekhaya lababantu [These people must go back home]".  




Each of the papers presented in this dissertation uses quantitative research methods to 
understand attitudes in post-apartheid South Africa. The main task of each paper is to 
weigh the validity of micro-sociological drivers of public attitudes towards 
international immigration and migrants. The dataset used in these papers is the South 
African Social Attitudes Survey. A detailed discussion of this dataset is presented in 
this chapter. Particular attention is paid to sample design, data quality and the survey’s 
ethical considerations. In addition, the limitations of the dataset used will be sketched 
out with regards to the general limitations of quantitative research approaches. 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 
The review provided by the previous chapter has shown that attitudes should be considered 
worthy of academic analysis.  Attitudes have an important effect on both behaviour and 
public policy and should, consequently, be quantified and measured. Researchers believe that 
one of the best ways to measure attitudes is through public opinion surveys and by examining 
data quantitatively we can better understand how attitudes form. Taking a pragmatic 
approach to research methods requires trying to figure out what kinds of questions are best 
answered using quantitative public opinion surveys, as opposed to other methods (like focus 
groups or indepth interviews). In my opinion, the research questions outlined in the first 
chapter of this thesis are best answered by the use of a quantitative methodology. 
 
The ultimate goal of my research is to generalise the “truth” found in this study to the adult 
population in South Africa. Pursuing such a goal requires using a dataset that can effectively 
represent that population. In other words, it is very important to select the right dataset. The 
dataset used in this study will be presented in each of the empirical chapters. However, due to 
constraints of word count imposed by the publications in which these chapters were 
published, it was not possible to provide a comprehensive discussion of the dataset in the 
empirical chapters. This chapter will present a more detailed discussion of the dataset used in 
this study, highlighting the limitations of the dataset used. Many of the limitations 
highlighted are intrinsic to the nature of public opinion polling and not the dataset itself.  
 
This study used secondary attitudinal data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey 
(SASAS) which is administered by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC). Designed 
as a time series, SASAS has been conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003. I received 
ethical clearance from the University of KwaZulu-Natal to conduct my research using this 
data –the protocol reference number is HSS/1135/013D. In the spirit of full disclosure, I must 
acknowledge my role as a junior member of the management team of SASAS. The remainder 
of this section will provide an outline of this dataset, focusing on the following on the 
essential aspects of the dataset.  
 
3.2 The Sample Design 
 
In the social sciences one of the greatest obstacles to valid inference, perhaps the greatest, is 
selection bias (King et al. 1994). This is one of the largest barriers to inference in qualitative 
research. As discussed in the previous chapter, the random sample is a method for eliminating 
bias in a quantitative methodology. The survey design of SASAS handles selection bias in 
two ways: (i) the respondent does not self-select to enter the survey; and (ii) the interviewers 
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are given meticulous instructions as to whom they should enter the survey. In this way, 
SASAS has been constructed to produce a nationally representative sample of adult 
individuals living in South Africa in households geographically distributed throughout the 
country’s nine provinces. SASAS is not perfectly representative of all adult South Africa but 
nevertheless offers a better cross-section of the adult population than would almost any other 
approach.  
 
SASAS is an adult survey and ‘adults’ are defined here as individuals aged 16 and older (with 
no upper age limit). The sampling frame employed here was founded on the most relevant 
national census and a set of small area layers (SALs).  Estimates of the population numbers 
for a number of categories of the census variables were acquired per SAL. In this sampling 
frame, special institutions (e.g. military camps, hospitals, schools and university hostels, old 
age homes), industrial areas, recreational areas and vacant SALs were omitted before drawing 
of the sample. The rest of this subsection will provide a description of how the individual 
SALs were selected and then how the respondents within those SALs were chosen.  
 
Figure 3.1: An Example of the Map of the 500 selected Enumeration Areas in 2013 
 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 
 
A complex sample design was employed to draw the sample which encompassed 
stratification and multi-stage sampling procedures. The explicit stratification variables used 
in the sample were SALs which were employed as primary sampling units. The estimated 
number of dwelling units (taken as visiting points) in the SALs was the secondary sampling 
units. In the first stage of the sampling procedure, the primary sampling units (i.e. the SALs) 
were selected with probability proportional to size. Here the estimated number of dwelling 
units in an SAL was used as a measure of size. As secondary sampling units, the dwelling 
units were delineated as separate (non-vacant) residential stands, flats, structures, 
homesteads, and so on. In the second stage of the sampling procedure, a pre-set number of 
individual dwelling units (or visiting points) were selected with equal probability in each of 
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the selected dwelling units. Lastly, in the third stage of the sampling procedure, an individual 
was selected with equal probability from all persons 16 years and older in the chosen 
dwelling units. Figure 3.1 provides the graphical representation of the location of the 500 
selected SALs in SASAS 2013 as an example. 
 
Province, geographic type and majority population group were employed as distinct 
stratification variables for the sample.  The allotted number of primary sampling units (which 
could vary between different strata), within each stratum, was selected using proportional to 
size probability sampling with the estimated number of dwelling units in the primary 
sampling units as an indicator of size.  Seven dwelling units were selected in each of these 
drawn primary sampling units. A list of the 500 drawn SALs were given to geographic 
information specialists and maps were then generated for each of the 500 areas (indicating 
clear navigational beacons such as churches, schools, roads etc.). Before fieldworkers started 
the interviewing process, supervisors were instructed to visit the local police stations, 
indunas, traditional leaders or relevant authorities in the specific SAL (such as the one in 
Figure 3.2). This was done to ensure that the authorities were aware of the survey and to 
notify the communities of the survey’s intent. 
 
Figure 3.2: An Example of an SAL Map used to Assist the Fieldwork Teams 
 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 
 
Fieldworkers were advised that commercial farms, in particular, should be treated with 
caution and that they should visit the local Agri South Africa offices before entering 
commercial farms. Official letters were distributed to the authorities, outlining the project’s 
purpose, its duration and the appropriate ethical issues. This procedure was followed, not 
only as part of the HSRC’s research and ethical protocol but also to guarantee the safety of 
the fieldwork teams. After fieldwork team arrived in the SAL and notified the local 
authorities of the survey, supervisors had to identify the selected households. Once these 
households had been identified, a household member was selected as the survey respondent. 
This household member (respondent) needed to be an adult (i.e. 16 years or older). The 
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household member was selected randomly –to do this the fieldworker employed the KISH 
grid to randomly select the household member (see Kish, 1994).  
 
3.3 Data Weighting  
 
To take account of the unavoidable reality that not all respondents selected in the survey had 
the same probability of being chosen by fieldworkers, the data was weighted. The weighting 
procedure had three distinct stages: (i) visiting point (address); (ii) household; and (iii) 
individual. The procedure was designed to mirror the relative selection probabilities of the 
individual at the main phases of selection.  In order to guarantee representativity of smaller 
groups (such as Indian South Africans), special weights needed to be applied.  Person and 
household weights are benchmarked using a variety of different variables. The marginal 
totals for the benchmark variables were attained from the relevant population estimates 
published by Statistics South Africa. In other words, the estimated South African population 
is used as the target population. 
 
3.4 Questioning Respondents  
 
Respondents were asked to complete a questionnaire consisting of about three hundred 
questions. In order for the survey to be an appropriate instrument for social scientists, the 
questionnaire is translated into the country’s major languages –namely isiZulu, isiXhosa, 
Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Setswana and Afrikaans.  People speaking any of the official languages 
in South Africa should be able to complete the SASAS questionnaire. Fieldworkers were 
provided with hard copies of the translated templates to safeguard consistency of translations 
for the country’s various official languages. All translations are overseen by a steering 
committee which works with translators to ensure comparability across all versions of the 
questionnaire. This procedure affords the survey the ability to efficiently collect information 
on attitudes and behaviours across the post-apartheid nation’s varied multi-cultural 
communities.  
 
It is important to be aware of the limitation of using a questionnaire like the one employed by 
SASAS. Anti-positivists will argue that opinion surveys rely on a ‘reality’ that can be 
observed objectively. For ardent anti-positivists, all truth is relative and cannot be enumerated 
as the positivists seek to do (Turner, 1993; Heidtman et al., 2000). I recognise that the 
researcher cannot be totally objective and impartial and there is a degree of researcher 
imposition to all surveys of this type. When developing the SASAS questionnaire, the 
SASAS researchers were making their own assumptions and judgments about what is and is 
not salient to the research objective. Academic proponents of explorative sociology will 
contend that such an approach will result in the researcher eschewing everyday experience 
from the explanation of positivist evidence. Of chasing validation of what has already been 
assumed to be ‘true’.  
 
SASAS questionnaire instruments are mostly composed of items constructed by researchers 
that allow respondents to choose between predefined options. In other words, gathering 
limited information from respondents without explanation. The SASAS respondent is 
constrained by which questions to ask, and how the question and responses options are 
framed. The standardisation of SASAS response options may, consequently, hide nuance and 
detail in a respondents’ answer. Moreover, there is no mechanism to tell how much thought 
and honesty a respondent in SASAS has put in when answering the questionnaire. The 
validity of treating respondents’ answers to questions as ‘true’ pre-existing views —what 
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could be thought of ontological valid opinions –is key assumption on the part of this study. 
As a result, the question of validity is presented when considering representations of the 
public opinion gathered using questionnaires of this sort.  
 
A key phenomenologist argument is that quantitative public opinion research produces 
‘opinions’ which are merely synthetic constructs. Writing in the 1970s, Pierre Bourdieu 
(1993: 150) said that: 
[The opinion poll’s] most important function is to impose the illusion that there is 
something called public opinion in the sense of the purely arithmetical total of 
individual opinions; to impose the illusion that it is meaningful to speak of the average 
of opinions or the average opinion”.  
Bourdieu did not dismiss the gathering of mass attitudes but rather argued for the need to 
acknowledge the ‘constructed’ nature of opinion polls (also see Ginsberg 1982; Osborne and 
Rose 1999). But a pessimistic interpretation of survey research would envision such research 
as recreating a widely disseminated set of possibilities and set limits to what can be ‘known’ 
in the objective world. Such an interpretation implies that users of surveys are trapped in a 
hegemonically sanctioned version of reality. 
 
3.5 Quality Control 
 
The SASAS research team conducted a conscientious quality control effort. SASAS 
researchers physically completed random visits to selected SALs to guarantee that 
fieldworkers had followed ethical research practices required by the survey. These 
researchers checked that the fieldworkers had appropriately identified the selected households 
and respondents in the household. In addition, the researchers checked that the appropriate 
procedures were followed in administering the research instrument. Telephonic backchecks 
were also completed with 15% of the drawn sample. A team dedicated to the data-capturing 
function checked that there were no data-capturing errors. The Data Curation Unit (DCU) at 
the HSRC has rigorous data cleaning protocols. Data were checked and corrected –the DCU 
checked for logical consistency, for permitted ranges, for reliability on derived variables and 
for filter instructions. Realisation rates for SASAS are typically above 75% of the drawn 
sample. The high realisation rate observed was attained because communities were well 
informed about the survey as well as the face-to-face data collection methodology employed. 
 
As discussed in the previous section, the SASAS questionnaire is composed of close-ended 
questions and it must be acknowledged that such a format does not allow research 
participants to identify issues and themes in a way that a qualitative format would. Survey 
questions can be understood differently by different respondents but also that the same 
answers can have different explanatory significance. SASAS fieldworkers undergo training 
aimed to ensure that they are able to effectively communicate the question to respondents. In 
addition, all SASAS undergo a period of piloting in which several teams of fieldworkers 
administer the survey in specially chosen SALs. After the teams have finished surveying 
these SALs, reports are given to the management team on how communities understood and 
interpreted the survey questions. Changes to improve the survey instrument are discussed 
based on these reports. 
 
A succession of sociological scholars has highlighted the disadvantages of closed-ended 
questionnaires in public opinion research. There is no denying that opinion surveys have their 
limits but alternative methodologies also have their own drawbacks. Qualitative 
methodologies can generate findings that are weighed down with their own (if not greater) 
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limitations and even bias (King et al., 1994). Standardisation, reliability, and 
representativeness provide surveys with recognised properties that provide valuable and valid 
data for researchers (Zaller, 1992; Eagly and Chaiken, 1993; Wilson 2013). Quantitative 
survey research tools can help researchers in a way that other more qualitative methodologies 
cannot. That is not to suggest that surveys always produce superior data about mass attitudes 
but that survey instruments have value in the academic research of attitudes.  
 
3.6 Ethical Considerations and Consent 
 
The HSRC subscribes to a strict internal Code of Ethics. The study design and research tools 
(questionnaires, consent and assent forms, training manuals, etc.) were approved by the 
HSRC’s Research Ethics Committee. A questionnaire is included in the SASAS field round 
only if the HSRC Ethics Committee has approved it. Fieldworkers had to obtain respondents’ 
consent. Although verbal consent was to be secured from the respondent starting the 
interview, written consent forms had to be signed upon completing an interview. The 
remainder of this subsection will discuss the consent form procedures.  
 
All respondents aged 18 years and older were required to provide written informed consent 
by completing a consent form. This document had six components, it: (i) clarified the purpose 
of the study; (ii) stressed that participation was voluntary; (iii) outlined the expected duration 
of the interview; (iv) summarised how confidentiality of information was to be preserved; (v) 
presented an honest assessment of the risks/discomforts and benefits related to participation 
in the survey; and (vi) provided contact details for the HSRC’s tollfree ethics hotline and 
survey coordinator contacts. All respondents aged 16-18 years were also required to provide 
written informed consent by completing a consent form. But in cases where the selected 
respondent was a minor but still old enough to participate in the survey (i.e. aged 16 or 17 
years) the informed consent process that was respected was that of the HSRC’s Guidelines on 
Research with Orphans and Vulnerable Children. A dual consent process was obligatory, 
both from the minors and the minor’s parent or guardian.  
 
  





In May 2008, anti-immigrant riots in South Africa displaced more than a hundred 
thousand people. Despite the media attention that the riots attracted, there has been no 
study that presents trend data on anti-immigrant sentiment for the period after 2008. 
This paper uses data from the nine rounds of the South African Social Attitudes Survey 
over the period 2003–2012 to fill this gap and test the success of government 
commitments to reduce anti-immigrant prejudice. The results reveal that attempts to 
combat xenophobia have been ineffectual, with anti-immigrant sentiment prevalent and 
widespread in 2012. Afrophobia was observed, with a majority of citizens identifying 
foreign African nationals as the group they least wanted to come and live in South 
Africa. The government is advised to urgently address the alarming and widespread 
pervasiveness of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa. 
 
4.1 Introduction  
 
Since the mass anti-immigrant riots of May 2008 displaced more than a hundred thousand 
people in South Africa15, the prevalence of anti-immigrant sentiment in the country has been 
the subject of extensive debate. The South African government has pledged to fight 
xenophobia and promote tolerance towards foreign nationals. In the aftermath of the May 
riots, then national President Thabo Mbeki addressed the nation, promising to 
“entrench…full acceptance within all our communities of new residents from other 
countries”. His successor, President Jacob Zuma, reiterated the commitment of his 
administration to combating xenophobia on taking office in 2009. However, recent outbreaks 
of xenophobic violence in the country have provoked questions about the effectiveness of 
government efforts to reduce xenophobic sentiment. This paper aims to ascertain the level of 
anti-immigrant attitudes in the country since 2008, using public opinion survey data. Such an 
investigation will shed new light on how effective the government’s anti-xenophobia 
measures have been. I will argue that the South African government has failed to adequately 
prioritise xenophobia as a serious issue.  
 
Academics have made a concerted effort to understand anti-immigrant sentiment in South 
Africa, particularly after the events of May 2008. This article will contribute meaningfully to 
this growing body of knowledge and debate. The results of my investigation will show that 
anti-immigrant attitudes are widespread in South African society. Discussions of xenophobia 
in South Africa, and sub-Saharan Africa more broadly, are often equated with anti-immigrant 
                                                          
15 The riots began on 11 May 2008 when violent attacks began in Alexandra: a township 
north of Johannesburg. The rioting quickly spread to many separate settlements across the 
province of Gauteng before moving to communities across the country (Crush et al., 2008; 
Desai, 2008). During the period of the rioting more than 150,000 people were displaced, 670 
were wounded and 62 people were killed (Hayem, 2013). After, what some criticised as a 
slow reaction, the government moved decisively to quell the violence calling in the national 
army to end the rioting. 
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violence. In this article, I seek to better understand anti-immigrant attitudes rather than anti-
immigrant violence per se. Although xenophobic violence is an important component of any 
study on xenophobia on the African continent, it is important to remember that anti-
immigrant sentiment does not only manifest itself in violent acts and that xenophobia has 
many manifestations. Nor can one assume a simple relationship between xenophobia and 
anti-immigrant violence: hostility towards immigrants does not, in of itself, result in violence. 
 
Explanations of xenophobia have been linked to the economic conditions of South African 
communities and labour market competition (see Desai, 2008; Dodson, 2010; Neocosmos, 
2010 who comment on this trend). This suggests a simple linear relationship between anti-
immigrant prejudice and economic status. Using quantitative public opinion data, I will 
explore the validity of this relationship, arguing that no simple linear association exists. This 
article will contend that anti-immigrant sentiment would be better understood as a political 
discourse rather than a response to economic conditions. Public attitudes towards immigrants 
and the government’s reaction to that anti-immigrant sentiment must be understood as part of 
a political discourse that prioritises indigeneity and promotes a South African exceptionalism. 
 
4.2 The Migrant Population in South Africa 
 
International migration has always been an integral part of the modernisation and 
industrialisation of contemporary South Africa. Such migration dates back to the mid-
nineteenth century when extensive migration systems were created by the colonial state to 
serve the mining and agricultural sectors (for a discussion of these systems, see Arrighi et al., 
2010). These systems (which were further entrenched during the apartheid regime) began to 
break down in the 1980s as the racialised apartheid state itself began to collapse. Following 
the breakdown of the apartheid system, the new democratic government – led by the African 
National Congress (ANC) – discouraged the recruitment of foreign workers in the country 
(Neocosmos, 2010). This decision was made in an effort by the state to protect ‘indigenous’ 
South African labour from foreign competition.  
 
Following the democratic transition, South Africa continued to attract international migrants 
despite a decline in labour recruiting. Based on data on legal migrant movements into the 
post-apartheid nation at legal entry points collected by the South African government, this 
trend was clear to policy-makers (Segatti, 2011a). The number of reported legal entries 
increased in the decades following the transition and continued to grow every year with the 
exception of a mild downturn in 2009 (also see Crush, 2012). Immigrants in South African 
occupy a wide variety of economic spaces – including teachers, doctors, construction workers 
etc. – and mainly reside in the nation’s townships and cities. A significant number of 
migrants have applied for asylum status, and South Africa is currently one of the key asylum-
seeker destinations in the world16. 
                                                          
16 Between 1994 and 2004 there were 150,000 asylum applications received by the South 
African Department of Home Affairs (Crush, 2012: 16). The department is unable to process 
these applications quickly and the state has been slow in the granting of asylum to applicants 
and the refugee determination process is currently characterised by a considerable backlog. 
During the period 1994–2011, only 53,000 applicants were granted refugee status. In the 
period 2008–2012 the number of applications for refugee status increased and in 2009 alone 
there were 220,028 new applications (Crush, 2012: 7). The vast majority of applications were 
from sub-Saharan African countries, particularly Zimbabwe (two-thirds of all applicants in 
2009) which has suffered economic and political turmoil since 2000. 
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The flow of foreign migrants into South Africa seems to have produced substantial debate, 
especially over the size of the migrant population residing in the country. Accurate data on 
this population and human mobility in the country is difficult to obtain (see Landau et al., 
2011 who remark on the difficulties faced by local municipalities in tracking human 
mobility). This is partially a result of ineffective information-gathering systems and partially 
a result of irregular immigration into South Africa. National census data, as well as World 
Bank population data, suggests that the foreign immigrant population in the country may be 
slightly over 2.2 million as of late 2012. Most immigration into the country seems to be from 
sub-Saharan Africa, although immigrants are also increasingly arriving from other parts of 
the Global South including Pakistan, Bangladesh and China. 
 
4.3 Previous Public Opinion Survey Research on Immigration in South Africa 
 
Anti-immigrant sentiment is not limited to South Africa alone. Immigration tends to provoke 
a strong response from the public in many nations, especially in the Global North. A 
significant body of research has been developed to measure and track public opinion on 
immigration and immigrants in Europe and North America (for a review of this work, see 
Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). This scholarship notes that a considerable share of the public 
in the Global North holds anti-immigrant opinions. Attitudinal studies of public opinion 
towards immigrants and immigration, however, are less well understood in the Global South 
(see Lawrence, 2011; Miller, 2012 who remarks on this research gap). In particular, sub-
Saharan Africa is largely ignored, with few public attitudes survey studies available to 
measure trends. This is counter-intuitive, as there are striking similarities between the 
immigration debate in the Global North and South. In international migrant receiving 
countries in the Global South, public debate on immigration is characterised by concerns that 
immigrants cause crime, take jobs from locals and are a burden on already pressured social 
welfare nets. Given the nature of these debates, public opinion research is required in order to 
better understand xenophobic attitudes in the Global South. 
 
Unlike other nations on the continent, there is reliable public opinion data on immigration 
available in South Africa. Through public opinion surveys, the Southern African Migration 
Project (SAMP) has documented anti-immigrant sentiment in the country since the late 
1990s. In 2001 and 2002, SAMP conducted attitudinal surveys on immigration policy and 
perceptions of foreigners among the citizens of Southern Africa (Crush and Pendleton, 2007). 
This research instrument, known as the National Immigration Policy Survey (NIPS), allowed 
the SAMP researchers to measure xenophobic attitudes in the region. Another set of the 
national attitudinal surveys was conducted by SAMP in South Africa in 1997, 1999 and 2006. 
This section reviews the SAMP attitudinal research to discern how the results may shape the 
construction of our understanding of recent trends in South African attitudes towards 
foreigners. 
 
Evidence from the SAMP survey literature suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment is 
widespread in Botswana, Namibia and particularly South Africa. Using 2007 public opinion 
survey data from Pew’s Global Attitudes Project, Miller (2012) noted a similar finding. Crush 
and Pendleton (2007: 64), using the NIPS research instrument, found that in Southern Africa 
citizens tended to exaggerate the number of foreigners residing in their country, and tended to 
view immigration as ‘a problem rather than an opportunity’. In comparison with citizens of 
other nations, South Africans were found to be the most supportive of restrictions on 
immigration (also see Crush et al., 2008). Immigrants, however, are not viewed as a 
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homogenous group by the South African public. To better understand xenophobic opinions in 
South Africa, the 2006 SAMP survey on attitudes towards immigration asked questions about 
foreigners from specific countries. The results indicated that South Africans viewed 
immigrants from the North Americas and Europe more favourably than foreigners from 
Africa. 
 
According to the public opinion data from SAMP on South Africa, a majority of South 
Africans believed that immigrants create unemployment and drain the country’s economic 
resources (Crush and Pendleton, 2007: 71–72; Crush et al., 2008: 29–30). The findings from 
SAMP also revealed, however, that negative attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa cut 
across class, gender and racial lines. Supporting this finding, Du Toit and Kortze (2011: 182–
188) found, using the World Value Survey data, that restrictive immigration attitudes were 
fairly widespread among the country’s different socio-demographic groups. In other words, 
rich and poor, employed and unemployed, black and white, all conveyed similar attitudes. A 
study by Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012) on those factors associated with the wards 
where the 2008 anti-immigrant riots occurred is of interest. Unemployment and absolute 
poverty were not found to play a decisive role, debunking explanations which place emphasis 
purely on such economic characteristics as the drivers of xenophobic violence. 
 
Despite the magnitude of public feeling and the level of xenophobic violence evident, there 
has been little quantitative research on attitudes towards migrants after 2008. Given the 
significant events of the 2007–2011 period, this represents a considerable knowledge gap in 
our understanding of xenophobic attitudes in South Africa. Most studies are qualitative in 
nature, and make subjective judgements on the prevalence of xenophobia from micro-level 
analysis (in her review of the relevant literature, Dodson, 2010 came to a similar conclusion). 
The gap makes it difficult to discern whether the opinions of the South African public 
towards foreigners have altered since 2008. Government anti-xenophobia measures, as well 
as civil society and government condemnation of xenophobia in recent years, may have 
resulted in a decline of anti-immigrant sentiment. This paper will provide insight into how 
attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa may have changed in the years following the 
May 2008 riots. 
 
4.4 Measuring Xenophobia Using Public Opinion Data 
 
To gain a better understanding of changing attitudes towards foreigners, data were used from 
the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) for the period 2003–2012. The survey is 
administered between October and November and has been repeated annually by the Human 
Sciences Research Council since 2003. The survey series is nationally representative of all 
people living in private households in South Africa who are 16 years and older. This 
nationally representative probability sample does not include people living in hospitals, care 
centres, old age homes, orphanages and so on. The realised sample size for the survey in 
terms of respondents averages at around 3000 per year for the period. The implicit 
stratification variable was the enumerator areas from the national census. The data were 
weighted to the mid-year population estimates published by Statistics South Africa. SASAS 
contains detailed information about the socio-economic, demographic and labour force 
characteristics of respondents making the survey ideal for research of this kind. 
 
The survey employs a range of questions designed to capture South African perceptions 
providing indicators with which to better understand and monitor South African attitudes. 
When constructing measures for anti-immigrant sentiment, the question asked consistently  
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Figure 4.1: Attitudes towards Welcoming Immigrants, South Africa, 2003-2012 
 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2003-2012)  
Notes: 1. Data are weighted using the weights specifically designed for SASAS. 
 
Table 4.1: Most Undesirable Immigrant Groups in South Africa, 2003-2012 
Which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa? 
  Nigerians Other Africans Asian Other Can't Choose 
  (%) Std. Err. (%) Std. Err. (%) Std. Err. (%) Std. Err. (%) Std. Err. 
Year 
          2008 21 (1.03) 30 (1.12) 3 (0.44) 11 (0.78) 34 (1.19) 
2009 17 (1.04) 30 (1.19) 4 (0.49) 22 (1.16) 26 (1.18) 
2010 20 (1.08) 32 (1.26) 5 (0.53) 19 (1.06) 23 (1.11) 
2011 22 (1.03) 39 (1.24) 7 (0.63) 16 (0.96) 15 (0.92) 
2012 26 (1.34) 34 (1.37) 9 (0.79) 14 (1.05) 16 (1.04) 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2008-2012)  
Notes: 1. Data are weighted using the weights specifically designed for SASAS.  
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across nine rounds of SASAS was: “Please indicate which of the following statements applies 
to you: I generally welcome to South Africa…(a) All immigrants; (b) Some immigrants; and 
(c) No immigrants”. The first category denotes complete acceptance of immigrants, the 
second more selective acceptance and the third complete rejection. It is possible, using 
responses to this question, to trace patterns of hostility towards foreign migrants over the 
2003–2012 period (Figure 4.1). Beginning in 2008, SASAS also began tracking which 
immigrant group respondents would least want to come and live in the country using the 
open-ended question: “Which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South 
Africa?”, which allows for identification of the most ‘undesirable’ immigrant groups.  
 
In 2003, approximately a third of South Africans expressed the view that they would not 
welcome any immigrants. Another third indicated that they would be receptive to the 
presence of some immigrants, with only 34% willing to welcome all foreign migrants. Such 
sentiments have tended to fluctuate within a relatively narrow range over the nine rounds of 
SASAS conducted between 2003 and 2012 (also see Gordon et al., 2012 in which a version 
of these trends was first discussed). The findings of this study corroborate those of the SAMP 
researchers (see Crush and Pendleton, 2007; Crush et al., 2008). The widespread 
condemnation of the May 2008 violence by government and civil society leaders may be 
responsible for the comparatively low level of anti-immigrant sentiment observed in late 
2008. However, this effect appears to have been short-lived, with the 2009–2012 results 
showing a rapid return to pre-2008 levels. In late 2012, only 27% of the population stated that 
they welcomed all immigrants to South Africa. 
 
The results suggest that many South Africans differentiate between the international migrants 
they want and the migrants they do not. This suggests that the indiscriminate use of the term 
‘immigrant’ in this context is unwise. This argument is not unique to South Africa. In his 
study on British attitudes to migrants from seven different regions, Ford (2011) reviews 
recent sociological research on ethnicity and finds that most studies do not disaggregate 
between immigrant groups and that this is a serious shortcoming on their part. Ford argues, in 
his UK study, that robust differences do exist in how public attitudes are formed about 
different ethnic groups with an emphasis placed on perceived cultural differences between 
immigrant groups and citizens as a key determinant. If the ethnicity of the international 
migrant involved is an important factor in the formation of public sentiment, then this begs 
the question: which foreign immigrant ‘groups’ are particularly undesirable to adult South 
Africans? 
 
Researchers (e.g. Murray, 2003; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Matsinhe, 2011) have noted that anti-
immigrant sentiment in South Africa is directed primarily towards those from other African 
countries, derogatorily referred to as the makwerekwere17. This would suggest that African 
immigrants are the most undesirable in the country and, indeed, the data analysis supports 
this hypothesis. In 2012 more than half (55%) of the nation’s adult population identified 
African immigrants as the most undesirable foreign immigrant group (Table 4.1). Although 
there are regular xenophobic attacks on South Asians and Chinese foreigners in South Africa, 
it is clear that these migrants do not attract the same kind of attention that African migrants 
do. The group most commonly identified by adult South Africans were immigrants from 
                                                          
17 The word is an offensive term for African foreign nationals in South Africa originating 
from onomatopoeic references to the supposedly ‘strange ways’ that the foreign African 
nationals speak (Nyamnjoh, 2006: 39). 
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Nigeria. Interestingly, no other group seems to have elicited the same level of attention, a 
finding that was consistent across the 2008–2012 period18. 
 
4.5 The South African Government Response to Xenophobia 
 
Since its inception, the African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) Monitoring Project has 
evaluated the South African government’s response to xenophobia. The 2011 APRM report 
criticised the South African government’s efforts on combatting xenophobia, indicating little 
or no progress. Criticism was levelled at several of the initiatives that have either not been 
maintained or effectively rolled out. The report suggested that there was even a level of 
denialism on the part of officials. This was not a new revelation and government denialism on 
xenophobia had been featured in a number of academic studies in South Africa (e.g. Desai, 
2008; Landau, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010; Hayem, 2013). Indeed, former President Thabo 
Mbeki’s reaction to the 2008 May attacks19  is perhaps the most eloquent expression of this 
denialism although the current President Jacob Zuma is also somewhat guilty of denialism20. 
 
Given this denialism, it is not surprising that a review of government efforts to reverse 
xenophobic attitudes suggests that the state’s programme of action on the issue has been 
lacklustre. Between 2008 and 2012, the government has held 49 community dialogues to 
encourage social cohesion and combat xenophobia. The country’s Department of Home 
Affairs has established a counter-xenophobia unit and established a communication strategy 
to promote cohesion between foreigners and citizens. The National Development 
                                                          
18 Of those who selected a group when asked about least preferred international migrant 
group, three additional questions were asked. Respondents were queried whether "Thinking 
of the group you just mentioned, how much do you agree or disagree with the following 
statements: (i) The group presents a threat in terms of job opportunities?; (ii) The group 
presents a threat in terms of crime? ; and (iii) The groups presents a threat to my culture and 
lifestyle?" Of those individuals who selected 'Nigerians', three-quarters (74.9%) agreed that 
this group presents a job opportunities threat, nine-tenths (91.6%) agreed that this group 
presented a crime threat and about half (54%) agreed that this group was a threat to their 
culture. This data seems to offer some indication of why some South Africans selected 
‘Nigerians’ as their least preferred group.    
19 In a public address, on 3
rd
 July 2008, then President Thabo Mbeki spoke out against violent 
attacks on foreign nationals. The former President seemed to struggle with the idea that 
xenophobia was widespread and prevalent in his country. During the address he stated that: 
“What happened during those days was not inspired by possessed nationalism, or extreme 
chauvinism, resulting in our communities violently expressing the hitherto unknown 
sentiments of mass and mindless hatred of foreigners – xenophobia… I heard it said 
insistently that my people have turned or become xenophobic… I wondered what the 
accusers knew about my people which I did not know. And this I must also say —none in our 
society has any right to encourage or incite xenophobia by trying to explain naked criminal 
activity by cloaking it in the garb of xenophobia” (cited in Dodson, 2010: 7).  
20 A good example of his approach in this matter is President Jacob Zuma’s statement in a 
2013 debate in the country’s National Assembly: “I think that at times there’s a bit of an 
exaggeration, where people say that xenophobia is a big problem in South Africa. I think that 
is a bit of an exaggeration, although I am not saying it’s not there, because, at times when 
incidents occur, it is seen, particularly when people react. Foreigners are busy everywhere, in 
every corner of this country, and they are employed, and that feeling is not that big” (cited in 
the Parliamentary Monitoring Group, 2013).  
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Commission has proposed countering xenophobia by conducting sustained campaigns, 
although details on how this would be done are negligible. These activities have been 
acknowledged by the 2013 and 2014 APRM reports on South Africa. But given the level of 
anti-immigrant sentiment amongst the country’s adult public, these measures seem 
inadequate and at best circumspect. 
 
In 2012, a National Social Cohesion Summit was held to improve social cohesion in the 
country, and during the two-day event government leaders heard strategic initiatives to 
combat xenophobia in the country. The summit was cited by the APRM reports on South 
Africa as an important part of the government’s efforts to reduce xenophobia. In a media 
statement, the Director of the African Centre for Migration and Society at the University of 
the Witwatersrand Professor Loren Landau stated that anti-foreigner sentiment was evident at 
the 2012 summit, and instead of condemning it, many politicians were passive in their 
response (Mail & Guardian, 03/09/2012). In a later newspaper article, he went further, 
arguing that national discussions about social cohesion and discrimination almost entirely 
exclude questions of ethnicity and immigration (Mail & Guardian, 17/05/2013). 
 
The passivity of the authorities in combatting xenophobia extends to government efforts to 
punish perpetrators of anti-immigrant violence. As noted by Hayem (2013: 89–90), many of 
those arrested for their participation in the May 2008 attacks were released under pressure 
from both community and political leaders, as well as for other reasons. The police have been 
slow to act during other (lesser publicised) incidences of xenophobic violence since 2008 
and, as Landau (2010) argues, an atmosphere of impunity often exists in such cases. 
Recommendations for more stringent anti-xenophobia measures have been heard but not 
implemented. For instance, a recommendation by the South African Human Rights 
Commission for the development of hate crime legislation and appropriate support measures 
has languished for years without resolution. 
 
4.6 The Economic Rationalism of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment 
 
A popular explanation for anti-immigrant sentiment, as already outlined, is that poverty and 
economic underdevelopment are drivers of xenophobia in the country. The former Editor-in-
Chief of the nation’s popular weekly, Sunday Times, Mondli Makanya, even went so far as to 
characterise this narrative as common sense. Speaking in an interview, he stated: 
“I think that most black South Africans understand why black working-class South 
Africans feel the way they do. It’s about economics. It’s also about people in transition, 
about a class of people arriving below them, undercutting them and competing with 
them in a context where they must scramble, of high unemployment, where the state is 
absent” (cited in Desai, 2008: 58). 
This explanation has attracted significant media attention. This narrative occasionally makes 
use of Fanonian logic –that the oppressed, bereft of other alternatives turn their aggression 
inwards (Gibson, 2012). In the APRM report (2013: 112), this link is made, the authors of the 
report stating that “[s]ocio-economic circumstances precipitate some resentment towards 
foreigners who in certain sections of the labour market seem to be favoured by employers 
because they work hard for much lower wages than are offered to citizens”. If this 
explanation for xenophobia is accepted, then government efforts to fight xenophobia can be 
restricted to efforts to reduce poverty and create jobs. No, or very little, type of other 
campaigning will be required. 
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In South Africa, economic explanations for anti-immigrant sentiment in the country are often 
grounded within an understanding of the negotiated democratic transition. From a regime 
based on racial oppression and authoritarianism, the country has transitioned to a multiracial 
democracy has produced a multitude of new democratic rights for South Africa’s formerly 
oppressed population groups. However, this transition has at the same time created a deep 
contestation over the realisation of these rights (Murray, 2003; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Neocosmos, 
2010). As early as the late 1990s, Tshitereke (1999: 4) sought to explain xenophobia in South 
Africa in such terms. Indeed, he links inequality with xenophobia, arguing that: 
“In the post-apartheid epoch, while people’s expectations have been heightened, a 
realisation that delivery is not immediate has meant that discontent and indignation are 
at their peak… This is the ideal situation for a phenomenon like xenophobia to take root 
and flourish”.  
The emphasis placed on economic factors by these advocates for competition theory allows 
their analysis of xenophobia to be conveniently packaged with broader criticisms of the 
nation’s macro-economic policies. Even a cursory overview of the performance of the post-
apartheid economy will reveal troubling economic indicators. Unemployment remains high 
and poverty prevalent (Gibson, 2012), despite the fact that the ANC-led government has 
expanded the social welfare net and spent millions on public works programmes. Frustrated 
with the slow pace of service delivery, many communities have engaged in (at times violent) 
protest action21. Particularly after 2004, the pervasiveness of such actions has grown, and 
some have been accompanied by anti-immigrant rhetoric22. 
 
The link between economic self-interest and competition theory indicates that antagonism is 
likely when different groups (i.e. citizens and foreigners) are rivals for the same limited 
resources. The economic competition argument states that realistic fears about the economic 
impact of immigration on the local labour market and welfare system affect attitudes towards 
immigrants (Miller, 2012). As a consequence, therefore, those less exposed to economic 
hardship are thus more likely to exhibit more favourable sentiments towards foreigners than 
those unshielded. Evidence of public opinion analysis in Europe and North America suggests 
a link between individual-level economic indicators and anti-immigrant sentiment (Ceobanu 
                                                          
21 The reader should be aware that there is a tendency to exaggerate the state of community 
unrest in South Africa. The South African Police Service’s (SAPS) Incident Registration 
Information System (IRIS) recorded 156,230 ‘crowd incidents’ between 1997 and 2013. Of 
those incidents, 90% were categorised as ‘crowd (peaceful)’ and 10% as ‘crowd (unrest). The 
latter category should not be equated with ‘violent protests' and evidence produced by 
Alexander et al., (2015) in a report on the IRIS data shows this to be the case. The notion of 
‘increasing and continual violent protest actions’ has been used (by General Riah Phiyega, 
the National Police Commissioner and others) to justify increases in SAPS spending and a 
militarised approach to crowd control. It could be argued, as Alexander and his colleague do, 
that the effect of the official discourse on ‘violent protests' to stigmatise an important feature 
of a democratic society: protests. 
22 This was noted in a book by Von Holdt et al. (2011) on eight case studies where service 
delivery protests and xenophobic attacks occurred. Von Holdt and his colleagues argue that 
participants in these protests were involved in a struggle to impose a regime of national 
citizenship.  Under this regime, according to this argument, citizenship would carry a claim to 
resources. This claim would, at the same time, carry the exclusion of foreign nationals (i.e. 
non-citizens). Under this paradigm, the accumulation of resources by foreigners is seen as 
illegitimate. Work by Misago (2012) and Hayem (2013) also refers to the growth of nativist 
revivalism in the country). 
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and Escandell, 2010). This evidence seems to support the assumption that in South Africa 
there is a link between economic self-interest and anti-immigrant sentiment. 
 
4.7 Does Xenophobia Cross the Class Divide? 
 
There has been considerable debate about class classifications in South Africa. There are 
several mechanisms, as Burger et al., (2014) has shown, by which class can be measured and 
discerned in the country. But these authors contend that class identification in the country is 
complicated by perceived tensions between racial and cultural identity and persistent 
confusion around what terms like ‘middle class’ represents (also see Southall 2014). Given 
that discussions on xenophobia by Mondli Makanya and others are often premised on 
individuals' conscious identification with certain class statuses, I used a subjective measure of 
class in the analysis23. The results suggest that in 2012, those who described themselves as 
part of the upper class were less likely to say they welcomed no immigrants while those who 
saw themselves as belonging to the lower class were the most likely to support this statement 
(Figure 4.2). This represents a distinct change from what was observed in both 2008 and 
2010 when the opposite was true.  
 
Does anti-immigrant sentiment vary between other measures of economic and social strata in 
South African society? The results of bivariate analysis reveal that there is a degree of 
variation in anti-immigrant sentiment between the different rungs of the country’s socio-
economic ladder. If anti-immigrant sentiment is examined by employment status, it is 
apparent that the unemployed and part-time employed are no more likely than their full-time 
employed counterparts to welcome immigrants. If anti-immigrant sentiment is analysed by 
population group, it is evident that the white minority is less welcoming than the black 
majority. Educational status is, however, a better measure of socio-economic position than 
employment status or population group. If the data are examined by this measure (Table 4.2), 
it is apparent that tertiary-educated South Africans are more likely to be selective in their 
acceptance of immigrants than the less well-educated who favour complete rejection. In 
many countries, class often commonly associated with occupation and I ran an experiment 
using reported occasion as a determinant of attitudes towards international migrants. The 
results did not suggest that occupational status was a robust predictor of attitudes24.  
 
                                                          
23 Economic status was determined by a subjective self-identification measure. Respondents 
were asked: “People sometimes describe themselves as belonging to the working class, the 
middle class, or the upper or lower class. Would you describe yourself as belonging to the: (i) 
lower class; (ii) working class; (iii) middle class; (iv) upper middle class or (v) upper class?” 
Responses were then coded into the following categories: (i) lower class; (ii) working class; 
(iii) middle class; and (iv) upper middle class. 
24 In SASAS, respondents were asked, “What is your current occupation (the name or title of 
your main job)?” Using responses from this question, I constructed a three dummy variables: 
(i) no occupation; (ii) unskilled; (iii) semi-skilled; and (iv) high skilled. Multinomial 
regression analysis was used to predict the relationship between these dummy variables and 
the measure on welcoming international migrants. Here I employed SASAS data from 2012. 
Using unskilled as the reference, I found that the high-skilled (r = -0.991; SE = 0.288) were 
less likely to select ‘no immigrants’ (versus all immigrants) even controlling for a range of 
demographic variables. Standard goodness-of-fit tests do not suggest that our occupation 
dummies adequately explained a noteworthy degree of variance in the model. 
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Figure 4.2: Attitudes towards Welcoming Immigrants by Subjective Class Groups, 2008, 2010 and 2012  
 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2008, 2010, 2012)  
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Table 4.2: Attitudes towards Welcoming Immigrants across Socio-Economic Groups in 
South Africa, 2008, 2010 and 2012 
I generally welcome to South Africa… immigrants? 
 
2008 2010 2012 
 All Some No All Some No All Some No 
  (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) 
Educational Status    
Tertiary 38 43 19 28 50 23 28 56 16 
Completed Secondary 45 24 31 34 39 28 26 46 28 
Incomplete Secondary 41 28 31 35 35 30 28 41 31 
Senior Primary 45 23 32 35 36 29 27 40 33 
Junior Primary and Below 54 11 35 36 33 31 28 35 37 
Urban/Rural Status    
Urban Formal 41 31 27 31 37 32 28 45 26 
Urban Informal 48 20 32 33 45 22 26 46 28 
Trad. Auth. Areas 46 18 36 39 36 25 26 37 37 
Rural Formal 43 30 27 32 42 26 25 48 27 
Subjective Economic Status    
Affluent 36 37 27 21 50 30 37 39 24 
Comfortable 40 37 24 26 44 30 25 53 21 
Getting Along 48 23 29 34 37 28 27 44 29 
Poor 42 19 39 42 31 28 26 36 38 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2008, 2010, 2012)  
Notes: 1. Data are weighted using the weights specifically designed for SASAS.  
 
Perceived family wealth may be an important indicator of anti-immigrant sentiment. If self-
reported economic status25 is used as a measure of economic position (Table 4.2), it is 
apparent, however, that only a minority of those who think of themselves as affluent favoured 
complete acceptance. Between 2010 and 2012, the share of those who favoured complete 
rejection increased among those who defined themselves as poor. This may suggest a 
hardening of attitudes amongst the poor in the recent period. Statistical tests, however, did 
not show individual economic position to be a good explanatory factor of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in South Africa26. The results indicate that the relationship between economic 
status and anti-immigrant sentiment may be more complicated than first thought. 
 
                                                          
25 Respondents were asked “Would you say that you and your family are: (i) wealthy, (ii) 
very comfortable, (iii) reasonably comfortable, (iv) just getting along, (v) poor or (v) very 
poor?“ Responses were then coded into the following categories: (i) affluent, (ii) comfortable, 
(iii) getting along and (iv) poor.  
26 Multivariate analysis was employed to test the results. Multinomial regression analysis was 
used to predict categorical placement for our immigrant sentiment measure. The results did 
indicate that self-reported economic status was statistically significant predictor of whether 
an individual would welcome international migrants. The results indicated that the higher an 
individual on the post-apartheid ladder in 2012, the less likely that individual will be to reject 
all foreigners. Goodness-of-fit tests (using standard measures contracted by McFadden as 
well as Cragg and Uhler on whether the model fitted the data) revealed that the economic 
indicators in the model do not adequately explain a large share of variance in public 
sentiments towards immigrants. This seems to suggest that other non-economic factors might 
be better predictors of public attitudes towards immigrants. 
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Those on the higher rungs of the South African socio-economic ladder were found to be more 
prone to identify Nigerians as the most undesirable type of immigrant (Table 4.3). The less 
educated, on the other hand, were more likely to identify other African foreigners as 
unwelcome. It is clear that there is no simple relationship between economic self-interest and 
hostility towards foreign Africans in the country. What then can explain this observed 
Afrophobia (to borrow a term from Matsinhe, 2011)? Why have foreign Africans (especially 
those from Nigeria) attracted so much anti-outsider sentiment? Morris (1998) puts forward 
the ‘biocultural’ thesis, contending that because of their physical biocultural features 
(clothing style, bearing, physical features etc.), foreign nationals from Africa are in general 
clearly distinct and the indigenous are able to pick them out for animosity. I find this 
explanation unconvincing. The South African 2011 national census indicates that there are 
24,000 Nigerian nationals in the country. Although the census may not have captured 
irregular Nigerian immigrants, it seems improbable that the observed animosity towards this 
group is driven by the visibility of Nigerians in South African communities. 
 
Evidence of anti-outsider violence in post-apartheid townships in recent years suggests that it 
is particularly important to consider the changing distribution of attitudes in informal urban 
areas. Almost half of all informal urban residents favoured complete rejection in 
October/November 2007, six months before the May 2008 attacks. In 2010 the proportion of 
informal urban dwellers expressing this view had dropped to less than a quarter (before 
increasing again in 2012). Many informal urban South Africans have shifted from complete 
rejection to selective acceptance, with almost half expressing this opinion in 2012. A majority 
of informal urban dwellers were found to report African foreigners as undesirable, with a 
fifth identifying Nigerians as undesirable. It is important to remember at this juncture that a 
xenophobic climate, as Misago (2012) contends, does not itself explain outbreaks of anti-
outsider violence. Such violence may be driven by a number of different factors. Fauvelle-
Aymar and Segatti (2012), for instance, find that incidences of anti-outsider violence during 
the May attacks were linked to community heterogeneity (both economic and culture). 
 
4.8 Indigeneity and South African Exceptionalism 
 
The results section suggests the limitations of public opinion data in offering answers to the 
question of xenophobia in South African society. If anti-immigrant sentiment in the country 
cannot be associated with a simple linear relationship with economic status then where can 
the source of such animosity be located? Neocosmos (2010) argues, using a Fanonian 
approach, that the politics of nationalism originated on emphasising indigeneity lies at the 
root of post-colonial xenophobia (also see Dunn, 2009). Instead of understanding xenophobia 
in South Africa as a mere reaction to economic deprivation, it should rather be understood as 
a political discourse. Landau (2010) has argued that the discursive and institutional efforts to 
control political and physical space have generated an often violent prejudice towards the 
foreign outsider in South African cities. The attitudes of the public in South Africa should not 
be seen as isolated from the country’s policies towards immigrants and immigration. 
 
In the early post-apartheid period, migration into South Africa was governed according to the 
controversial Alien Controls Act (No. 76) of 1991, a piece of apartheid-era legislation which 
remained in place after the political transition and was only replaced in 2002. Scholars, like 
Crush (1999), described the Act as an item of legislation premised on principles of control, 
exclusion and expulsion, and argued that the post-apartheid migration management system 
was characterised by corruption and racial double standards (also see Segatti, 2011b).  The 
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Table 4.3: Most Undesirable Immigrant Groups in South Africa across Socio-Economic Groups, 2012 
Which, if any, group would you least want to come and live in South Africa? 
  Nigerians Other Africans Asian Other Can't Choose 
  (%) Std. Err. (%) Std. Err. (%) Std. Err. (%) Std. Err. (%) Std. Err. 
Educational Status                   
Tertiary 35 (4.13) 20 (3.10) 12 (2.47) 9 (2.16) 24 (3.37) 
Completed Secondary 25 (2.62) 29 (2.43) 7 (1.35) 16 (2.22) 23 (2.19) 
Incomplete Secondary 23 (1.96) 34 (2.10) 8 (1.31) 14 (1.62) 21 (1.80) 
Senior Primary 20 (3.58) 37 (3.97) 8 (1.89) 11 (2.22) 23 (3.12) 
Junior Primary and Below 17 (3.44) 33 (4.37) 8 (2.41) 11 (3.14) 30 (4.40) 
Urban/Rural Status                   
Urban Formal 30 (1.82) 28 (1.68) 7 (0.85) 14 (1.36) 21 (1.46) 
Urban Informal 20 (3.33) 27 (3.74) 11 (2.97) 19 (3.28) 24 (3.30) 
Trad. Auth. Areas 15 (1.95) 39 (2.53) 9 (1.59) 11 (1.64) 27 (2.39) 
Rural Formal 17 (3.35) 40 (4.49) 6 (1.89) 7 (2.35) 30 (3.78) 
Subjective Economic Status                 
Affluent 24 (3.44) 30 (4.25) 7 (2.05) 11 (3.08) 27 (3.72) 
Comfortable 28 (2.78) 28 (2.59) 10 (1.66) 14 (2.31) 20 (2.21) 
Getting Along 25 (2.12) 30 (1.99) 8 (1.32) 13 (1.51) 24 (1.90) 
Poor 19 (2.14) 35 (2.34) 6 (1.06) 15 (1.76) 25 (2.15) 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)  
Notes: 1. Data are weighted using the weights specifically designed for SASAS.  
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ideological foundation of the legislation, according to scholars like Crush (1999) and Peberdy 
(2001), was the creation of ‘Fortress South Africa’ –a bastion against the influx of the non-
indigenous (also see Murray, 2003). The government’s management of immigration during 
this early period has been criticised as archaic and reminiscent of the apartheid regime. 
 
In the years after the democratic transition, a number of politicians seem to have promoted an 
anti-immigration message. The Minister of Home Affairs during the late 1990s, Mangosuthu 
Buthelezi, for instance, made a series of statements arguing that African foreigners were a 
threat to local economic development in the country and that a considerable number were 
involved in criminal activities (Desai, 2008; Neocosmos, 2010). The anti-immigration stance 
of the government is most evident in its stereotyping of African migrants. Misago (2012) 
noted with interest that respondents in his study echoed long-standing state discourses 
blaming foreigners for the country’s ills (also see Landau, 2010). Although subsequent 
ministers have been more politic in their statements to the press, it could be argued that the 
Department of Home Affairs has not done enough to counter the evident xenophobia of the 
public. The image of the ‘foreigner as a threat’ seems to permeate immigration regulations 
and law enforcement even at the local level27. 
 
As the previous section made clear, Afrophobia should not be understood simply as a 
problem of the poor. Matsinhe (2011) argues that the pervasiveness of negative stereotyping 
of African foreigners in South Africa is associated with the dynamics of intergroup relations 
during the country’s authoritarian colonial period. The psychological implications of these 
dynamics perpetuated the formation of South African identities that attach an ‘otherness’ to 
African foreigners. For Matsinhe, it would be better to understand the prevalence of 
Afrophobia in the country as a consequence of identity formation in the post-apartheid 
period. It seems that the ‘otherness’ of African foreigners, for many South Africans, is best 
personified under the label ‘Nigerian’. It may be that ‘Nigerian’ represents a stereotypical 
image of the foreignness to many in the country, a label conveying the supposed ‘barbarity’ 
of an imagined Africa. 
 
Political liberalisation tends to provoke debates over citizenship and autochthony28. The 
democratisation trend in sub-Saharan Africa in recent decades, as Dunn (2009) argues, has 
often spawned such debates, throwing political identities into flux. Neocosmos (2010) has 
identified a discourse of exceptionalism in South African public culture emerging in the years 
after the country underwent political liberalisation (also see Matsinhe, 2011; Gibson, 2012). 
                                                          
27 Drawing on research conducted in 2010 in focus group interviews with municipal officials 
in five urban South African municipalities Landau et al., (2011) on internal and external 
migration. The researchers found that although some municipal officials display a positive 
attitude towards international migrants, most tended to perceive foreign immigrants as threats 
to social order and economic prosperity in their municipalities. 
28 In the Greek "autochthony" can be translated into "son of the soil" (i.e. autos "self," and 
khthon "soil") and is most often used as a synonym for 'indigenous'. In ancient Greece, this 
word was used to refer to the first humans to inhabit or possess a particular area of land (e.g. 
the Arcadians in Peloponnese). Greek philosophers of the period, like Herodotus, would use 
the word "autochthony" to describe how these original peoples (autochthons) kept themselves 
free from mixing with foreign (xenos) peoples (Harrison 2002). In contemporary Sub-
Saharan Africa, a number of scholars have argued that questions over concerning 
"autochthony" are currently among the most crucial and contested issues in political life (see, 
for instance, Dunn, 2009; Neocosmos, 2010; Matsinhe, 2011). 
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This discourse (and those who espouse it) contends that South Africa –due to its 
industrialised, democratic character –is fundamentally different from any other Sub-Saharan 
African country. In order to maintain the exceptionalism of South African society, African 
foreigners must be rejected as contaminates. During the post-apartheid period, the political 
elite in South Africa have tended to characterise African foreigners in a negative light. In her 
study of immigration policy in the country, Peberdy (2001: 24) notes that policymakers 
believe that African foreigners “supposedly threaten ‘the nation’ by endangering its physical 
and moral health, and its ability to provide services, employment, and to control crime”. For 
Peberdy this discourse is awash with depictions and descriptions of Africans as disease 
carriers (also see Murray, 2003). 
 
The discourse of South African exceptionalism does not only play itself out at the national 
macro policy level but is also evident at the micro-level as well. Research from the African 
Centre for Migration and Society, conducted by Misago (2012), argues that competition in 
community leaderships has encouraged the emergence of populist and violent forms of local 
leaders who seek to enhance their authority and power by reinforcing communities’ 
resentment towards what is perceived as ‘threatening’ foreign nationals. Local leaders exploit 
the notion that indigeneity is the primary avenue for accessing resources and jobs, 
manipulating notions of national subjectivity (also see von Holdt et al., 2011). Micro-
politicians in the country’s informal urban settlements are adapting institutionalised 
xenophobia that particularly dehumanises foreigners from elsewhere on the continent.  
 
Police officers have been accused of negligence in protecting the rights of immigrants, 
particularly those from Africa. Perhaps what is most surprising about the conduct of the 
police, and government authorities more broadly, is how the old racist ideas have persisted in 
the new era. State authorities often identify immigrants on the basis that they ‘look foreign’ 
with dark skin pigmentation an indication of foreignness (Nyamnjoh, 2006; Desai, 2008; 
Landau, 2010). The police specifically target foreign Africans in special campaigns, blaming 
them for crime, and immigrants are common victims of police corruption. Police have also 
been observed failing to intervene during anti-immigrant riots, destroying the identity 
documents of migrants and abusing foreigners more generally (also see Misago, 2012). The 
police torture and murder of 27-year-old Mozambican immigrant, Mido Macia, in February 
201329 is a poignant example of the lack of concern for immigrants’ rights exemplified by 




An analysis of public opinion data has shown that government efforts to reduce anti-
immigrant sentiment in the country have been, at best, ineffective. Given the passivity of the 
state’s anti-xenophobia campaign, this is not a surprising finding. The findings also suggest 
that there is no simple relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and economic self-
interest in South Africa. Examining the public opinion evidence, it is clear that xenophobia is 
prevalent across the different socio-economic groups in the country, while a statistical 
examination suggests that economic self-interest may not explain anti-immigrant sentiment. 
Finding the economic competition argument has been found inadequate, I argue, 
                                                          
29 Emidio Macia died after being dragged for metres attached to the back of a police van and 
then assaulted (Mail & Guardian, 15/03/2013). A subsequent report revealed deep cuts on 
arms, abrasions on his face and lower limbs, bruised ribs and testicles, bleeding and water on 
the brain. His death was caused, in the end, by a lack of oxygen. 
P a g e  | 47 
 
alternatively, that xenophobia could better be understood as the product of political 
subjectivities.  
 
The South African governing elite –in a similar fashion to other ruling classes on the 
continent (see Dunn, 2009) –has organised citizenship rights around political indigeneity. The 
assertion of such politics is less overt in the current period and immigration policy, in 
particular, has softened in the recent period (Segatti, 2011b). The government has begun to 
implement a migration policy that allows for greater skilled labour immigration and emphasis 
on the developmental role of immigration. This shift has allowed many South African 
businesses to employ migrants although opportunities to access temporary migrants are still 
limited. Despite this tempering, however, the ideological proponents for ‘Fortress South 
Africa’ remain strong and contemporary state policy remains focused on defending the 
national borders from the ‘threats’ presented by immigration. Indeed, these proponents were 
most evident in recent public policy discussions which argued for a further ‘securitisation’ of 
South African immigration policy.  
 
It is apparent, given the results of this study, that there is a need for a more proactive and 
concerted effort to change public opinion on immigration and immigrants. As an overview of 
the current programme of anti-xenophobia measures in the country illustrates, there is a 
mismatch between the resources available to fight xenophobia and the scale of anti-
immigrant sentiment. It could be argued, however, that this is more than a resource issue. 
Although more substantive educational campaigns (in partnership with civil society bodies) 
will undoubtedly reduce xenophobic sentiment in the country, what is required is an 
alternative to the current politicisation of indigeneity. The discourse of exceptionalism and 
Afrophobia that characterises much of South African political life must be challenged. 
  





In Sub-Saharan Africa, political leaders tend to link the presence of immigrants with 
dangers to the national community and accuse foreigners of seeking to take jobs, power 
and land from true autochthons. Emphasising their autochthonous status, such leaders 
blame immigrant communities for a decline in national wellbeing and rationalise 
discriminatory action against them as a defence of the collective community. This 
chapter aims to analyse subjective national wellbeing using public opinion data and to 
map the linkages between national wellbeing and xenophobia. The chapter will explore 
this hypothesis within each of Hadley Cantril’s classic three subjective wellbeing ladder 
groups. Using South Africa as a case study, this is the first time that such tests will be 
conducted in a Sub-Saharan African environment.  
 
The chapter used data from the 2012 South African Social Attitudes Survey, a 
nationally representative opinion poll of 2,521 respondents. Standard linear multivariate 
regression is used to test the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and 
xenophobia. Among each of the Cantril subgroups, there were similar predictors of pro-
immigrant sentiment: intergroup contact, perceived consequences of immigration and 
subjective national wellbeing. Improving levels of subjective national wellbeing in the 
country will, therefore, have a negative impact on xenophobia in the country. This 
chapter will conclude by discussing future areas of research to explore and present 
recommendations on how quality of life research can be used to better understand 
prejudice in countries like Sub-Saharan Africa and beyond. 
 
5.1 Introduction  
 
The "nation" is a central component of what Anthony Appiah (1994) called the "collective 
dimension" of individual identity, and, therefore, important to studies of community 
wellbeing. In Sub-Saharan Africa, political leaders tend to link the presence of immigrants to 
dangers to the national community and accuse foreigners of seeking to damage that 
community. Emphasising their autochthonous status, such leaders blame immigrant 
communities for a decline in national wellbeing. Discriminatory action against foreigners 
can, therefore, be justified as a defence of the collective national community. A recent 
example of this phenomenon occurred in South Africa in April 2015 when anti-migrant riots 
in the cities of eThekwini and Johannesburg broke out. The violence left a number dead and 
saw the displacement of thousands into makeshift refugee camps. Pictures of the violence 
(particularly the death of Mozambican national Emmanuel Sithole) made international 
headlines and provoked reflection and commentary on, and concern about, the character of 
South African society.  
 
The recent and recurrent anti-immigrant violence showcases the need for further attitudinal 
academic research into xenophobia in the country. South African President Jacob Zuma 
denounced the April 2015 attacks. During his condemnation, he indicated that he was 
sensitive to the frustrations of the poor in the country, which he identified as one of the root 
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causes of xenophobia. Mmusi Maimane, the leader of the main opposition party in the South 
African parliament, also condemned the attacks. He likewise said that he understood the 
frustration being felt by South Africans, especially unemployed youth, who struggle to access 
opportunities to improve their lives. The April 2015 violence was reminiscent of large-scale 
anti-immigrant riots which affected foreign communities throughout the country in 200830. 
During the 2008 riots, the frustrations of the poor were also put forward as an explanation for 
the violence.  
 
The implicit assumption in the statements made by Jacob Zuma and Mmusi Maimane is that 
there is a relationship between quality of life and xenophobia in South Africa. Indeed, the 
country seems divided by those who are dissatisfied with their lives (and future prospects) 
and the more satisfied, optimistic and hopeful in society. I believe that quality of life research 
can shed new light on what is driving xenophobia in a Sub-Saharan African environment. 
Quality of life researchers, like Cummins et al. (2003), have tended to distinguish between 
subjective personal and national wellbeing. Given the rhetoric surrounding recent anti-
immigrant violence in South Africa, subjective national wellbeing may be significantly 
correlated with attitudes towards immigrants in the country. This correlation may hold, 
regardless of the personal wellbeing of the individual. This chapter aims to analyse the 
validity of this proposition and map any linkages between national wellbeing and 
xenophobia.  
 
Since the early 20
th
 century, social psychology research has postulated an association 
between negative experiences and increased prejudice toward outgroups, known as 
Frustration-Aggression Theory. According to this theorem, individuals transfer the 
frustrations they experience in daily life onto members of outgroups (Dollard et al., 1939). 
Scholars have used Frustration-Aggression Theory to link aggression towards with individual 
feelings of deprivation (also see Brown, 2011).  Cognisant of Frustration-Aggression Theory, 
this chapter explores the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and attitudes 
towards immigrants in South Africa. Standard quantitative techniques will be used to test the 
thesis that there is a relationship between national wellbeing and xenophobia. The chapter 
will first place the study within the context of the existing literature on immigration and 
xenophobia in South Africa. Then the bivariate and multivariate analysis will be presented 
and the results of this analysis discussed.  
 
The April 2015 attacks seem to showcase deep divisions in South African society, 
highlighting the existence of a disillusioned and frustrated minority. The determinants of anti-
immigrant sentiment may be different amongst this minority than amongst those who are 
more content and optimistic about life. It may be that those who are frustrated with their lives 
will be more likely to view immigrants as hostile if they perceive their national community to 
be in danger. In order to explore this assumption, the relationship between subjective national 
wellbeing and anti-immigrant sentiment will be tested within each of Hadley Cantril’s classic 
three subjective wellbeing31 ladder groups. This is the first time that such tests will be 
                                                          
30 The May 2008 riots were the most striking examples of collective anti-immigrant violence 
in South Africa. Over a hundred thousand displaced were displaced during anti-immigrant 
riots that last about two weeks. These riots saw the deaths of more than 60 and left roughly 
700 people wounded. A report by the Human Sciences Research Council (2008) provides a 
detailed description of the attacks (also see Hassim et al., 2009). 
31 Wellbeing is generally viewed as a description of an individual's quality of life as a whole. 
In general, wellbeing can be measured using objective and subjective approaches. The first 
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conducted in a Sub-Saharan African environment. The aim of the chapter is to contribute 
meaningfully to the quality of life literature and seek to better understand how quality of life 
may be driving prejudicial attitudes in a developing country.  
 
5.2 Literature Review  
 
Economic competition theory points to self-interests over limited resources —such as jobs 
and social welfare benefits —as driving conflict between groups. Consequently, this theory 
suggests that attitudes vary according to an individual’s position in a society’s hierarchy 
(Hardin, 1995). For example, the poor, the unemployed and the uneducated are expected to 
feel insecure about their position and, therefore, be unwelcoming of outsiders (see, for 
example, Sides and Citrin, 2007; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Citrin and Sides, 2008 who 
discuss and test this hypothesis). The existing public opinion research on attitudes towards 
immigration has also found that group concerns will have a relationship with anti-
immigration attitudes32. In other words, individuals’ evaluations of their collective 
environment are related to their perceptions of outgroups. This scholarship suggests that the 
more negatively an individual evaluates the health of the collective (in this case the nation), 
the more hostile that individual will be towards immigrants. The multidimensional character 
of evaluations of the group collective –frequently termed "sociotropic" evaluations in social 
psychology –is often ignored in most studies on public attitudes towards immigrants. As a 
result, their relationship with anti-immigrant sentiment has been inadequately investigated. 
 
The brief description above of the existing literature on the economic competition theory 
suggests the need to test how evaluations of the group collective affect attitudes towards 
international migrants. This chapter, as aforementioned, will conduct this test by focusing on 
subjective national wellbeing. In order to put subjective national wellbeing in South Africa in 
context, the following literature review will present a comprehensive picture of South African 
society. The first part of the review will present a discussion on emerging patterns of quality 
of life in the country since the early 1990s. I will then provide a concise description of 
immigration into South Africa and then in subsequent section expound on the problem of 
xenophobia in South Africa. This last section will touch briefly on the relevant quantitative 
literature on intergroup relations.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
understand wellbeing through certain observable 'facts' such as economic, social and 
environmental statistics. For example, we could measure wellbeing using personal annual 
income per capita. The second considers an individual’s wellbeing to be best understood 
using self-reported survey measures. Subjective measures of an individual’s use an 
individual’s self-reported evaluations of their life’s quality (Diener and Suh, 1997). Scholars 
studying subjective wellbeing contend that such evaluations involve a multidimensional 
process which includes cognitive judgements of life satisfaction and affective evaluations of 
emotions and moods (also see Diener, 2009; Cummins et al., 2009; Gulyas, 2015). Subjective 
wellbeing is thought to be a more holistic indicator of quality of life than objective indicators 
like income or consumption. 
32 Individual assessments of national economic performance have been shown to be 
influential in attitudinal research on immigration.  A recent review of the existing literature 
on immigration attitudinal research by Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) noted that when 
examining and analysing attitudes toward immigrants, individual assessments of the 
economic state of the nation have proved influential, often more so than the effect attributed 
to personal economic circumstances. 
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5.2.1 Subjective Wellbeing in South Africa  
Since the early 1990s, the democratic governments in South Africa have promised “a better 
future” for all those living in the country. This slogan captured the optimism and euphoria of 
a nation transitioning out of authoritarianism towards democracy. Evidence of this heightened 
jubilation was found in the South African Quality of Life (SAQoL) trend study which had 
been monitoring life satisfaction in the country since the 1980s. The academic output from 
this study noted elevated euphoria in the transition period (e.g. Møller, 2004; 2007; 2013). 
However, following an upswing in life satisfaction in the early 1990s, a considerable decline 
was noted in the mid-1990s (also see Møller and Roberts, 2015). During the period 1995-
2007, average subjective wellbeing in South Africa remained relatively flat. This period of 
stagnation was followed by an (albeit mild) upswing in subjective wellbeing in the 2008-
2012 period. Placing these trends in context, this study will now briefly discuss the progress 
made in securing a better life for all in South Africa.   
 
In 1994, the new democratically elected government faced significant challenges, particularly 
widespread racial inequality and poverty. The Project for Statistics on Living Standards and 
Development (PSLSD) was one of the nation’s earliest inclusive household income and 
living standards surveys. This project was started by the World Bank at the request of the 
Congress of South African Trade Unions and the ANC in 1992. The project’s final report, 
published in 1994, showcased the harsh reality of the country’s history of racial separation, 
contrasting the impoverishment of ‘black’ rural South Africa against the wealth of ‘white’ 
urban areas, giving rise to the infamous phrase: “plenty amidst poverty”. Under post-1994 
democratic governments, South Africa has made significant economic and social progress in 
redressing these problems. There has been a significant increase in access to basic services 
for the black majority (particularly access to electrical connections and piped water) under 
well-funded public works programmes. The country’s social welfare system now provides 
social grants and free municipal services to registered indigents33. In the last decade, the 
proportion of South Africans living in poverty and hunger has dropped considerably 
according to a recent Statistics South Africa (2014b) report. 
 
Living standards for most South Africans have improved significantly since the democratic 
transition but the country still faces many serious challenges. A good mechanism to identify 
the most critical of these problems is by asking ordinary South Africans themselves. In a 
2010 SAQoL survey, respondents, once they had rated their own happiness, were asked what 
would make them happier?  Most respondents identified jobs and income that would provide 
financial security (Møller, 2013). These concerns reflect the stark realities of the South 
African labour market which has failed to absorb increasing numbers of young entrants. 
Unemployment (particularly amongst the youth) in the country has remained high during the 
period 1995-201434. The second most identified item was, unsurprisingly, better access to 
                                                          
33 Since 1994 there has been considerable expansion of the South African social welfare 
system to include millions of poor Black Africans. Government efforts to assist the poor gain 
access to basic services has seen the provision, under the Free Basic Services policies, of free 
water, electricity, sanitation and waste removal to millions of people (Statistics South Africa, 
2014a). The government has made cash transfers to millions of households through the social 
grants system. Through the Child Support Grant, the national pension scheme and other 
social grants, some 16 million South Africans were beneficiaries of government cash 
transfers in 2014 (Statistics South Africa, 2014b: 20).  
34 A 2015 World Employment and Social Outlook and Trends report by the International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) documents how unfavourably the South African labour market 
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services. At the municipal level, poor financial management and corruption have hindered the 
delivery of basic services to the public. Community protests demanding greater access to 
services and better governance at the municipal level have escalated since 2010. Protests have 
become increasingly violent in the last five years35.  
 
5.2.2 The Context: South Africa and Immigration  
As with many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, immigration has played an extremely 
important role in the history of modern South Africa. The chapter will now discuss the 
immigration context in the country from a historical perspective. Colonial era dispossession 
of land and restrictions on land ownership forced large numbers of Black Africans into the 
colonial labour market as migrant workers (Wolpe, 1972). Between 1921 and 1951, for 
example, the number of Black Africans making a living as small-scale farmers declined 
drastically from 2.38 million to 447 653 (Union of South Africa, 1960). Land ownership for 
Black Africans was confined to designated ‘homelands’ or native reserves, and migration in 
and out of these ‘homelands’ was severely restricted (also see Lipton, 1986). The 
reproduction of this migrant labour system hinged on the inability of the migrants (as 
individuals or as a group) to influence the political institutions that governed them. Political 
repression was essential to the system and Black Africans were subject to a political order 




 century, migrants were brought into South Africa from elsewhere in the region to 
work in the country's mineral and (to a lesser extent) agricultural sectors. Significant numbers 
of workers were also recruited from Asia, Europe and North America. Some of these 
immigrants settled permanently, of which one of the most interesting examples is South 
Africa’s Indian minority. Originally brought in by colonial authorities to work on sugar 
plantations, many settled permanently and currently the country has one of the largest Indian 
diaspora populations outside South Asia (Klotz, 2013). Many immigrants from Southern 
Africa engaged in cyclical migration, moving between South Africa and their home country. 
Acting as "labour reserves", nations in Southern Africa became sources of cheap labour for 
the development of the capital economy in South Africa (Wolpe, 1972). By the mid-20
th
 
century, the country was the main receiving centre (and beneficiary) of a transnational system 
of labour migration that stretched across the macro-region.   
 
Between 1910 and 1990, the white minority government in South Africa maintained a strict 
racial hierarchy. Coercive social engineering programmes were used to enforce a system of 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
compares with other countries. Out of the 107 nations included in the report, South Africa 
was estimated to have the 8
th
 highest unemployment rate in 2015.  Unemployment rates 
amongst the adult youth (36.1% in 2014) were substantially higher than those of other adults 
(15.6% in 2014). The adult youth account for less than two-fifths (39.9%) of total 
employment. The considerable disparity in the absorption rate noted between adult youth and 
other adults further reflects the scarcity of job opportunities for the adult youth in the national 
labour market. Cross-national comparative data presented in the ILO (2015) report estimates 
that South Africa will have the 6
th
 highest level of youth unemployment out of 107 countries 
in 2015.  
35 The Civic Protest Barometer (CPB) report by Powell et al. (2014) provides data on trends 
on recorded protest action in South Africa's municipalities.  Since 2010 the number of civic 
protests has grown, standing at 218 in 2014. The CPB measures the percentage of protests 
that involve an element of violence. It would appear that incidences of violence are growing 
and in 2014 more than four-fifths (83%) of recorded protests were considered violent.  
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economic and social favouritism based on racial demarcations (see Lipton, 1986 for a 
comprehensive discussion of this system). In the 20
th
 century, the main opposition to this 
system within South Africa was the African National Congress (ANC) formed in 1923. As 
opposition to settler colonialism (known from the 1950s on as the apartheid system) gained 
momentum in the 1960s, the ANC sought the assistance from newly independent neighbours 
on the African continent. Many ANC leaders received asylum (as well as military training 
and logistical support) in countries like Tanzania, Zambia and Mozambique (Neocosmos, 
2010). The ANC, working with trade unions and social movements, was eventually able to 
force the white minority government of the late 1980s to allow democratic elections. These 
were held in April 1994.  
 
There have been five (largely) peaceful national elections in South Africa between 1994 and 
2014, all of which have been won by the ANC. The post-1994 governments sought to 
dismantle the old system of migrant labour (which had already begun to decline in the 1980s, 
see Crush and Dodson, 2007), amending old immigration legislation and eventually passing 
new laws making the recruitment of foreign workers more difficult (Segatti, 2011b). As a 
consequence of this shift in direction, immigration patterns into the country began to change, 
becoming more informal (McDonald et al., 2000). Many international migrants have, for 
example, settled in South African cities as entrepreneurs, establishing small-scale businesses 
in poor urban communities. An extensive post-apartheid literature covering this process has 
accrued, primarily from the prominent research institutions, the African Centre for Migration 
Studies and the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP). Due to the poor data collection, 
it is difficult to accurately track these patterns or even the exact size of the international 
migration population in the country.  
 
5.2.3 Blaming Outsiders in South Africa 
Foreigners in South Africa are often blamed for many of the problems facing the country. 
Disparagingly called ‘makwerekwere’, an unfair reference to their cultural backwardness, 
international migrants are often unjustly vilified as deceitful and immoral. Under the 
direction of the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC), negative anti-immigrant 
sentiment was first documented in a national survey of 2,200 South Africans in October 1994 
(Minnaar et al., 1996). The HSRC study found considerable levels of negative sentiment, 
noting that South Africans blame undocumented immigrants for national problems such as 
crime and unemployment. Similarly, high levels of xenophobia were recorded in nationally 
representative surveys undertaken by SAMP in 1997, 1999, 2006 and, most recently, 2010 
(e.g. Mattes et al., 1999; McDonald et al., 2000; Crush et al., 2013). Chapter 4, using an 
alternative public opinion dataset for the period 2003-2012, substantiated these SAMP 
findings. Following a growing escalation in anti-immigrant violence in the late 2000s, the 
South African government has pledged to reduce xenophobia amongst the public. 
 
A crucial catalyst for the formation of prejudice is a perception that a group presents a threat 
(whether explicit or not) to the position of an individual (or their group). The perception can 
rationalise hostility towards an outgroup and adoption of hostile attitudes towards members 
of that outgroup (Hardin, 1995). Public opinion research in North America and Europe has 
demonstrated a clear link between negative outgroup evaluations and perceptions that an 
outgroup is a threat (see, for example, Scheepers et al., 2002; Citrin and Sides, 2008). The 
types of threat under discussion often relate to the negative impact that immigration will have 
on the social protection system, the quality of education or the cultural unity of the nation. 
Mattes et al. (1999), using SAMP data, found a clear link between anti-immigration 
sentiment and negative perceptions about the consequences of immigration in South Africa. 
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Dodson (2010) notes an interesting gender dimension to this sense of threat, with foreign 
nationals identified as "stealing" women from local men. It will be important, therefore, to 
examine perceived consequences of immigration among the South African public when 
studying the determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes.  
 
Academics in South Africa have made a concerted effort to understand anti-immigrant 
sentiment in the country. When examining negative attitudes towards foreign nationals, a 
number of scholars have cited public frustrations over poverty, unemployment and 
inadequate infrastructure as primary factors (see Dodson, 2010 who provides an interesting 
overview of the academic discourse on xenophobia in South Africa). Scholars such as 
Neocosmos (2010) opposed this discourse, arguing that the formation of an exclusivist South 
African nationalism can better explain the formation of xenophobia in the country. 
Neocosmos also places ample blame on the country's political elite including senior 
government ministers. He claims that their public statements on immigration contributed to 
the legitimisation of an anti-foreigner discourse in the country (also see Klotz, 2013). Almost 
all scholars writing about xenophobia in the country identify the origins of anti-immigrant 
sentiment in the racism, nationalism and isolation of the apartheid era. 
 
A strong national identity and national pride can be an empowering, affirming mechanism in 
the face of the old discrimination and chauvinism of the colonial and apartheid periods. 
Certainly, individuals can hold positive attitudes towards both their ingroup as well as 
outgroups. For example, a study by Brewer and Campbell (1976) found that of 30 ethnic 
groups in East Africa, individuals who demonstrated in-group favouritism were not 
particularly hostile towards the other ethnic groups (also see de Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003). 
National context may play a significant role in understanding anti-immigrant sentiment and 
may explain why such sentiments seem to vary so considerably over time.  The most 
convincing example of this effect is the upsurge of xenophobia in Europe and North America 
which followed international economic and military conflict (see Brown, 2011 for a history 
of the public opinion studies related to this phenomenon). Examining the period 1860-2010, 
Klotz (2013) notes that xenophobia in South Africa seems most prominent during periods 
when the South African ‘nation’ was perceived to be in crisis.  
 
5.3 Data and Method  
 
In order to examine anti-immigrant sentiment among the South African public, data from the 
South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS) 2012 wave was used. SASAS is a nationally 
representative public opinion survey and uses a multi-stage sampling method based on census 
enumerator areas. The sample consists of adults (aged 16 years and older) living in private 
residences and the survey has been conducted annually by the HSRC since 2003. A total of 
2,521 persons were interviewed by trained fieldworkers between October and November 
2012. The questionnaire was translated into the country’s major languages, and each 
interview was conducted in the respondent’s home language. I will now present three 
descriptive sections on how I constructed measures for (i) Cantril’s life satisfaction 
subgroups; (ii) subjective national wellbeing; and (iii) attitudes towards international 
migrants.  
 
5.3.1 The Cantril Ladder as a Measure  
In 2012, SASAS replicated a life satisfaction module designed by Hadley Cantril and 
published in 1965. The exact phrasing of Cantril’s module was used, with the English‐
language cues translated into the numerous official languages spoken in South Africa. 
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Fieldworkers asked respondents to consider their wishes and hopes, and then their fears and 
frustrations exemplified in the best and worst possible life they could imagine. Following 
this, respondents were shown an illustration of a symbolic 11‐point ‘ladder of life’ with the 
bottom being the worst life as they had defined it, and the top being the best. Respondents 
were then asked where they stood on the ‘ladder of life’ at (i) five years ago; (ii) at present; 
and (iii) in five years’ time. Results to these questions are showcased in Figure 5.1. 
Responses tended to be clustered at the mid-point when individuals in the country rated their 
past and present. There was a greater distribution of ratings for the future, with the 
distribution skewing towards the right.  
 
It is interesting to consider individual wellbeing evaluations in South Africa by population 
group. The Black African majority tend to report lower levels of subjective wellbeing in 
comparison to other groups, particularly the white minority. This is a finding that has been 
noted in every SAQoL wave between 1995 and 2012 (Møller, 2007; Møller, 2013). The 
SASAS 2012 data on past and future life evaluations were analysed in a recent working paper 
by Møller and Roberts (2015). Their research noted that Cantril ratings for the future go in 
opposite directions for black and white respondents. Black South Africans tended to evaluate 
their future prospects favourably, while White South Africans, in contrast, were more 
doubtful about the future. Pessimism among the white population in South Africa has been 
well-documented by researchers, such as Møller (2004; 2007; 2013), using SAQoL data. This 
disparity between population groups probably reflects the expectations and aspirations for a 
‘better life’ promised to the black majority by the ANC-led governments during the last 
twenty years. 
 
A good life situation overshadowed by fears for the future is very different from a bad present 
situation accompanied by hope according to Gulyas (2015). Cognisant of this distinction, 
researchers (most notably those working for the Gallup World Poll) have combined present 
and future evaluations of personal well‐being to create composite subgroups of subjective 
wellbeing. Based on this delineation, three Cantril subgroups were created for this study by 
combining the personal ratings on the Cantril for PRESENT and FUTURE to create a 
composite 0-10 measure. Testing confirmed the reliability and validity of this measure 
(Cronbach alpha 0.68) which then used to create a categorical variable based on the Gallup 
grouping. The distinct groups (independent) groups are: High (8-10); Medium (5-7) and Low 
(0-4).  
 
5.3.2 Measuring Subjective National Wellbeing  
In order to test whether a relationship between subjective national and the Pro-Immigrant 
Attitude Index exists, this chapter needs to construct a measure of subjective national 
wellbeing. Six items on national wellbeing were included in SASAS 2012 and these six were 
used to construct the National Wellbeing Index (NWI). These items measured public 
evaluations of the country’s economic, natural, governmental, social and security 
environment36. The NWI was designed as a domain-level representation of subjective 
national wellbeing (Cummins et al., 2003). The NWI is a composite score that provides a 
more precise measurement of sociotropic concerns. In order to construct each index, the 
                                                          
36 Six questions were asked: “How satisfied are you with: (i) the economic situation?; (ii) the 
state of the natural environment?; (iii) the social conditions?; (iv) how the country’s affairs 
are managed?; (v) business?; and (vi) national security?” In line with the standard 
methodology on the NWI (Cummins et al., 2003), each item was measured on a single 11-
point scale ranging from ‘completely dissatisfied’ to ‘completely satisfied’. 
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relevant items are converted into a 0-100 score and then combined. The final range on each 
index is 0-100 with the higher the value, the higher the self-reported level of satisfaction 
(Table 5.1). The discriminant validity of NWI was investigated using Principal Component 
Analysis with varimax rotation and multivariate regression analysis37. 
 
Table 5.1: Mean Scores and Principal Component Analysis on the National Wellbeing 
Index 







Economic situation in South Africa 46.61 0.776 254.5 0.845 
State of the natural environment in South Africa 52.00 0.754 261.4 0.848 
Social conditions in South Africa 50.33 0.786 260.3 0.844 
Country’s affairs are managed in South Africa 46.95 0.826 244.8 0.834 
Business in South Africa 50.51 0.746 258.7 0.850 
National security in South Africa 49.76 0.686 272.3 0.862 
Notes: 1. The data is weighted; and 2. A higher mean (ranged 0-100) indicates a higher level 
of satisfaction with the relevant item.   
 
Responses on the NWI will reflect the individual perceptions about external conditions for 
the national population as a whole according to Cummins et al. (2003). The public evaluated 
South Africa’s economic situation (M =46.8) and security (M =49.7) negatively on average 
(Table 5.1). This probably reflects their concerns about the level of unemployment, law and 
order issues (e.g. the prevalence of crime and poor policing) and poverty which have featured 
in studies by Møller (2013) and others. Overall the NWI was 49.6 and this score can be 
compared with a reported Australian NWI of 61.1 in 2007 (Cummins et al., 2009:149). The 
results on the NWI suggest that many in the country are concerned about the current 
wellbeing of South Africa.  
 
5.3.3 Attitudes towards International Migrants  
In order to understand attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa, two items on attitudes 
towards foreigners living in the country were included in the SASAS 2012. These two items 
asked respondents to use a scale 0-10 (where 10 was positive and 0 was negative) and to 
“Please describe how you feel about foreigners living in South Africa in general. Are they (i) 
negative or positive?; (ii) hostile or friendly?” Responses to these two items (depicted in 
Figure 5.2) were combined and averaged to create a composite 0-10 index (called the Pro-
Immigrant Attitude Index). A high value on this index indicates a favourable evaluation of 
foreigners living in South Africa. I computed Cronbach's alpha statistic (0.91) for the scale 
formed and noted that and its reliability proved to be satisfactory. Mean responses on this 
index were low (M =4.7; SD =2.8), indicating that many in the country do not view 
immigrants in a favourable light.  
 
Since the 2008 anti-immigrant riots, the South African government has sponsored initiatives 
in recent years to combat xenophobia, build social cohesion and create spaces for positive 
societal integration. Given these efforts, the results presented in Figure 5.2 are disquieting. 
                                                          
37 The different NWI dimensions were loaded onto a clearly defined factor which explained 
58.3% of variance. The factorability of the correlation matrix also met the other assumptions 
for such an analysis. Therefore expectations, based on previous research, regarding the 
measurement of this latent concept are confirmed. 
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South African leaders in government and civil society should be commended for their 
denunciation of anti-immigrant violence in South Africa. However, the results of this study 
suggest that most people in South Africa have an unfavourable opinion of foreigners and 
view this group as a threat. Furthermore, these findings provoke serious questions about the 
efficiency of current efforts to combat intolerance and xenophobia in South African society.   
 
5.4 Results  
 
The first part of this section will test whether subjective national wellbeing has a significant 
correlated with attitudes towards immigrants in the country at the bivariate level. The second 
section aims to analyse the validity of this proposition at a multivariate level and chart any 
associations between national wellbeing and xenophobia. Both sections are interested if the 
proposed relationship between subjective national wellbeing and attitudes towards 
international migrants holds regardless of the personal wellbeing of the individual. 
 
5.4.1 Bivariate Analysis by Cantril Subgroup 
In SASAS 2012, respondents were asked: “Which, if any, group would you least want to 
come and live in South Africa?” Responses to this question were open-ended and respondents 
were not read a list of predetermined answers. Responses to this question were later recoded 
into nine subcategories. Weighted responses to this question are considered across the three 
Cantril subgroups designed for this study (Figure 5.2). The results show that no one Cantril 
subgroup was significantly more likely to select ‘cannot choose’ than the other. Respondents 
were more likely to select groups from Sub-Saharan Africa as their least tolerated foreign 
group in comparison to groups from Asia, North America or Australia. The most mentioned 
foreign African groups were Nigerians, Zimbabweans and Somalians. Certain differences 
were noted between Cantril subgroup in Figure 5.3. Those in the High group were more 
likely to select Nigerians compared with the Low and Medium. Perhaps surprisingly, 
‘returning South Africans’ were selected by larger share (8%) of the Low than was expected.  
 
The results in Figure 5.3 suggest a particular aversion to certain types of immigrants among 
many South Africans. The distribution of public sentiment towards immigrants in general 
across the three Cantril subgroups is shown in Figure 5.4. As can be observed, responses on 
the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index are similar for the High and Medium groups. The Low 
group is different from these two other groups, with a somewhat larger share of this group 
reporting negative attitudes towards immigrants. However, variations in responses between 
the three Cantril groups were relatively minor and it would appear that, regardless of life 
satisfaction, individuals in South Africa hold negative attitudes towards foreigners living in 
the country. 
 
Tables 5.2 and 5.3 give sample characteristics by Cantril subgroup. The result suggests a 
progression on the Cantril Ladder from lower to higher ratings by observed socio-economic 
status, and between population groups. Respondents more likely to be in the Low group are 
Black African, undereducated, unemployed and from the rural areas. Those groups with 
higher levels of material wellbeing (e.g. the better educated, the employed, urban dwellers) 
tend to be located in the High and Medium groups. Both Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 also give 
mean responses on the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index broken down by a range of socio-
economic attributes. Although minor variations between some subgroups were noted, on the 
whole, the evidence in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 challenges the popular tendency to identify 
xenophobia as the ‘problem’ of one particular group (such as the youth or the unemployed) in 
South Africa. 
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Figure 5.1: Personal Ratings on the Cantril Ladder 
 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)  
 
Figure 5.2: Public Attitudes towards Foreigners Living in South Africa 
 




























Where on the ladder do you feel you personally stand 


























Describe how you feel about foreigners living in South Africa in general 
Negative or Positive Hostile or Friendly
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Figure 5.3: Most Disliked Foreign Groups in South Africa 
 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)  
 
Figure 5.4: Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index by Cantril Subgroups 
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Describe how you feel about foreigners living in South Africa in general 
Low (0-4) Medium (5-7) High (8-10)




Table 5.2: Mean Responses to the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index by Selected Socio-
Demographic Subgroups 
 
Total Low(0-4) Medium (5-7) High (8-10) 
 
N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD 
Gender  
Male 946 4.71 2.77 195 3.83 2.85 483 4.80 2.64 246 5.43 2.82 
Female 1489 4.58 2.78 391 4.24 2.75 736 4.68 2.67 334 5.00 2.97 
Population Group  
Black African  1437 4.56 2.89 424 3.99 2.82 722 4.68 2.79 271 5.16 3.10 
Coloured 445 4.97 2.41 84 4.57 2.37 232 4.82 2.37 115 5.78 2.44 
Indian 210 4.31 2.59 26 3.45 2.75 97 4.62 2.30 85 4.23 2.83 
White 342 4.89 2.40 52 4.47 2.91 168 5.02 2.05 108 5.38 2.36 
Age groups  
16-19 years 207 4.78 2.82 24 3.96 2.88 98 4.55 2.55 83 5.36 3.09 
20-29 years 519 4.85 2.69 107 4.25 2.77 278 4.86 2.61 125 5.61 2.60 
30-39 years 459 4.53 2.87 97 3.85 2.82 247 4.55 2.81 107 5.25 2.91 
40-49 years 442 4.45 2.86 132 4.06 2.93 197 4.60 2.66 100 5.00 3.04 
50-59 years 365 4.78 2.61 94 4.47 2.76 189 4.94 2.60 76 4.69 2.75 
60-69 years 266 4.38 2.70 77 3.56 2.83 129 4.78 2.40 54 4.96 2.92 
70 years + 175 4.19 2.96 54 4.11 2.36 81 5.03 2.98 33 3.58 3.28 
Notes: 1. The data is weighted. 2. High mean scores indicate positive sentiments towards 
immigrants while low mean scores indicate negative sentiments. 3. All individuals who 
reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded. 
 
The types of variation observed did not differ considerably with what was observed in 
Chapter 4 and the pattern of results depicted in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 support the findings of the 
previous chapter. One interesting trend that was apparent was that educated people tended to 
be more positive in their assessment of foreigners although the size of the observed difference 
was marginal (Table 5.3). This suggests that educational attainment will have a statistically 
significant but minor effect on attitudes towards international migrants. But on the whole, the 
results suggest that people across the country’s socio-economic spectrum tend to hold anti-
immigrant opinions. The same patterning was observed, regardless of the Cantril subgroup 
under investigation. In other words, even hopeful and contented individuals in South Africa 
view foreigners living in the country in a negative light. What can explain the lack of 
variation between the Cantril subgroups? It may be that the factors that are driving pro-
immigrant sentiment differ by Cantril subgroup. Alternatively, life satisfaction could have a 
weak (albeit negative) relationship with prejudice towards international immigrants, and 
other factors might better explain the formation of pro-immigrant sentiment in the country. 
 
Table 5.3: Mean Responses to the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index by Selected Socio-
Economic Subgroups 
 
Total Low(0-4) Medium (5-7) High (8-10) 
 
N M SD N M SD N M SD N M SD 
Labour Market Status  
Unemployed 726 4.48 2.86 251 4.03 2.97 364 4.66 2.73 108 4.84 3.07 
Employed 611 4.86 2.65 87 4.62 2.52 314 4.77 2.57 203 5.26 2.79 
Part-time Employed 182 4.91 2.87 47 3.64 3.11 95 5.01 2.46 36 6.16 3.18 
Labour Inactive 865 4.67 2.75 196 3.79 2.56 435 4.75 2.69 224 5.17 2.85 
Educational Attainment  
Primary and Below 504 4.41 2.87 174 4.42 3.05 241 4.33 2.75 81 4.68 2.92 




Incomplete Secondary  881 4.55 2.72 214 3.84 2.68 442 4.79 2.62 216 4.82 2.84 
Completed Secondary 610 4.79 2.85 115 3.84 2.70 330 4.77 2.68 160 5.85 3.06 
Tertiary education 284 5.20 2.64 33 4.53 2.62 146 5.05 2.54 102 5.77 2.68 
Geographic Type  
Urban, formal 1482 4.70 2.62 265 4.21 2.65 751 4.74 2.48 428 5.17 2.76 
Urban, informal 213 4.53 2.62 61 3.89 2.68 111 4.94 2.40 38 4.50 2.88 
Trad. Auth. Areas 537 4.48 3.16 215 3.87 3.01 251 4.57 3.10 65 5.58 3.46 
Rural, formal 206 4.96 2.54 46 4.53 2.61 106 5.20 2.35 49 5.65 2.53 
Notes: 1. The data is weighted. 2. High mean scores indicate positive sentiments towards 
immigrants while low mean scores indicate negative sentiments. 3. All individuals who 
reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded. 
 
5.4.2 Multivariate Analysis by Cantril Subgroup  
In order to adequately test the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and 
xenophobia, I turn to multivariate modelling and employ a standard Ordinary Least Squares 
regression. The dependent is the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index, and a positive coefficient 
represents a positive evaluation of foreigners living in South Africa. A number of different 
control variables were created for the multivariate analysis; these are introduced and 
discussed below.  
 
5.4.2.1 Constructing Independent Variables for the Model  
Age was measured using a continuous variable coded as the age of the respondent in years at 
the time of interview. Education is coded as a continuous variable using years of educational 
attainment (0-16). Provincial location, population group, marital status, gender and labour 
market participation were controlled for using dummy variables.  Political affiliation was 
captured using a survey question on which political party an individual would vote for if 
there was a hypothetical general election tomorrow. Responses were coded onto a categorical 
variable, for which the categories were: ruling party (African National Congress), main 
opposition (Democratic Alliance), other opposition and undeclared/refused. I included a 
measure of personal life evaluations in the past five years (Past Five Years Evaluation) 
measured on a 0-10 scale with 10 representing the best possible life. I control for the 
relationship between the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index and negative stereotypes about 
immigrants by using the Perceived Foreign Threat Index.  
 
For social identity theorists studying anti-immigration sentiment, nationalism has been a 
dominant factor in explaining attitudes towards immigrants (see, for example, de Figueiredo 
and Elkins, 2003; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Citrin and Sides, 2008). Group identity theory 
posits that an individual’s sense of group belonging and pride can result in a simultaneous 
process of outgroup hostility, without any perceived or real competition (Tajfel, 1981). 
Supporters of this position argue that individuals’ general need for cultural socialisation and 
identity can result in fear of unfamiliar culture and cultural change. Fear of this kind can 
produce prejudice (also see Brown, 2011). Nationalism is controlled by using a 1-5 measure 
which combined two items38 on how proud an individual was to be a South African, with the 
high score indicating pride in the country. It must also be noted that national pride is a 
                                                          
38 Respondents in the survey were asked comparative questions on national pride, asking if 
they agreed or disagreed that: (i) “I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any 
other country in the world”; and (ii) “Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country 
than most other countries”. Responses were reversed and coded onto a five-point Likert scale 
which was then reversed (1 strongly disagree, 5 strongly agree). 




multidimensional concept and the measure constructed here may not adequately capture the 
different facets of South African nationalism. Due to data limitations, I was unable to 
construct a multidimensional measure of a national sentiment to distinguish between different 
components of national pride. 
 
In intergroup relations research, a popular theorem is that regular social interaction can 
overcome antagonisms between different groups. According to this hypothesis, which was 
first formulated in Allport’s (1954) seminal work The Nature of Prejudice, intergroup contact 
has a positive impact on reducing prejudice between groups. The nature of this contact is, 
however, also highly influential and Allport argued that contact could only reduce prejudice 
if that contact occurred under certain conditions of friendship (e.g. contact had to be 
‘intimate’, cooperative, and equal). Many surveys on intergroup relations often fail to include 
measures that address the nature of contact between individuals, resulting in an inability to 
test whether the preconditions suggested by Allport have been met (Pettigrew and Tropp, 
2006). Cognisant of this conditionality, contact with immigrants in this study is accounted for 
using a categorical variable: no contact; casual contact (foreign acquaintances but no foreign 
friends); and friendship with foreigners living in South Africa39.  
 
Table 5.4: Mean Scores and Principal Component Analysis on the Perceived Foreign 
Threat Index 







Immigrants increase crime rates 3.82 1.14 0.793 0.632 0.709 
Immigrants take jobs away  3.76 1.22 0.804 0.597 0.702 
Immigrants bring disease to South Africa 3.44 1.26 0.782 0.611 0.719 
Immigrants use up our country’s resources 3.77 1.09 0.712 0.737 0.756 
Notes: 1. The data is weighted; 2. A higher mean (ranged 1-5) indicates a higher level of 
agreement with the relevant item; and 3. All individuals who reported they were not citizens 
of South Africa were excluded. 
 
In 2012, SASAS respondents were asked to specify the extent to which they agreed or 
disagreed that immigrants (i) increased crime rates; (ii) took jobs away from people who were 
born in South Africa; (iii) spread disease; and (iv) drained resources from the country. 
Respondents were coded onto a standard 1-5 agreement scale and then reversed (1 = disagree 
strongly, 5 = agree strongly). The majority of the adult population was found to agree with 
these statements (Table 5.4). The results on each individual item correspond with what has 
been found by SAMP surveys on public attitudes towards immigrants (e.g. Mattes et al., 
1999; Crush et al., 2013). To produce a Perceived Foreign Threat Index, responses to these 
SASAS questions were then combined and averaged which ranged from 1-5, with the higher 
value representing the higher level of perceived threat from foreigners. The validity of the 
measure was confirmed using reliability testing (which produced a Cronbach alpha of 0.77) 
and via factor analysis.  The distribution on the index is skewed towards the right, indicating 
that most in South Africa believe that foreign immigrants are a threat to material livelihoods 
in their communities. 
                                                          
39 Two questions are employed to create this categorical variable: (i) “How many 
acquaintances do you know who have come to live in South Africa from another country?”; 
and (ii) “Of the people you know who have come to live in South Africa from another 
country, how many would you consider to be your friends?” 





5.4.2.2 Multivariate Findings   
The primary goal of the chapter is to show the relationship between subjective national 
wellbeing and attitudes towards immigrants amongst the different Cantril subgroups. But it 
would be instructive to look at how the independent variables describe in the previous section 
correlate with the dependent variable amongst the entire citizen adult population. For this 
test, three models were produced. The first includes only the standard socio-demographic and 
economic background variables while the second introduces the Past Five Years Evaluation 
indicator as well as the NWI. The final model introduces the Perceived Foreign Threat Index 
as well as the contact variable and is the fully specified model.  No variance inflation value 
exceeded ten. By testing the variance inflation values on each model, multicollinearity among 
the independent variables was assessed. The results of the multivariate analysis are 
represented in Table 5.5. 
 
In Model III, even after controlling for a range of socio-economic, behavioural and attitudinal 
variables, the NWI remained a significant determinant of the dependent. It is notable that the 
size of the correlation between the NWI and the dependent declined (from beta = 0.22 in 
Model II to beta = 0.18 in Model III) when the Perceived Foreign Threat Index and the 
contact variable were introduced. However, the NWI was the second most salient of all 
independent variables in the final model. As may be expected, the Perceived Foreign Threat 
Index was the most salient correlate in Table 5.5. Individuals’ evaluations of the past five 
years also had a statistically significantly affect at the 0.1% level in Model III.  Although the 
size of the observed coefficient (beta = -0.08) was small in comparison to the NWI, it 
indicators that positive evaluations of life tend to lead to more positive attitudes towards 
international migrants.  
 
In the final model, population group was found to be a weak but significant predictor of 
attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa. The Coloured (beta = 0.05) and white racial 
minorities (beta = 0.06) were found to be significantly different from the Black African 
majority although the scale of this difference was slight. This result is unsurprising given the 
findings showcased in Table 5.2. The effect of education on attitudes towards outgroups has 
been investigated by a number of scholars. Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), for example, 
found a significant effect of education on attitudes towards immigrants using European Social 
Survey data (also see Coenders and Scheepers, 2003). The results depicted in Table 5.5 
suggest a weak but positive relationship between education and the Pro-Immigrant Attitude 
Index.  
 
As expected, confirmatory evidence was found for Allport’s contact hypothesis in Table 5.5. 
The results clearly corroborate the pattern observed in other studies concerning the nature of 
contact (see, for instance, Pettigrew, 1998b; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006), namely that those 
who had contact with immigrants were more likely to demonstrate higher levels of pro-
immigrant sentiment than those with no foreigner contact. Those with foreign acquaintances 
but no foreign friends were not significantly more tolerant than those with no contact, 
confirming the thesis that the type of contact matters. The role played by national pride is 
also tested and it is clear that, as can be observed in Table 5.5, the nationalism variable did 
not behave as expected. In none of the three models was national pride a significant predictor 
of attitudes. 
 




Table 5.5: Multivariate on the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index amongst the Entire Adult Citizen Population  
  Model I Model II Model III 
  CoEff. Std. Err. Beta Sig. CoEff. Std. Err. Beta Sig. CoEff. Std. Err. Beta Sig. 
Female (ref. male) -0.08 0.12 -0.01 
 
-0.02 0.12 0.00 
 
-0.02 0.11 0.00 
 Age -0.01 0.00 -0.05 * 0.00 0.00 -0.03 
 
0.00 0.00 -0.01 
 Married (ref. not married) -0.16 0.15 -0.03 
 
-0.21 0.15 -0.03 
 
-0.27 0.14 -0.04 





  Coloured 0.56 0.22 0.06 * 0.43 0.22 0.05 
 
0.44 0.21 0.05 * 
Indian 0.41 0.35 0.03 
 
0.32 0.35 0.02 
 
0.28 0.34 0.02 
 White 0.50 0.24 0.06 * 0.57 0.24 0.07 * 0.51 0.23 0.06 * 





  Unemployed -0.28 0.17 -0.05 
 
-0.31 0.17 -0.05 
 
-0.17 0.16 -0.03 
 Part-time Employed 0.28 0.25 0.03 
 
0.21 0.25 0.02 
 
0.16 0.24 0.02 
 Labour Inactive -0.03 0.17 0.00 
 
-0.23 0.17 -0.04 
 
-0.17 0.16 -0.03 
 Years of Education 0.06 0.02 0.07 ** 0.05 0.02 0.07 ** 0.04 0.02 0.05 * 
National Pride -0.05 0.07 -0.01 
 
-0.15 0.08 -0.04 
 
-0.05 0.07 -0.02 
 Past Five Years Evaluation  
  
0.09 0.03 0.08 ** 0.09 0.03 0.08 *** 
National Wellbeing Index 
  
0.04 0.00 0.22 *** 0.03 0.00 0.18 *** 






















-0.82 0.06 -0.26 *** 










 Root MSE   2.72      2.64      2.51  
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05 
Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, political affiliation and geographic location, 2. The data is weighted, 3. 
Positive coefficients indicate positive sentiments towards immigrants while negative coefficients indicate negative sentiments, and 4. All 
individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.  
  




Table 5.6: Multivariate on the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index amongst the Different Cantril Subgroups 
  Model I: Low(0-4) Model II: Medium (5-7) Model III: High (8-10) 
  CoEff. Std. Err. Beta Sig. CoEff. Std. Err. Beta Sig. CoEff. Std. Err. Beta Sig. 
Female (ref. male) 0.44 0.24 0.08 
 
-0.03 0.15 -0.01 
 
-0.35 0.24 -0.06 
 Age -0.01 0.01 -0.07 
 
0.01 0.01 0.04 
 
0.00 0.01 -0.02 
 Married (ref. not married) 0.40 0.32 0.06 
 
-0.10 0.19 -0.02 
 
-1.27 0.31 -0.21 *** 





  Coloured 0.44 0.53 0.05 
 
0.32 0.28 0.04 
 
0.51 0.45 0.05 
 Indian 0.78 1.03 0.03 
 
0.53 0.46 0.03 
 
-0.12 0.57 -0.01 
 White 0.22 0.55 0.02 
 
0.56 0.32 0.07 
 
0.43 0.44 0.06 





  Unemployed -0.18 0.36 -0.03 
 
0.05 0.22 0.01 
 
-0.23 0.36 -0.03 
 Part-time Employed -0.60 0.53 -0.06 
 
0.26 0.31 0.03 
 
0.99 0.50 0.09 
 Labour Inactive -0.64 0.40 -0.10 
 
-0.04 0.22 -0.01 
 
-0.04 0.31 -0.01 
 Years of Education -0.12 0.04 -0.16 ** 0.07 0.02 0.09 ** 0.14 0.04 0.17 *** 
National Pride -0.05 0.16 -0.01 
 
-0.10 0.10 -0.03 
 
-0.02 0.15 -0.01 
 Past Five Years Evaluation  0.12 0.05 0.11 * 0.11 0.04 0.08 ** -0.04 0.05 -0.03 
 National Wellbeing Index 0.02 0.01 0.14 ** 0.04 0.01 0.20 *** 0.02 0.01 0.10 * 









-0.42 0.38 -0.05 
 Friends 0.89 0.29 0.15 ** 0.38 0.17 0.07 * 0.58 0.26 0.10 * 
Foreign Threat -0.69 0.15 -0.21 
 
-0.72 0.09 -0.24 *** -0.98 0.13 -0.31 *** 










 Root MSE   2.52      2.41      2.55  
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05 
Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, political affiliation and geographic location, 2. The data is weighted, 3. 
Positive coefficients indicate positive sentiments towards immigrants while negative coefficients indicate negative sentiments, and 4. All 
individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.  
 




Now I examine how the independent variables describe in the previous section correlate with 
the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index amongst the different Cantril subgroups. Three linear 
regression models were conducted, one for each of the three subgroups. The results of this 
modelling are represented in Table 5.6. In all Cantril subgroups, public concerns about the 
welfare of the nation had a salient relationship with the dependent in other words. It was 
interesting to note that in Model II (beta = 0.20) the size of the beta coefficient on the NWI 
was notably larger than the coefficient observed in Models I (beta = 0.14) and III (beta = 
0.10). The remainder of this subsection will discuss other findings that emerged from the 
multivariate testing in Table 5.6, noting differences between the models.  
 
Individuals’ assessments of their lives in the past five years did not have a statistically 
significant effect on the dependent in Model I and III. This measure of personal life 
appraisals was, however, correlated (beta = 0.08) with the Pro-Immigrant Attitude Index in 
Model II. Given the findings in Table 5.5, it was unsurprising to note that the Perceived 
Foreign Threat Index had a robust relationship with the dependent in all three models, 
although the size of the beta coefficient was larger in Model III (beta = -0.31) than in Model I 
(beta = -0.21) and II (beta = -0.24). Friendship was also statistically associated with the 
dependent in all three models. The correlation between friendship and the dependent was, 
however, weaker in Model II (beta = 0.07) when compared to what was observed in Model I 
(beta = 0.15) and III (beta = 0.10).  
 
An intriguing finding was observed when considering the influence of marital status on 
attitudes towards international migrants. Marital status has generally been found to be a weak 
and inconsistent predictor of attitudes towards foreigners (see, for example, de Figueiredo 
and Elkins, 2003; Sides and Citrin, 2007). Marital status did not seem to have a statistically 
significant correlation for those in the Medium and High Cantril subgroups. In Model III, 
however, those who were married were found to be much more negative (beta = -0.21) in 
their assessment of foreigners than the unmarried. Foreign nationals are often accused of 
breaking up ‘local’ marriages and the prevalence of this stereotype may explain this 
observation. It is not clear why this finding only holds for those who are in the High group. 
Perhaps married individuals who are satisfied with life may be afraid of losing what they 
have. Another noteworthy observation from Table 5.6 concerned educational attainment. This 
independent variable had a significant and positive correlation with the dependent in Model II 
(beta = 0.09) and III (beta = 0.17). However, the correlation between educational attainment 
and pro-immigrant sentiment was negative in Model I (beta = -0.16). It is not clear why 
educational attainment should have a negative relationship with the Pro-Immigrant Attitude 
Index among the Low group40. 
 
5.5 Discussion  
 
In South Africa, the government faces substantial pressure to deliver on the personal hopes of 
the electorate for a better life. There already exists in South Africa a substantial block –
roughly 24% of the total adult population –of discontented and disillusioned individuals. It is 
possible to imagine a scenario where unmet expectations lead to an expansion of this block, a 
                                                          
40 It could be argued that the observed effect here is due to the low numbers of tertiary 
educated respondents in the Low Cantril subgroup. This supposition is based on the thesis 
that there are significant nonlinearities in the association between education and pro-
immigrant attitudes. Using European data, scholars like Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007), have 
argued that such nonlinearities exist. 




growing population of individuals who are stressed, worried, depressed and angry. Although 
avoiding this outcome is a worthwhile goal, such a change may not alter the level of 
xenophobic sentiment in the country by a considerable margin. The evidence presented in this 
study showed that even among those who are in the ‘High’ Cantril subgroup, anti-immigrant 
sentiment is strong. While there were some interesting differentiations between the different 
Cantril subgroups, on the whole, the factors that are driving pro-immigrant sentiment did not 
differ by Cantril subgroup. Among each of the three Cantril subgroups, there were similar 
predictors of pro-immigrant sentiment. 
 
One of the main aims of this study was to discern whether subjective national wellbeing had a 
relationship with pro-immigrant sentiment. Multivariate testing showed that public concerns 
about the welfare of the nation have a salient relationship with attitudes towards foreign 
nationals regardless of Cantril subgroup. Immigration policy in South Africa may have 
played a role in constructing this link. According to Klotz (2013), post-1994 immigration 
policy in South Africa has certainly tended to promote the notion of immigrants as the ‘other’ 
(also see Segatti, 2011b). Reviewing the history of immigration policies in the country, he 
argues that anti-immigration policies have been used as a mechanism to reassure the 
boundaries of national ‘identity’. Neocosmos (2010) contends that the post-1994 state’s 
nation-building policy encouraged divisions between ‘citizens’ and ‘foreigners’. Regardless 
of the cause, it seems apparent that individual identification with the collective dimension in 
South Africa has resulted in a relatively robust correlation between subjective national 
wellbeing and anti-immigrant sentiment.   
 
Figure 5.5: National Ratings on the Cantril Ladder 
 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2012)  
 
Given the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and subjective national wellbeing, it 
would seem important to present data on individual’s past and future evaluations of national 
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country on a symbolic 11‐point ladder in which the top rungs represented their greatest hopes 
for South Africa and the bottom their worst fears. Respondents were asked where the country 
stood on the ladder (i) five years ago; (ii) at present; and (iii) in five years’ time41. The results 
(Figure 5.5) show that national ratings of the country’s future tended to be, on average, 
positive. Mean evaluations of the past five years in the country, by contrast, were more 
negative. Investigating this data further, Møller and Roberts (2015) found that past national 
rating tended to be higher for the economically better-off in society. The poor tended to be 
more positive about the future, indicating their expectations for further socio-economic 
development. Black Africans tended to rate the immediate past quite negatively in 
comparison to the white minority but were on average much more positive in their 
assessment of the future.  
 
Evidence of negative evaluations of subjective national wellbeing among many South 
Africans suggests the importance of better understanding the public’s hopes for a better 
nation. Looking at hopes for the future of the South African nation among the public using 
the Cantril Method, Møller and Roberts (2015) found that South Africans were very inward-
looking and raised almost no concerns concerning issues beyond the nation. The majority of 
national hopes are ‘precarious’ economic and political ones (i.e. hopes paired with fears or 
hopes defined by deprivation, see Gulyas, 2015). The most common hopes for the future 
included: employment, protection from crime, honest government, adequate standard of 
living, good governance and leadership, a strong economy and a good public health service. 
Addressing many of the negative trends (in terms of unemployment, poverty and crime etc.) 
that the public feels are damaging the nation should improve subjective national wellbeing in 
the country.  
 
In many industrial countries, education has been seen as an antidote to racism and 
xenophobia. But educational attainment had a negative relationship with pro-immigrant 
sentiment among South Africans who were in the Low Cantril subgroup. The direction of 
relationship here could help explain why many better-educated South Africans tend to exhibit 
similar levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in public opinion surveys (e.g. Minnaar et al., 
1996; Mattes et al., 1999; Crush et al., 2013). It is not immediately clear, however, why 
educational attainment should have such a different relationship for those in the Low Cantril 
subgroup compared to the other two subgroups. Education systems often make use of 
national symbols and mythos (Brown, 2011).  Exposure to the education system (under 
certain circumstances) could heighten the perceived differences division between insiders 
(i.e. citizens) and outsiders (i.e. foreigners). More research is clearly needed to better 
understand this finding, focusing on the past and present education systems in South Africa.  
 
One of the limitations of this study was that it was unable to identify those characteristics 
associated with xenophobic violence. This study has not investigated the relationship between 
subjective national wellbeing and intergroup violence and there is no evidence, currently, that 
links the NWI with intergroup violence in a linear fashion. Although evidence was found for 
a relationship between pro-immigrant sentiment and subjective national wellbeing, the 
                                                          
41 Pairwise correlations between the composite subjective National Wellbeing Index 
constructed for this study (i.e. the NWI) and these three measures showed that five year 
future evaluations (0.405) had a higher correlation coefficient with the NWI than past five 
year evaluations (0.115). Also using pairwise correlations, future evaluations of the state of 
the nation (0.146) were found to have a higher correlation coefficient with the Pro-Immigrant 
Attitude Index than past evaluations (0.067). 




relationship between outgroup hostility and violence is complex. Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti 
(2012), in their study of the 2008 anti-immigrant riots, identify those characteristics 
associated with the areas where the violence occurred: male dominated, linguistically diverse, 
highly unequal, and a high proportion of black informal urban dwellers. This research has 
been unable to speak to which characteristics are associated with violent behaviour towards 
immigrants. More scholarly work (like that conducted by Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti) 
should be conducted investigating the determinants of anti-immigrant violence in South 
Africa. 
 
5.6 Recommendations and Conclusions  
 
The ongoing refugee influx into Europe, North America and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
highlights the need to better comprehend the determinants of xenophobic prejudice in a fast 
changing world. The central goal of this chapter is to show that a better understanding of 
quality of life can help us better understand social tolerance towards diverse groups. 
Although this goal is somewhat outside the remit of the discipline, quality of life scholars 
have often pushed beyond the boundaries of their own discipline to explore broader issues 
and make new connections (see, for instance, Michalos, 2013). Quality of life indicators can 
act as vital measures of a nation’s health and their relationship to prejudice should become an 
important site of study alongside other macroeconomic indicators. The chapter has followed 
this tradition and shown that quality of life data can be employed to better comprehend 
prejudice by utilising a multidisciplinary lens. In this way, the chapter has contributed 
meaningfully to the quality of life academic field. 
 
The chapter has added to our understanding of quality of life in South Africa. But the 
findings of this chapter, and their significance, go beyond the confines of South Africa and 
suggest a new mechanism to understand prejudice in Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere. Two 
of the three main predictors identified in this chapter (i.e. intergroup contact and perceived 
consequences of immigration) are well-known predictors of anti-immigrant sentiment. The 
other predictor was subjective national wellbeing, which is an indicator often ignored by 
scholars studying intergroup relations. In this study, subjective national wellbeing acted as a 
determinant of pro-immigrant sentiment, regardless of whether we look at the frustrated and 
disillusioned or the satisfied and sanguine. Quality of life researchers should be cognisant of 
this relationship and should consider how the results of this study may impact on their own 
work. For quality of life researchers interested in understanding prejudice, there is a need to 
identify and monitor subjective national wellbeing. Efforts must be made to field the National 
Wellbeing Index in nationally representative surveys at regular intervals in Sub-Saharan 
Africa and elsewhere in order to gather the appropriate data for future studies. 
 
The chapter has shown that there may be a link between individuals’ sense of a national ‘self’ 
and anti-immigrant prejudice. The focus of this study was national subjective wellbeing, but 
subjective community wellbeing may have an equally robust relationship with anti-immigrant 
sentiment in developing countries like South Africa. As quality of life research expands 
further into Sub-Saharan Africa, a priority should be placed on measuring and understanding 
subjective collective wellbeing at different levels (e.g. neighbourhood, village, town, region 
etc.). Future research should advance our knowledge on the link between subjective 
collective wellbeing at different geographies and prejudice. The classic measures designed by 
Hadley Cantril on subjective individual and national wellbeing performed well in 
heterogeneous South Africa. These Cantril measures should be considered as part of future 
quality of life studies that look at the relationship between prejudice and different kinds of 




subjective community wellbeing. In conclusion, I feel confident in predicting that community 
wellbeing studies will have a particularly important role to play in future investigations of 
xenophobia and prejudice in a diverse array of geographic settings.  
 







African states are often characterised as low trust societies. Could a deficiency of social 
capital explain prejudice towards immigrants in such societies? Using South Africa as a 
case study, this paper tests the effect of social trust, social bonds with neighbours and a 
sense of community on attitudes towards foreigners. The results reveal that social 
capital may be a more important predictor of attitudes than economic status. Social 
bonds between neighbours and a sense of community were found to be more salient 
determinants of prejudice than social trust. In African societies it is, therefore, 




In many African societies, anti-immigration prejudice is a widespread problem which can be 
a threat to social order. A study of attitudes towards immigration across 47 countries found 
that many citizens in African nations, particularly those south of the Sahara, had negative 
attitudes towards immigration (Miller, 2012). In Sub-Saharan Africa, such prejudice has 
caused social upheaval in a number of countries, including Côte d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Kenya and 
South Africa. Could this reflect a social capital deficit among such societies? Is xenophobia –
a form of racism– influenced by flagging social bonds in neighbourhoods in African 
countries, and what is the direction of this relationship? Putnam (2000) has argued that social 
capital acts as a foundation for collaboration and co-existence between groups and 
contributes to the creation of integrated and cooperative communities. This paper will explore 
these questions, using South Africa as a case study.  
 
Like many African nations, South Africa is a culturally heterogeneous nation characterised 
by significant economic and social inequalities. The results of international public opinion 
surveys clearly show that citizens in the country are, on average, very distrustful of strangers. 
But these levels of trust are similar to those in other African countries. Using the 2010–2012 
Afrobarometer survey, for example, it is possible to compare social trust in South Africa with 
32 other countries on the African continent. Less than a fifth (17%) of South Africans thought 
that most people could be trusted compared to about four-fifths (81%) of those who thought 
that you cannot be too careful42. The country was found to have middling levels of social trust 
when compared to other African countries in the survey. Social trust in the country was 
below Namibia (25%) and Senegal (30%), but above Kenya (9%), Zambia (10%) and Nigeria 
                                                          
42 The question used to measure social trust in the 2010–2012 Afrobarometer survey is a two-
point indicator which asked respondents, “[g]enerally speaking, would you say that most 
people can be trusted or that you need to be very careful in dealing with people?” 
Respondents answered either (i) most people can be trusted or (ii) need to be very careful. 




(16%). As a result, the country serves as an interesting social laboratory for studying the 
relationship between intergroup relations and social capital in an African context.  
 
The relationship between social capital and anti-immigrant prejudice, suggested by Putnam 
(2000), has not, however, been adequately tested in the developing world. Of those studies 
that do quantitatively explore the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment outside North 
America and Europe, there is little focus on indicators of social capital. This paper will 
rectify this knowledge gap by testing multiple measures of social capital on attitudes towards 
immigrants in an African society. South African data from the 2011 South African Social 
Attitudes Survey (SASAS) will be utilised for this purpose. The results of this study will 
contribute significantly to the scholarship on how social capital influences attitudes towards 
immigrants in such societies. 
 
6.2 The Setting: Immigration in South Africa 
 
According to population data from the United Nations’ Population Division (UNPD), South 
Africa has one of the largest international migration populations on the African continent and 
only Côte d'Ivoire is comparable (UNPD, 2013). To place the country in perspective, the 
available cross-national data suggest that of the more than 17 million international migrants 
reported by the UNPD to be living in different Sub-Saharan African countries, almost one-
seventh (13.9%) are located in South Africa. However, it should also be remembered that 
international migrants comprise only a small share (4.5%) of the total population of that 
country. The immigrant population has grown significantly over time. According to data from 
the World Bank and the South African 2011 national census, the number of immigrants in the 
country increased from 1.2 million in 1990 to 2.2 million in 2011. It is very difficult, 
however, to arrive at a precise count of the number of immigrants in the post-apartheid 
nation, due to sustainable evidence of undocumented migration (see Segatti, 2011a). 
 
Immigration has played a prominent role in the pre-transition history of South Africa. During 
the centuries of white minority rule, the colonial and then apartheid governments recruited 
Black Africans from southern Africa (and beyond) to work in the nation’s mines and farms as 
cheap, unskilled labour. After the end of white minority rule in the early 1990s, and the 
beginning of the democratic process, South Africa enjoyed a relatively high level of 
economic development and political freedom, and was considered an attractive destination 
for immigrants on the continent. Following the first truly democratic elections in 1994, a 
significant number of immigrants entered the country, with the bulk of the new arrivals 
coming from Sub-Saharan Africa (Crush, 2012). These immigrants entered a nation 
recovering from the racial segregation and intergroup conflict that had characterised South 
Africa for much of its history as a modern state. 
 
South Africa, along with many other African states, emerged from nondemocratic rule during 
the feted third wave of democratisation. This transition was, however, considered unique 
because the new democratic government was faced with the daunting task of dismantling a 
system of racial segregation and privilege –the apartheid system– which favoured the 
country’s white minority. Evolving out of colonial-era legislation, this system resulted in a 
highly racially polarised society (e.g. Gibson and Gouws, 2000; Gibson, 2006) characterised 
by interracial economic and social inequality. Among the legacies of the colonial and 
apartheid periods was a strong subcultural pluralism where racial (as well as intra-racial or 
ethnic) divisions were central to politics. Steenkamp (2009) has argued that social distrust 




permeated pre-transition South Africa. Creating social cohesion, and consequently palatable 
intergroup relations, was one of the central tasks of the country’s post-transition government.  
 
In rebuilding the post-apartheid nation, the new government, led by the African National 
Congress (ANC), began a programme of nation-building, reconciliation and national unity. 
The notable scholar Neocosmos (2010) has argued that the nation-building programme 
launched by the ANC has been decidedly hostile to the growing immigrant community. 
Certainly, notwithstanding shifts in policy, the government has tended to focus on preventing 
undocumented migration into the country (also see Segatti, 2011b). Authorities have been 
granted wide powers to detain and deport those who violate the country’s immigration 
control laws. The extensive powers to detain suspected undocumented migrants granted to 
the authorities have resulted in a high arrest rate (Landau, 2005; Nyamnjoh, 2006) and 
hundreds of thousands are deported from South Africa every year. The political opposition in 
South Africa (which is relatively small and receives support from only a minority of the 
electorate) have done little to challenge this state of affairs. 
 
Mass urban anti-immigrant riots broke out in South Africa during May and June 2008. The 
riots resulted in the death of 62, the arrest of 1384 and the displacement of more than a 
hundred thousand (Misago, 2012). Such xenophobia was largely directed against black 
immigrants from Sub-Saharan Africa, who are derogatorily referred to as makwerekwere in 
South Africa. Although the largest and most extensive anti-immigrant riots observed so far in 
the country, the 2008 riots should be seen as part of a general pattern of anti-immigrant 
violence that has been a troubling feature of the post-apartheid period.  Much research in 
South Africa has focused on the causes of xenophobic violence (Dodson, 2010). It is 
important to be cognisant of the fact that the drivers of xenophobic violence will not perfectly 
correlate with the drivers of xenophobic prejudice more generally. The decision to engage in 
such violence is mediated by a number of factors other than simple prejudice, as research by 
Horowitz (2001) has shown. 
 
A number of public opinion surveys in South Africa have captured attitudes towards 
immigration during the post-apartheid period. Attitudes towards immigrants more generally 
were well documented by the Southern African Migration Project (SAMP), using a number 
of public opinion surveys in 1999, 2006 and 2010. The findings of these surveys show that a 
majority of South Africans preferred restrictive immigration policies43 and held anti-
immigrant sentiments (Crush et al., 2013). The 2001–2002 National Immigration Policy 
Survey, fielded in Southern Africa, confirmed these findings (Crush and Pendleton, 2007). 
Despite this survey work, the quantitative public opinion research on anti-immigrant 
sentiment in South Africa is relatively thin. As far as the author is aware, no current study on 
attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa has investigated the impact of social capital on 
anti-immigrant sentiment using quantitative opinion data. 
 
6.3 Determinants of Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: A Literature Review 
 
A number of researchers have sought to explain xenophobia in South African society. In 
particular, scholars have sought to better understand the relationship between intolerance of 
                                                          
43 These findings were further verified by international survey evidence. According to a study 
by Miller (2012: 3) using data from the 2007 Global Attitudes Project, South Africans were 
found to be more supportive of restricting immigration than any of the other 47 different 
nations surveyed, except for citizens of Tanzania and Malaysia. 




foreigners and material conditions in South African communities. In her review of the 
literature on xenophobia in South Africa, Dodson (2010) notes this trend, particularly in the 
aftermath of the 2008 riots. In Europe and North America, economic competition theory has 
been utilised by social scientists to test a connection between economic position and 
prejudice towards immigrants (see, for instance, Citrin et al., 1997; Hainmueller and Hiscox, 
2007; McLaren and Johnson, 2007). The credence of this argument seems to have been 
strengthened by the fact that post-apartheid South Africa, like many developing countries, 
suffers from high levels of unemployment, considerable income inequality and widespread 
poverty. 
 
A number of scholars writing about xenophobia in South Africa have questioned the link 
between anti-immigrant prejudice and material conditions (for a review see Dodson, 2010). 
Using often qualitative techniques, researchers such as Nyamnjoh (2006) and Neocosmos 
(2010) have argued that issues of identity (both political and social) act as drivers of 
xenophobia in the country. An interesting and noteworthy study on xenophobic violence in 
South Africa may offer insights into what drives anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa. 
Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012) ask whether there was an objective correlation between 
the areas affected by the 2008 anti-foreigner riots and a certain socio-economic profile. Using 
ward level data, the researchers concluded that unemployment and absolute poverty were not 
correlated with the occurrence of the 2008 riots. Heterogeneity, in terms of both income and 
ethnicity, however, was found to be significantly correlated. Obviously, correlates of 
xenophobic violence and anti-immigrant sentiment will not be identical. Nonetheless, 
Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti’s study demonstrates the importance of social identity in 
understanding attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa. 
 
6.3.1 Social Identity: Nationalism and Race 
Group identity may be an important predictor of attitudes towards immigrants. An 
individual’s sense of group belonging and pride, social identity theory postulates, can result 
in a simultaneous process of outgroup hostility (Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Other scholars, 
such as Allport (1954), dispute the link between prejudice and ingroup pride or loyalty. In the 
case of attitudes towards foreigners, beliefs about the nation are particularly important. 
Attitudes towards immigrant communities in Europe have been shown to be strongly 
correlated with more symbolic concerns about cultural threats that such groups represent to 
established national unity and distinctiveness than with economic position (see, for instance, 
McLaren and Johnson, 2007; Citrin and Sides, 2008). In South Africa, social identity is 
complicated by the colonial and apartheid-era social engineering programmes that sought to 
divide and separate communities along racial lines. Despite the end of these programmes 
attachment to racial identity remains strong in South Africa44 (Gibson and Gouws, 2000; 
Gibson, 2006). This paper will examine the impact of social identity on attitudes towards 
immigrants, using multiple social identity variables. 
 
                                                          
44 Attitudinal evidence for this reality has been captured in a number of academic works 
including by Gibson and Gouws (2000), Gibson (2006) and Bornman (2010, 2011). It could 
be argued that the apartheid racial categories have been given new life and renormalised by 
the post-apartheid state. In fact, Maré (2003) has advanced the contention that the 
commitment of the African National Congress to ‘non-racialism’ is unachievable because 
there has been no serious theoretical investigation and reinterpretation of these categories. He 
described South African society as having transitioned from a racialised past to a racialised 
present. 




Social identity theory would suggest a link between anti-immigrant sentiment and national 
pride. The link between nationalism and attitudes towards immigration has been the subject 
of great interest in Europe and North America (see, for example, Maddens et al., 2000; de 
Figueiredo and Elkins, 2003). Acknowledging the anti-rural and pro-urban character of 
modern South African nationalism, Neocosmos (2010) argues that contemporary xenophobia 
in the country is caused, in part, by national pride. Neocosmos, however, did not test this 
association using quantitative data. As far as the author is aware, national pride has not been 
used as a predictor of anti-immigrant sentiment in quantitative public opinion studies in 
South Africa. Lawrence (2011), using the 2002 Latin Barometer Survey which covers 17 
Latin American nations, found that national pride was not a significant predictor of 
opposition to immigration. This raises doubt as to the salience of national identity pride as a 
predictor of attitudes across different immigration contexts, and this study will control for 
how a general sense of national pride influences anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa. 
 
Anti-immigrant sentiment has strong ethnic and racial overtones in many countries and, given 
that xenophobia is a form of racism, we expect racial attitudes to be salient determinants of 
anti-immigrant sentiment. In South Africa, the apartheid system put forward an ideological 
(as well as pseudo-scientific and religious) rationale for intergroup differentiation and 
stratification, encouraging outgroup hostility. Early post-apartheid evidence in South Africa 
suggests a link between attachment to racial identity and prejudice. Gibson and Gouws 
(2000) found, for example, that those who expressed a need for group solidarity and derived 
psychic benefits from their group associations were more likely to be intolerant of individuals 
with opposing political opinions. However, a recent study by Gibson (2006), which measured 
the impact of racial identity on inter-racial and political intolerance, found no correlation 
between racial identification and prejudice. This mixed evidence suggests that attachment to 
racial identity may play a role in attitude formulation among the South African public. Based 
on this evaluation of the literature, we derive the following hypotheses: 
 
H1. A strong attachment to racial identity will be correlated with attitudes towards 
foreigners, with strong attachment positively correlated with negative attitudes. 
 
Qualitative research in the country on the 2008 anti-immigrant riots suggests that micro-level 
political factors triggered the violence. Misago (2012) argued that political leadership 
vacuums and competition for community leadership helped translate prevailing xenophobic 
attitudes into anti-foreigner action. The violence revealed deep divisions between parts of the 
electorate and locally-elected leaders, and the absence of conflict resolution mechanisms in 
many communities. This study found that community leaders at the township level mobilised 
communities using nativist discourses – such mobilisations were characterised by a distinct 
level of political intolerance. This speaks to the role played by democratic values in 
understanding prejudice formation in South Africa. In a multivariate analysis of intergroup 
attitudes, Gibson (2006) found that blacks and whites in South Africa who were more 
supportive of democratic institutions were more tolerant. To explore the relationship between 
political intolerance and xenophobia, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2. Political tolerance in South Africa will be negatively associated with anti-immigrant 
sentiment. 
 
6.3.2 Social Capital: Trust and Community Cohesion 
Social capital, as defined by Putnam (2000: 19), is the associates among individuals’ “social 
networks and the norms of reciprocity and trustworthiness that arise from them”. Putnam 




argues that communities whose members are more socially cohesive will be more tolerant 
and therefore more likely to have positive attitudes towards outgroups. This suggests that, 
particularly in the context of tightly-knit communities, social networks have a positive 
function in reducing prejudice45. The relationship between social capital and anti-immigrant 
sentiment has received relatively little attention in the literature on xenophobia in South 
Africa. Steenkamp (2009), one of the few scholars making the link between social capital and 
anti-immigrant prejudice in the country, argues that anti-immigrant violence in South Africa 
exposed the high level of social distrust in post-apartheid society. Steenkamp, however, fails 
to ground her conclusions in evidence from public opinion surveys and, as such, her 
assertions remain untested. 
 
Traditionally the neighbourhood has been seen as an important setting for many of the 
processes which affect the construction of social identity (Sarason, 1974; Low and Altman, 
1992). Its principal role historically as a ‘space’ for extended domestic activities made the 
neighbourhood an extension of an individual’s ‘home’ and, therefore, very significant in 
identity terms.  Individuals who socialise in their local environment and build social networks 
with their neighbours will develop locally-based identities that could inform their attitudes 
(Cuba and Hummon, 1993). The cohesive nature of the neighbourhood, measured in social 
capital, will have an impact on an individual’s social identity formation (also see Forrest and 
Kearns, 2001). Although the neighbourhood may be an important source of social identity, 
there are concerns in South Africa that the neighbourhood is being eroded as a source of 
identity due to, among other things, increased spatial mobility. On these arguments, a lot is 
contingent on the quality of our spatial mobility comparisons. 
 
For those scholars investigating social cohesion and social capital, the neighbourhood has re-
emerged as an important site of study. It is important, as Forrest and Kearns (2001) note, that 
neighbouring is distinct from the neighbourhood. People may feel attached to their 
neighbourhoods as physical environments but do not seek or practise neighbourhood social 
interaction (also see Tartaglia, 2006). As a result, it may be important to look at social 
bonding in the neighbourhood as a predictor of attitudes. It is difficult to predict what impact 
social bonding within neighbourhoods will have on attitudes towards immigrants. In their 
review of the key debates on social cohesion, Forrest and Kearns (2001: 2141) argue that 
most of the systematic research on neighbourhood cohesion “has been undertaken in the US 
and the conclusions drawn can only be cautiously transferred as research questions to be 
posed in other national and cultural contexts”. However, the work of Putnam (2000) seems to 
indicate that having strong social bonds with your neighbours will reduce prejudice. This 
study is interested in how social bonding in the neighbourhood influences attitudes towards 
immigrants and, based on a reading of the social capital literature, we hypothesise as follows: 
 
                                                          
45 In South Africa, our conversations about social cohesion, especially as it concerns cities, 
tend to be quite pessimistic (Struwig et al., 2013). Our communities are depicted as outside 
Putnam’s wholesomely cohesive conception.  Since its inception, the idea of cities as 
potential zones of affable sociability has been at the root of the social science according to 
Thrift (2005). He argues that misanthropy is a natural condition of urban spaces and that there 
is a misanthropic thread that runs through modern cities. In closing he reasons that we cannot 
simply explain away this malign background as a ‘crisis of modernity’. Rather we must learn 
to endure it as part of how cities are experience –as a phenomena which cannot be regulated 
out of existence. 




H3. Individuals who have strong social ties with their neighbours will be more tolerant of 
immigrants than those with weak social ties. 
 
The examination of the role played by social capital as a predictor of attitudes towards 
immigrants is a relatively new area of research and few scholars have investigated the role 
played by bonds in neighbourhoods in reducing prejudice towards foreigners. In order to best 
test this hypothesis, this paper investigates social bonds in neighbourhoods alongside two 
other measures of social capital (i.e. social trust and attachment to community). This will 
allow for a more comprehensive analysis of the role played by social capital in determining 
attitudes in an African country such as South Africa. We expect that social bonding in the 
neighbourhood will have a greater influence on attitudes than social trust or community 
attachment. The two other measures of social capital will now be discussed in the later text. 
 
Social trust (sometimes termed interpersonal trust) can be thought of as the level of trust an 
individual has towards strangers (Putnam, 2000). This logically results in a greater tolerance 
of all strangers, including members of outgroups. Herreros and Criado (2009) argue that 
societies with high levels of social capital will have more positive attitudes towards 
immigration. Drawing on the 2002/2003 European Social Survey, Herreros and Criado show 
that, regardless of the impact of other individual-level variables, those individuals with high 
social trust do exhibit more positive attitudes towards immigration (see also Citrin and Sides, 
2008; Rustenbach, 2010). Social trust shown to strangers may be conditioned by the 
stranger’s ethnic or national identity. Delhey and Newton (2005: 312) argue that “[o]utgroups 
are mainly evaluated and categorised according to the congruency with ingroup beliefs”, and 
as a result “similar groups are assessed more favourably” than dissimilar groups. 
Consequently, social trust may not be a significant predictor of tolerance towards all 
outgroups. Interpersonal trust may have a different impact in a nation (such as South Africa) 
which is so deeply and recently affected by past racial segregation programmes. Social trust 
will be included as control when testing the role of neighbourhood social interaction. 
 
Sense of community is currently one of the most discussed concepts within community 
psychology and, over the last 30 years, work on this concept has grown substantially (for a 
review of this literature, see Tartaglia, 2006). As Sarason (1974) predicted, this research has 
shown that a sense of community has been linked to social and political participation and life 
satisfaction. A sense of community is associated with local identity, which is closely 
connected to social identity and a strong group identity may (as scholars such as Tajfel and 
Turner, 1979 have argued) be associated with prejudice towards outgroups. Few studies have, 
however, examined the correlation between prejudice and a sense of community. Researchers 
in Italy have investigated the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and community 
cohesion (Prezza and Zampatti, 2008). The results of this research found little evidence that a 
territorial sense of community is correlated with ethnic prejudice. Based on these findings, 
there is some evidence to suggest that attachment to a community may not be related to 
attitudes towards immigrants and this will be tested in this study. 
 
6.4 Data and Measurement 
 
The data selected for use in this study were the 2011 SASAS. This cross-sectional survey has 
been fielded by the Human Sciences Research Council since 2003. The aim of this survey 
series is to generate data on how public attitudes, behaviour and values are changing in the 
country. SASAS is nationally representative and has a sample of 3057 respondents living in 
private households aged 16 and older in 2011. This sample is composed of 500 Population 




Census enumeration areas, stratified by province, geographical subtype and majority 
population group. Interviews were completed in the interviewee’s language of choice and the 
survey was conducted during the October/November period. The chapter focuses on those 
who claim citizenship and will only provide an analysis of their attitudes. As the SASAS 
2011 sample consisted of both citizens and non-citizens, we restricted the group of 
investigation to those who claimed citizenship (N = 2954). 
 
Public opinion surveys can capture a wide variety of information and this can help identify 
and map the location and concentration of social problems such as prejudice. The SASAS 
survey instrument contains a broad spectrum of information on socio-economic, demographic 
and labour-force-related characteristics of adult South Africans. Each round consists of a core 
module of questions on social and political attitudes as well as rotating modules on specific 
themes. The 2011 round included a module on social cohesion that included questions on 
social bonding in a neighbourhood as well as intergroup tolerance. Questions from this 
module will be used in this study. The data available for this study relate to the 2011 period. 
More detailed information on trends in perceptions and understanding of different categories 
of ‘stranger’, ‘migrant’ and ‘immigrant’ and better delineation of their changing meanings 
over time is unavailable. 
 
6.4.1 Dependent Variable 
In order to measure negative attitudes towards outgroups in South African society, we used a 
question on tolerance towards certain groups. Respondents were asked how satisfied or 
dissatisfied they would be to have a foreign immigrant as a neighbour, a question derived 
from a similar question in the World Value Survey (WVS). The use of the word ‘foreign’ is 
employed to distinguish international immigrants from other migrants or strangers in the 
South African context. This question used a five-point scale ranging from 1 ‘very satisfied’ to 
5 ‘very dissatisfied’. As there are only five categories in the dependent variable, a linear 
regression approach was considered to be inappropriate and an ordered logistic regression 
approach was selected. 
 
6.4.2 Independent Variables 
Gender was measured using a dummy (1 = female; 0 = male), as was marital status (1 = 
married; 0 =not married). Census classification of respondents’ area of residence was coded 
as a set of dummy variables (urban formal, urban informal, rural formal and rural areas under 
traditional authority) capturing the geographic complexity of South Africa. Race group 
(Black African, Indian, ‘Coloured’ and White), labour market status (full-time employed, 
part-time employed, unemployed, student, retired and labour inactive) and educational 
attainment46 (junior primary and below, senior primary, incomplete secondary, complete 
secondary and tertiary) were likewise measured using a set of dummy variables. Economic 
status was assessed using a subjective question on personal and family wealth and recoded 
into a six-point categorical variable: (1) wealthy, (2) very comfortable, (3) reasonably 
                                                          
46 Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007: 428) suggest that when examining the role of education as 
a determinant of attitudes towards immigrants, education should be measured categorically as 
these scholars noted ‘substantial nonlinearities in the relationship between education and 
attitudes toward immigrant’. Using data from the European Social Survey, these authors 
found that college education had a more positive association with support for immigration 
when compared with high school education. Interestingly, completing elementary schooling 
was reported as having negative influence on individual support for immigration. 




comfortable, (4) just getting along, (5) poor and (6) very poor. Age was measured using a 
continuous variable (age in years). 
 
Contact with immigrants may reduce anti-immigrant sentiment according to Contact Theory, 
first developed by Allport (1954), which states that contact with outgroup members can 
reduce hostility towards that outgroup. Subsequent research on intergroup contact, according 
to Pettigrew (1998a: 76), has concluded that “friendship potential” is an “essential, not 
merely facilitating, condition for positive intergroup contact effects that generalise”. The 
importance of intimate contact has been shown in European studies for predicting anti-
immigrant attitudes (see, for example, Herreros and Criado, 2009). Therefore, it will be 
necessary to control for intimate contact with immigrants in this study. Contact is measured 
using a categorical ‘friendship with immigrants’ variable with 1(no foreign friends), 2(a few 
foreign friends) and 3(some or many foreign friends). 
 
A series of different attitudinal variables were used in this study. National pride was 
measured using the question: “Do you agree or disagree that generally speaking, South Africa 
is a better country than most other countries?” The question: “Do you agree or disagree that 
being a member of my race group is an important part of who I am as a person?” was used to 
measure racial attachment. Responses to both these questions were captured on a five-point 
agree–disagree Likert scale with 1 representing ‘strongly agree’ and 5 ‘strongly disagree’. 
Political intolerance is how satisfied or dissatisfied they would be to have a person with 
different political views from own as a neighbour. This question used a five-point scale 
ranging from 1 ‘very satisfied’ to 5 ‘very dissatisfied’. In order to adequately understand the 
role played by political tolerance, political affiliation must also be considered. We controlled 
for political affiliation in the 2009 national elections47, creating a categorical variable. 
 
Social trust was measured using three questions on interpersonal trust48. Responses to these 
questions are coded using an 11-point scale of satisfaction (0, completely dissatisfied to 10, 
completely satisfied). The responses were combined (Cronbach alpha 0.821) into a 0–10 
score with 0 representing the lowest level of interpersonal trust and 10 the highest. 
Neighbourhood bonding was measured using three questions on reciprocal relations with 
neighbours49. Responses to these questions are coded into four-point scales with 1 
                                                          
47 The question used to construct this variable was: “For which party did you vote in the last 
national election, which was held in 2009?” Answers were then categorised to identify 
partisan support – the following dummy variables were created: ANC, Democratic Alliance 
(DA), other political parties and undeclared/undecided) The DA is the main opposition party 
in South Africa, although the share of the electorate who vote for the DA is relatively small in 
comparison to the ANC. The DA has not made immigration a central part of its party agenda, 
which is informed by economic liberalism. 
48 The exact wording of these questions is as follows: (i) “Generally speaking, would you say 
that most people can be trusted, or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with people?”; 
(ii) “Do you think that most people would try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, 
or would they try to be fair?”; and (iii) “Would you say that most of the time people try to be 
helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?” 
49 The exact wording of these questions is as follows: (i) “How comfortable would you be 
asking a neighbour to lend you a cup of sugar if you needed it?”; (ii) “How comfortable 
would you be asking a neighbour to take you to a doctor or clinic if you were sick?”; and (iii) 
“If you were short of money, how comfortable would you be asking a neighbour if you could 
borrow R20 [about two dollars]?”  




representing ‘very comfortable’ and 4 ‘very uncomfortable’. These scales were combined 
(Cronbach alpha 0.866) and converted into an index ranging from 0 (weak links between 
neighbours) to 10 (strong links between neighbours). 
 
As a proxy for community attachment, we use an 11-point scale of community satisfaction (0, 
completely dissatisfied to 10, completely satisfied) based on the question: “How satisfied are 
you with feeling part of your community?” This allows the construct of the ordinal 
satisfaction with community attachment (SCA) variable. It is important to note that a sense of 
community is a multidimensional concept, traditionally consisting of four interdependent 
dimensions: ‘membership’, ‘influence’, ‘integration and satisfaction of needs’ and ‘shared 
emotional connection’ (Prezza and Zampatti, 2008). Tartaglia (2006) suggests that when 
measuring a sense of community it is important to distinguish between the different 
components of community ties. Due to data limitations, we were unable to construct a 
multidimensional measure of a psychological sense of community or to distinguish between 




The SASAS results reveal that few in South Africa would be satisfied to have a foreign 
neighbour. Less than two-fifths (37%) of the public would be satisfied living next to such a 
group. Given the level of anti-immigrant sentiment observed (which corresponds to the high 
levels of xenophobia found by the SAMP researchers, see Crush et al., 2013), it is possible to 
highlight xenophobia as a major problem in South Africa. Xenophobia in the country coexists 
with widespread evidence in the SASAS data of social distrust (Figure 6.1). Confirming the 
arguments made by Steenkamp (2009), many South Africans exhibit weak levels of 
interpersonal trust. The SASAS data are comparable to data gathered from public opinion 
surveys, such as the Afrobarometer survey, which found that South Africans generally score 
low on trust scales. These results are comparable with findings in post-transition states in 
Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa (Delhey and Newton, 2005).  
 
The dismantling of the apartheid system and the creation of a democratic society should have 
resulted in growing interpersonal trust in the post-transition period. However, using WVS 
wave data, social trust has been observed to have declined in South Africa between the first 
survey wave (1981–1984) and the fourth (1999–2004). A notable increase in trust was 
observed in the sixth wave (2010–2014), although social trust remained below what it was 
before the political transition50. What can explain such persistent levels of distrust observed in 
the WVS data? Using survey data from seven societies, 1999–2001 Delhey and Newton 
(2003) found that individual-level determinants of social trust included a sense of public 
safety, perceptions of social conflict, social status and life satisfaction. In a wider study of 60 
countries, using WVS data, Delhey and Newton (2005) found correlations between social 
trust and country-level factors such as corruption, inequalities and governance. The failures 
of the post-apartheid state in addressing issues of community-level inequalities, crime and 
poverty may explain the low levels of social trust observed. 
 
 
                                                          
50 The question used to measure social trust in the WVS is a two-point indicator which is 
identical to the 2010–2012 Afrobarometer survey item referred to earlier in this paper. For an 
analysis of social trust in data for 60 countries collected from wave II for 1989–1993 and 
wave III for 1995–1997 of the WVS using two-point item see Delhey and Newton (2005). 




Figure 6.1: Indicators of Social Capital in South Africa 
 
Source: South African Social Attitudes Survey (2011) 
Notes: 1. The data is weighted to be representative of the national population, and 2. All cases that had any missing data for any of the variables 
used were removed, and 3.All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded.  
 




As is evident from Figure 6.1, levels of community attachment (M = 6.59, SD =0.05) and 
neighbourhood bonding (M = 5.85, SD =0.08) in South Africa were found to be, on average, 
higher than social trust (M = 4.53, SD =0.05). But it is clear that many South Africans feel 
detached from their communities. It is difficult to know, however, if this is a modern post-
apartheid phenomenon, reflecting a decline in community cohesion. Reliable nationally 
representative quantitative public opinion data on neighbourhood cohesion are not available 
in South Africa for the apartheid or pre-apartheid period. It is possible that opposition to 
apartheid created social cohesion within and between Black African communities, and that 
this cohesion declined in the modern period because of the re-fragmentation of former 
‘resistance’ communities and the disintegration of these communities through market 
competition51. Forrest and Kearns (2001) contend that other drivers of neighbourhood 
cohesion would be feelings of safety, shared values and participation in social and communal 
activities. A decline in these factors between the apartheid and the modern period could also 
be connected to a weakening of neighbourhood cohesion. Due to data limitations, it is not 
impossible to map such a decline using existing nationally representative public opinion data. 
 
To better understand what drives xenophobia in South Africa, we use multivariate analysis to 
test the validity of the hypotheses constructed for this study. Five models are created. The 
first is a base model containing the socio-economic, demographic and contact controls. The 
second model introduces national pride and racial group attachment (H1) into the base model. 
The third tests whether political intolerance (H2) is associated with a negative impact on 
attitudes. The fourth tests the predictive power of social capital measures (H3) to examine 
whether social capital will reduce prejudice towards immigrants in South Africa. Finally, a 
fifth model is constructed to determine the relative effect of all the variables together. The 
final model will test whether all signs and significance levels of the variables observed in the 
five other models are preserved in the full model. Odds ratios are presented for ease of 
interpretation (Table 6.1). 
 
In Model I, it was apparent that the indicators of economic position, both objective and 
subjective, were not found to be a good predictor of the dependent variable. Although this 
may appear surprising, it is broadly consistent with findings on anti-immigration hostility in 
Europe and North America which find that individual economic self-interest plays only a 
minor role in explaining anti-immigrant sentiment (see, for instance, Citrin et al., 1997; 
McLaren and Johnson, 2007). Research in the developing world is more mixed and Lawrence 
(2011) and Miller (2012) find evidence to support economic self-interest as a good 
determinant of attitudes towards international migrants. Those with several or many foreign 
friends have more positive attitudes than those with fewer or no friends among immigrants. 
Given the substantial evidence that has emerged on intergroup contact, this is not surprising 
(see Pettigrew, 1998a). 
 
  
                                                          
51 The argument for a transition from solidarity to fragmentation is, however, a supposition 
and cannot be supported by evidence. In fact the opposite could be argued. Neocosmos 
(2010) evokes the work of Marian Lacey and others to argue that apartheid and colonial 
regimes ‘refurbished’ African traditionalism with an emphasis on ethnic and cultural 
separatism. The apartheid-era homeland policy is just example of this divide-and-rule policy 
(also see Christopher, 2009; Maré, 2011).  The ANC-Inkatha Freedom Party internecine 
violence of the early 1990s is another example of fragmentation in resistance communities to 
which Neocosmos (2010) makes reference to (also see Gibson, 2012). 




Table 6.1: Ordered Logistic Models, Dissatisfaction with an Immigrant Neighbour 
  Model I Model II Model III 
  OR SE. OR SE. OR SE. 
Female (ref. male) 1.00 0.09 0.98 0.09 0.95 0.09 
Age 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.00 
Married (ref. not married) 0.82 0.08* 0.81 0.09* 0.90 0.10 
Race group (ref. Black African) 
    
Coloured  1.19 0.19 1.20 0.19 1.20 0.18 
Indian 1.73 0.30** 1.71 0.31** 1.84 0.31** 
White 1.50 0.28* 1.48 0.27* 1.44 0.28 
Geographic type (ref. Urban formal) 
    
Urban informal  1.06 0.16 1.05 0.16 1.03 0.16 
Rural, traditional areas 1.23 0.16 1.20 0.16* 1.26 0.17 
Commercial farms 0.92 0.18 0.93 0.18 0.94 0.19 
Employment status (ref. full-time employed) 
   
Part-time employed 1.03 0.18 1.03 0.18 1.08 0.19 
Unemployed  0.81 0.17 0.81 0.17 0.87 0.18 
Student 0.98 0.21 0.98 0.21 0.97 0.21 
Retired  0.86 0.15 0.86 0.15 0.88 0.15 
Other labour Inactive  0.74 0.16 0.74 0.16 0.76 0.17 
Self-reported poverty status (ref. wealthy) 
    
Comfortable  1.11 0.18 1.09 0.17 1.16 0.19 
Just getting by 1.25 0.19 1.22 0.19 1.36 0.22 
Poor 1.21 0.21 1.23 0.21 1.40 0.25 
Very Poor 0.89 0.23 0.88 0.23 1.15 0.30 
Educational attainment (ref. junior primary and below) 
  
Senior Primary 0.95 0.20 1.01 0.21 1.02 0.22 
Incomplete Secondary  1.00 0.20 1.07 0.21 1.12 0.22 
Completed Secondary  1.01 0.21 1.08 0.23 1.13 0.23 
Tertiary 0.89 0.23 0.95 0.24 1.04 0.27 
Immigrant Contact (ref. no friends) 
    
Few friends 0.58 0.07*** 0.59 0.07*** 0.62 0.07*** 










   
1.65 0.10*** 
Social trust 
     
Neighbourhood bonding 
    
SCA 
     
/cut1 -2.26 0.39 -2.43 0.49 -0.77 0.43 
/cut2 -0.36 0.39 -0.52 0.49 1.21 0.43 
/cut3 0.81 0.39 0.67 0.49 2.42 0.43 
/cut4 1.87 0.39 1.74 0.50 3.52 0.44 
N  2778   2771   2763   
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05 
Notes: 1. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate negative attitudes (intolerance) towards 
immigrants, 2. The data is weighted to be representative of the national population, 3. All 
cases that had any missing data for any of the variables used were removed, 4.All individuals 
who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded; and 5. The regressions 
also control for the province of residence and political affiliation.   




Table 6.1: Ordered Logistic Models, Dissatisfaction with an Immigrant Neighbour 
(continued)  
  Model IV Model V 
  OR SE. OR SE. 
Female (ref. male) 0.98 0.09 0.93 0.09 
Age 1.00 0.00 1.00 0.01 
Married (ref. not married) 0.81 0.09* 0.89 0.10 
Race group (ref. Black African) 
 
Coloured  1.11 0.18 1.18 0.22 
Indian 1.66 0.30** 1.75 0.36** 
White 1.38 0.26 1.47 0.32 
Geographic type (ref. Urban formal) 
 
Urban informal  1.02 0.16 0.98 0.16 
Rural, traditional areas 1.37 0.18* 1.34 0.19* 
Commercial farms 0.94 0.18 0.96 0.19 
Employment status (ref. full-time employed) 
Part-time employed 1.10 0.19 1.13 0.20 
Unemployed  0.90 0.19 0.96 0.20 
Student 0.93 0.20 0.92 0.20 
Retired  0.92 0.16 0.98 0.17 
Other labour Inactive  0.79 0.17 0.87 0.20 
Self-reported poverty status (ref. wealthy) 
Comfortable  0.96 0.16 1.02 0.17 
Just getting by 1.09 0.18 1.22 0.21 
Poor 1.05 0.19 1.26 0.24 
Very Poor 0.81 0.22 1.09 0.30 
Educational attainment (ref. junior primary and below) 
Senior Primary 0.92 0.19 1.05 0.23 
Incomplete Secondary  1.02 0.20 1.21 0.25 
Completed Secondary  1.01 0.21 1.20 0.26 
Tertiary 0.85 0.23 1.07 0.28 
Immigrant Contact (ref. no friends) 
 
Few friends 0.55 0.07*** 0.61 0.07*** 










Social trust 0.95 0.02* 0.95 0.02 
Neighbourhood bonding 0.92 0.02*** 0.92 0.02*** 
SCA 0.91 0.02*** 0.93 0.03** 
/cut1 -3.81 0.45 -1.71 0.60 
/cut2 -1.88 0.45 0.30 0.59 
/cut3 -0.69 0.45 1.54 0.60 
/cut4 0.40 0.45 2.67 0.60 
N  2684   2663   
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05 
Notes: 1. Odds ratios greater than 1 indicate negative attitudes (intolerance) towards 
immigrants, 2. The data is weighted to be representative of the national population, 3. All 
cases that had any missing data for any of the variables used were removed, 4.All individuals 
who reported they were not citizens of South Africa were excluded; and 5. The regressions 
also control for the province of residence and political affiliation.   




In Model II, national pride was found to be significantly associated with attitudes towards 
immigrants. Although an extensive body of evidence would suggest that national pride 
should be positively associated with anti-immigrant sentiment, the inverse was found in this 
model. Those South Africans who were more likely to believe that their country was better 
than other nations were found to be less likely to show intolerance towards immigrants. A 
racial hierarchy was evident in the base model with South Africans of European and Asian 
descent more likely than other racial groups to express anti-immigrant sentiment. Crush et al. 
(2013) noted a similar hierarchy using descriptive statistics from a 2010 SAMP survey, and it 
is notable that this observed hierarchy persists even when controlling for economic and 
human capital status.  
 
In all of the models in Table 6.1, educational attainment did not have predictive power in 
Model I52. In a bivariate analysis (including post hoc Scheffe tests) of attitudes towards 
having immigrant neighbours we also did not detect significant differences between well-
educated South Africans and their less well-educated counterparts. Given that a positive link 
between human capital and tolerance is often found in other contexts (see, for example, 
Hainmueller and Hiscox, 2007; Citrin and Sides, 2008), this is unanticipated. In an effort to 
understand this surprising finding, I repeated the analysis by race group to discern if 
educational attainment had different effects within different groups. The results show that 
educational attainment had no effect on the dependent regardless of which race group was 
examined. The analysis was also repeated by age group to give further depth to the finding on 
educational attainment in Table 6.1. The age cohorts used here were 16-29, 30-49 and 50 
years of age and older. The results showed that educational attainment had no effect 
regardless of which group was examined.  
 
Racial group attachment was found to be only weakly correlated with attitudes in Model II, 
but the results indicate that those who believe that their racial identity is an important part of 
their identity are more hostile towards foreigners. In Model III, the political intolerance scale 
is included in the base model along with political affiliation, and the odds ratios on the 
political intolerance scale are significantly associated with the dependent variables. Those 
individuals who were intolerant of other political views were found to be less tolerant of 
immigrants. Controlling for a range of socio-economic variables, political affiliation was not 
found to be a significant predictor of attitudes. To test the role played by social capital, social 
trust, satisfaction with community attachment (i.e. SCA) and the neighbourhood bonding 
scale were added in Model IV. It is evident that sharing reciprocal ties with your neighbours 
and feeling part of your community are important determinants of attitudes towards foreign 
nationals. Social trust was found to be a significant predictor at the 5% level in this model. 
 
In conclusion, this study found a strong connection between indicators of social capital 
(particularly at the neighbourhood level) and attitudes towards foreigners. All the 
independent variables created for this study are introduced into Model V. SCA and 
neighbourhood bonding were found to be more powerful determinants of anti-immigrant 
sentiment than educational status, economic status or labour market position. When 
controlling for social capital, racial attachment and political intolerance were found to have a 
                                                          
52 It could be argued that this is an empirical artefact related to including multiple measures of 
social position (such as education, labour market position and economic status) in the same 
model, which would suggest multicollinearity problems. But even if educational attainment 
was used as the only proxy for societal position, no relationship between educational 
attainment and the dependent was observed.  




strong influence on the dependent. Given the findings showcased earlier, promoting social 
capital and strong social ties within communities is evidently key to combatting xenophobia 




Colonial regimes tended to use divide-and-rule strategies to maintain political power. African 
states have often struggled to overcome the legacies of division created by these policies and 
promote social cohesion. South Africa is no different, with low levels of social trust 
observed. The results of this research suggest that in an African context social bonds, 
particularly in neighbourhoods, may be a more important determinant of attitudes towards 
immigrants than material concerns or labour market status. This study reinforces the need to 
use measures of social capital in academic explorations of public attitudes towards 
immigrants in such societies. In addition, the results suggest that programmes that promote 
neighbourhood cohesion, particularly social bonds within neighbourhoods, can reduce 
prejudice towards immigrants in African countries such as South Africa. While improving 
general interpersonal trust in the country is an important policy goal in itself, our findings 
show that strengthening neighbourhood cohesion will have a greater influence on anti-
immigrant sentiment in South Africa. 
 
Given the prevailing scholarship on xenophobia in South Africa, the findings presented in the 
previous section provoke the question: How can these findings be reconciled with the fact 
that xenophobic violence has been largely confined to poor townships and informal 
settlements populated by black South Africans? It could be argued that there is a disjuncture 
between observed levels of violence and the paper’s finding that indicators of socio-economic 
status are not salient predictors of anti-immigrant prejudice, after controlling for attitudinal 
factors such as social trust and group attachment. However, the decision to engage in violent 
action against members of an outgroup is not, in itself, a measure of hostility to that outgroup. 
Horowitz (2001), in his analysis of interethnic riots, notes that violence against an ethnic 
group develops under certain structural conditions. Anti-immigrant sentiment need not 
manifest as violence and may surface as other forms of discrimination. 
 
Identification with the nation is a multidimensional process and there are differences in the 
effect exerted by the different dimensions of national belonging. Given this, it is unsurprising 
that a single item measure of national pride was not found to be negatively associated with 
tolerance judgements towards immigrants. De Figueiredo and Elkins (2003), in their North 
American study, subdivide national pride into nationalism and patriotism and find that 
‘patriots’ tend to be more tolerant of non-natives and exclusive ingroup loyalty does not come 
at the expense of tolerance53. Due to data limitations, we were unable to distinguish between 
different dimensions of national pride. In order to better understand the impact of national 
                                                          
53 Using European data, Maddens et al. (2000) contend, for example, that when examining the 
relationship between nationalism and xenophobia, a distinction should be made between 
imagining the nation as an ethnic or republican construct (also see de Figueiredo and Elkins, 
2003). The republican construct views national identity as an adherence to a contract between 
citizens based on shared respect for the rule of law. The ethnic construct (or ethno-
nationalism), on the other hand, views the nation as essentially connected with the ethnic 
heritage of a cultural group. An ethnic identification with the nation is positively associated 
with negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration. In contrast, a republican 
identification with the nation could coincide with a more positive view of foreigners. 




pride on attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa, future researchers must unpack the 
concept of post-apartheid nationalism. 
 
There seems to be a link between xenophobia and racialism in the country, as foreigners from 
Sub-Saharan Africa seem to attract a greater level of prejudice than foreigners from other 
regions. This study did find that racial group attachment was positively correlated with 
animosity towards foreigners. Qualitative research in South Africa has suggested that 
‘foreignness’ in South Africa seems to be associated with the ‘darkness’ of an individual’s 
skin, with the especially ‘dark-skinned’ stigmatised as foreigners (see, for instance, 
Nyamnjoh, 2006). This suggests that the legacy of apartheid continues to have an impact on 
attitudes towards immigration in the country. Although the finding of this study requires 
further investigation, they do suggest the importance of racial identification and racialism in 
the formation of anti-immigrant prejudice in South Africa. Civil society and government 
actors can reduce prejudice towards immigrants by encouraging citizens to adopt a non-racial 
national identity. 
 
Educational attainment was not correlated with progressive immigration attitudes in this 
chapter. In their review of attitudinal studies in North American and European studies, 
Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) argue that an observed education effect on attitudes is likely 
capturing differences in liberalism, ethnocentrism, cultural capital and political correctness in 
a given population. The last one of these is an interesting consideration and deserves further 
discussion. Writing about North America, Jackman (1978) argued that a disjuncture existed 
between professed beliefs in abstract principles of racial equality and support for actual 
policies to enact racial equality. Jackman's argument suggests that the well-educated are more 
likely to recognise 'the right' (i.e. most politically correct) answers in surveys on social 
tolerance but may not apply to situations involving social tolerance54. As a result, the 
consistently reported positive association between attitudes of tolerance and education may 
be spurious, rather than substantive (also see Dovidio and Gaertner, 2004). What does this 
mean for our results? It may simply be that norms of political correctness that would lead 
individuals in other countries to avoid expressing anti-immigrant attitudes do not exist in 
South Africa.  
 
In the production (and reproduction) of xenophobic attitudes, a number of scholars in Africa 
have put forward the argument that the lack of political leadership as a key factor. Dodson 
(2010) notes in her review of the literature on South Africa that, among senior government 
figures, attitudes towards foreigners in South Africa seem to have been either ambivalent or 
(on occasion) openly hostile (also see Landau, 2005; Nyamnjoh, 2006; Neocosmos, 2010 
who note this trend). Rather than a lack of leadership, there is also evidence of politicians and 
community leaders, particularly at the micro-level, utilising anti-immigrant discourses to 
leverage public support. In his analysis of the anti-immigrant violence of 2008, Misago 
(2012) argues that anti-immigrant violence is connected to micro-level struggles over 
political leadership in communities. At one level the violence seems to be a kind of anti-
establishment protest, although Misago contends that the attacks also seem to reveal an 
                                                          
54 Although Jackman was writing about racial tolerance, his study could have significant 
effects on studies of immigration. In a Swiss study, Hainmueller and Hangartner (2013) 
demonstrate that the gap between stated and applied immigration preferences can be 
substantial. In their study, Swiss natives’ immigration ‘revealed’ preferences were distinctly 
different from their ‘stated’ preferences in comparable public opinion surveys (also see Janus, 
2010). 




aggressive territorialism and a growing localised ethnic understanding of national 
entitlements. This suggests that it is necessary to reconceptualise the role and functions of 




The results of this paper highlight the need to invest in building socially cohesive 
communities on the continent in order to counter animosity towards immigrants. But could 
there be a contradiction in calling on the state to combat xenophobia through programmes 
aimed at community building? Doesn’t such a call suggest that projects focused on building 
trust would do more good than efforts to alleviate poverty and address the unfulfilled 
promises of post-apartheid democracy –especially access to housing, jobs, services, education 
and health care? On the other hand, the re-joining question could be: Wouldn’t addressing 
these promises improve social cohesion? As already discussed, quantitative public opinion 
research by Delhey and Newton (2005), as well as others, has shown that improving the 
security, good governance and economic development within communities will have a 
positive impact on neighbourhood social cohesion (also see Forrest and Kearns, 2001). Not 
enough nationally representative quantitative public opinion research has been conducted on 
social bonding in the neighbourhood in South Africa, however, to answer this question. 
 
More studies must be undertaken in South Africa on the determinants of neighbourhood 
cohesion using nationally representative quantitative public opinion data. Such research could 
explore how higher levels of social bonding in neighbourhoods can be created and examine 
the influence of community governance on such bonding. Existing international research 
suggests that greater efforts aimed at reducing corruption and inequalities at the local level 
and bolstering community governance may be the key to strengthening social cohesion at the 
neighbourhood level (Forrest and Kearns, 2001; Delhey and Newton, 2005). Certainly, as 
Misago (2012) and others have pointed out, the absence of strong local governance, as well 
as high levels of corruption and inequality in many communities, can create conflict, 
undermining social bonding in those communities. Results from this study also show that 
promoting a climate of political tolerance is important in reducing anti-immigrant sentiment.  
 
It is important to be cognisant of the difference between collective xenophobic violence and 
anti-immigrant prejudice more generally. It is worthwhile, therefore, to reflect on how a 
future opinion survey instrument could be conducted so as to obtain more data about violence 
against ‘foreigners’ in a country such as South Africa. Certainly, there are limits to the extent 
to which survey data can reflect on social problems such as anti-immigrant violence. Public 
opinion data can obtain information on the public attitudes towards this form of violence, 
however. In order to counter anti-immigrant violence, it is helpful to better understand public 
tolerance of, and public reactions to, such violence. In 2010 SAMP conducted a survey on 
public attitudes towards immigration that included questions on the acceptability and possible 
causes of the mass urban anti-immigrant riots in South Africa during May and June 2008 (for 
results, see Crush et al., 2013). The inclusion of similar questions in a survey instrument such 
as SASAS would better allow researchers to understand how neighbourhood cohesion might 
influence attitudes towards anti-immigrant violence. 
 
Xenophobic sentiment may cut across social class groups in South Africa but xenophobic 
violence cannot be isolated from the struggles of poor and working-class black South 
Africans for access to housing, jobs and services that were denied to the black population 
during the pre-transition period. As the work of Misago (2012) and others demonstrates, 




outbreaks of anti-immigrant violence are intertwined with these broader community 
struggles, which may help explain why such violence emerges in poor black townships such 
as Alexandra. According to Horowitz’s (2001) theory of ethnic riots, one of the structural 
conditions that are likely to provoke violence towards an ethnic group is government policy 
that threatens the socio-economic position of host communities. Given this context, it is 
important to address the development concerns of South African communities in order to 
prevent xenophobic violence. 







South Africa’s democratic nation-building programme has sought to encourage a new 
non-racial nationalism. Over the last thirty years, racial divisions have lessened as the 
country has successfully consolidated a new democratic political system. However, 
interracial animosity and a sense of interracial competition continue to characterise 
many aspects of everyday life. Does this sense of interracial competition have an 
association with the emergence of widespread xenophobic sentiment in the country? 
Using the 2013 South African Social Attitudes Survey, a nationally representative 
survey, this paper will investigate determinants of anti-immigrant attitudes. The results 
show that anti-immigrant sentiment is linked to a sense of interracial competition and 
alienation. A belief that immigrants were beneficial to society was also strongly (and 
negatively) correlated with attitudes towards immigrants. These results suggest that 
reducing xenophobia in the country should be seen as part of a larger project of 
promoting social-cultural cohesion in the country. 
 
7.1 Introduction  
 
In 1980, the South African-born Nobel Laureate John Maxwell Coetzee published a novel 
entitled Waiting for the Barbarians, a bleak but masterful story of intergroup animosity and 
violence. Coetzee borrowed the title of this novel from an 1898 Greek poem by Constantine 
P. Cavafy on the relationship between civilisation and the outsider (i.e. the barbarian). The 
word “barbarian” has its origin in Ancient Greek, a pejorative reference to how non-Greek 
speakers were thought to sound. In modern South Africa, international immigrants 
(particularly those from elsewhere in Africa) are often derogatorily labelled makwerekwere, a 
similarly pejorative reference to how foreign language speakers allegedly sound. Xenophobia 
against this group –these new “barbarians” –is widespread and has received considerable 
international media attention in recent years, due to large-scale anti-foreigner riots55 in the 
country. 
 
When writing Waiting for the Barbarians in the 1970s, Coetzee was inspired by the 
contentious race relations of his native South Africa. During this period, the country was 
characterised by a system of racial segregation and institutionalised white supremacy. More 
than forty years later, and following a largely peaceful transition, racial divisions in the 
country (particularly in economic terms) remain stark. Interracial animosity and a sense of 
                                                          
55 The most well-known of these riots occurred in May 2008 and have become recognized as 
the most striking examples of anti-immigrant violence in the country. Over a two-week 
period, riots in many South African townships left more than sixty died, 700 wounded and 
over a hundred thousand (mostly international migrants) displaced (Neocosmos, 2010; Crush 
et al., 2013). Anti-immigrant riots, however, have been evident in South Africa since the 
early 1990s. The first occurred in 1994 when residents of the Alexandra (a township near 
Johannesburg) organized Operation ‘Buyelekhaya’ (Go Back Home) in an effort to drive 
foreigners out. 




interracial competition continue to characterise many aspects of everyday life. White South 
Africans fear the growing power of the Black African majority and Black Africans resent the 
continuing economic advantages enjoyed by the white minority. The central thesis of this 
paper is that this fear and resentment are correlated with attitudes towards international 
migrants in the country. 
 
The article will attempt, using quantitative research methods, to show that the problem of 
interracial cohesion has an influence on xenophobia in South Africa. In order to investigate 
the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and attitudes towards multiracialism, this 
study will use public data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey. The association 
between negative attitudes towards immigrants and indicators of racial alienation will be 
examined, controlling for a range of factors including intergroup contact and the perceived 
quality of interracial contact. Multivariate regression analysis will allow multiple factors to 
be tested and the relative strength of each to be discerned. Micro-level explorations of this 
type are important, as they allow us to explore how public discourses of belonging are 
impacted by economic characteristics and cultural values.  
 
7.2 The Hypothesis: Multiracialism and Xenophobia  
 
In this section, I will sketch a brief general overview of the continued importance of racial 
identity in South Africa. Then I will make an argument for the salience of interracial 
sentiment in predicting anti-immigrant attitudes by drawing on the literature on immigration 
policy debates in South Africa. Finally, I will review the existing quantitative public opinion 
research on immigration in South Africa and outline the paper’s hypothesis.  
 
7.2.1 Racial Identity in South Africa 
During the colonial era, an economic and social hierarchy was imposed on the black majority 
that favoured the white settler minority. Racial segregation in the country intensified under 
new legislation that was instituted in the 1940s –evolving by the 1950s into the notorious 
apartheid system. For most of the 20
th
 century, South Africa was an intensely segregated 
society where interracial contact was restricted and tightly controlled, often confined to 
unequal workplace relationships (Horowitz, 1991). State social engineering caused social 
divides to overlap and converge so that factors such as race and class become intertwined 
(also see Chipkin, 2007). Classifying racial groups were essential to this process. The 
Population Registration Act of 1950 decreed that all South Africans were to be categorised 
into four population groups (i.e. Black Africans, Coloureds, Indians/Asians and Whites). 
Although the struggle against apartheid gave rise to alternative meanings for these labels, the 
Registration Act categories have become embedded. Currently, the four population group 
labels are used in official statistics published by the modern South African state and in most 
of the current academic literature on the country. 
 
The end of the apartheid political system and majoritarian elections brought the African 
National Congress (ANC) to power in 1994. The new government immediately embarked on 
a nation-building initiative designed to promote liberal values and overcome apartheid-era 
divisions. Majoritarian democracy created major changes in the political dispensation, and 
therefore, in the construction of national identity. The South African democratic nation-
building programme has sought (at least officially) to encourage a new non-racial nationalism 
characterised by an attachment to multiculturalism (Chipkin, 2007). This programme invokes 
images of a shared history and a narrative around the ‘transformation’ and ‘healing’ of 
society (also see Neocosmos, 2010; Klotz, 2013). The legacy of apartheid was to be corrected 




and equality between the race groups achieved. Progress on reducing interracial economic 
disparities has, however, been slow and economic differences between race groups remain 
stark56.  
 
In assessing the future of South Africa in 1990, Horowitz (1991) warned that an awareness of 
racial difference would not necessarily evaporate after the end of legal racial segregation or 
white minority rule. Increased interracial contact and interaction may, he argued, confirm 
social borders and sustain feelings of racial alienation and a greater need to identify between 
racial groups. Recent quantitative public opinion research in the post-apartheid period has 
found that South Africans still strongly identify with their ‘racial identity’ and maintain 
evaluative comparisons with other race groups (see, for example, Bornman, 2010; Gibson 
and Claassen, 2010; Bornman, 2011; Durrheim and Tredoux, 2011). Moreover, interracial 
contact continues to occur within a context of unequal power relations (also see Vincent, 
2008). Even outside of interracial contact, individuals of all races in South Africa have to 
negotiate different unequal constructs of race in many aspects of their everyday lives. This 
can heighten a sense of competition between race groups and alienation from racial ‘others’. 
 
7.2.2 Debating International Migration in the South Africa  
In post-apartheid debates over immigration policy, fears that an influx of foreign immigrants 
could disrupt the nation-building process (i.e. the transformation and healing of society) were 
prevalent. Discourses developed that depicted foreigners as contaminates, damaging the 
‘healthy body’ of the nation. Current restrictions on the entry of foreign immigrants into the 
country are justified by the threat officials imagined and ascribed to immigrants and migrants. 
Such debates are significant for what they reveal about South African society’s contested 
interpretative frameworks. This subsection will review the literature on immigration policy 
debates in South Africa to highlight the salience of race in these debates. 
 
In the 1990s, South African politicians often described international migrants and immigrants 
as parasitic, criminal and carriers of disease in their public speeches and during policy 
discussions (for a review of post-apartheid immigration policies and their discourse, see 
Peberdy, 2009; Klotz, 2013). Mangosuthu Buthelezi, who was Minister for Home Affairs 
from 1994 until 2004, was infamous for speeches that stoked public fears about immigrants. 
In an informative intellectual exercise, Comaroff and Comaroff (2001) draw equants between 
the panic surrounding the 'invasion' of alien plant species in the vicinities of Cape Town and 
the public's fear of international migrants. For the Comaroffs, fear of the socio-political 
“aliens” is indicative of the effective naturalising capacity of autochthony discourse in South 
Africa. The salient concern is that the conditions for social reproduction are under acute 
threat and that the existing ecosystem that sustains communities was being disrupted by a 
‘foreign’ element. 
 
The casting of immigration (and immigrants) as agents of national contamination by South 
African politicians has occurred before in the country’s history. Peberdy (2009) examines 
past discourses around immigration, as well as immigration policies and practices of the 
South African state during the non-democratic period. An examination of the discourses on 
immigration during the colonial and apartheid periods reveals the centrality of racial identity 
constructions, particularly of white identity (also see Klotz, 2013). Often these debates 
                                                          
56 The reality of the interracial economic disparity is evident in a 2012 report by Statistics 
South Africa which breaks down racial inequality in terms of household income and 
expenditure.  




referred to the health of the body public and ‘immigrants’ as inputs that could either fortify or 
contaminate the metaphysical body of the nation. At the beginning of the 20
th
 century, for 
example, anxieties over the ‘contamination’ that Asian immigration might bring dominated 
debate on immigration policy among White South Africans. 
 
During the pre-democratic period, immigration policy in South Africa (and immigrant 
selection criteria in particular) showcased the (often brutal) construction of national identity 
and autochthony in the colonial and apartheid state. Immigration procedures were designed 
(and constantly redesigned) to filter out "undesirable" immigrants (Peberdy, 2009; Klotz, 
2013). Racial identity and perceived threats (from groups as diverse as Eastern European 
Jews and Southern European Catholics) to autochthonic ‘white’ South African-ness were 
important determinants of these discourses. Modern immigration policy debates are not 
fixated on ‘whiteness’ but seem absorbed with the danger posed by allegedly ‘backward’ 
African international migrants. Often, in these debates, the alleged regressive nature of 
immigrants is contrasted with the progressive nation-building project of modern South Africa 
(Neocosmos, 2010). These immigration discourses are embedded in notions of ‘South 
African exceptionalism’ (the belief that the country is not analogous to economically and 
socially regressive African countries, see Lazarus, 2004). The racial reasoning to these 
debates has been highlighted by Matsinhe (2011) who compares them to their colonial and 
apartheid equivalents.  
 
7.2.3 Past Quantitative Research on Attitudes towards Immigrants  
A significant public opinion scholarship based in Europe and North America has developed 
on attitudes towards international migration. Research in the Northern Hemisphere has 
followed two broad traditions in explaining immigration attitudes: (i) individuals’ self-
interest; and (ii) group-related attitudes and symbols. Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) 
provide a comprehensive overview of the voluminous international literature on public 
attitudes towards immigration. This body of work has also highlighted contact as a 
determinant of attitudes noting how individuals’ interpersonal networks shape opinions (also 
see Berg, 2009; Ha, 2010). The usefulness of this literature for the South African case can be 
questioned. It could be argued that the country is exceptional due to its history of racial 
segregation. In this respect, assumptions of South African exceptionalism suggest that the 
country cannot be compared to others in terms of attitudinal variables such as xenophobia. 
 
There is a small (but significant) tradition of quantitative scholarship on attitudes towards 
international migrants in South Africa. The Southern African Migration Programme (SAMP) 
has actively funded research of this type, conducting public opinion surveys on immigration 
and immigrants. South African quantitative public opinion scholarship on immigration has 
been concerned with whether anti-immigrant sentiments are more likely to form amongst the 
socio-economically underprivileged (see, for example, Crush et al., 2013; Facchini et al., 
2013). The results of existing quantitative public opinion scholarship in South Africa, 
however, suggest that attitudes towards immigrants are not driven by micro-level variations 
(such as labour market status) in socio-economic status. Past studies have found that negative 
attitudes towards immigration do not vary considerably by labour market status or population 
group in the country. 
 
In an early 1999 SAMP analysis of Black Africans’ attitudes to African international 
migrants, negative views of other race groups (i.e. Indian/Asians, Whites and Coloureds) 
correlated positively with an aversion to African foreigners. The results seemed a little 
counter-initiative to the report writers who stated:  




“One might think that the more that African South Africans reject white, Asian and 
Coloured South Africans, the more they would embrace fellow Africans from outside 
the country due to some kind of pan-Africanist, pro-black sentiment” (Mattes et al., 
1999: 24–25).  
The research concluded briefly that dislike of African foreigners may be linked to broader 
racialism in the country. But, then we could ask, what about the country’s racial minorities? 
Does aversion to other race groups result in anti-immigrant sentiment among White, Indian or 
Coloured South Africans? I hypothesise that the more an individual perceives her/his race 
group as threatened, the more likely it will be that the individual will perceive immigrants as 
threats. I will, therefore, test the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and a sense 
that other race groups are threatening amongst all four major race groups in the country.  
 
7.3 Data and Measurement  
 
This study uses attitudinal data from the 2013 round of the South African Social Attitudes 
Survey (SASAS). A repeated cross-sectional survey series, SASAS has been conducted on an 
annual basis by the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) since 2003. The survey series 
has been designed to yield a nationally representative sample of individuals aged 16 and older 
who live in private residences. Households were sampled from all of the country’s nine 
provinces. The sample consisted of 2,882 respondents and the questionnaire was translated 
into South Africa’s major languages to improve respondent understanding of the 
questionnaire.  
 
The SASAS 2013 round included a module on attitudes towards foreign ‘immigrants’. One of 
the key limitations of any quantitative study of anti-immigrant attitudes in South Africa will 
be the definition of who is South African and who is foreign. For many respondents, this 
definition is complicated by the linguistic, historical and ethnic dynamics of the country. A 
Xhosa speaking black South African, for instance, in the Western Cape could conceivably 
consider a Zulu-speaking black South African ‘foreign’. In order to contend with this 
problem, in this section of the survey respondents were told by fieldworkers that they would 
be asked “questions about people from other countries coming to live in South Africa”. 
 
One of the first questions in this module was: “Which, if any, group would you least want to 
come and live in South Africa?”’ The question was open-ended and respondents were not 
prompted with predetermined options. A diverse range of responses was given, but 
respondents’ answers did not include a group from inside the country. Respondents listed 
groups (such as Somalis) that were from other countries. Nigerians and Zimbabweans 
emerged as the most cited groups. However, there was a minor exception: a small segment 
(4%) of the adult public selected ‘returning South Africans’ (i.e. those who had emigrated but 
were now immigrating back). Responses to this question were comparable with previous 
survey research in South Africa (see, for example, Crush et al., 2013). Most international 
migrants in South Africa are from Sub-Sahara Africa57 and this fact may, or may not, have 
influenced respondents’ answers.  
 
                                                          
57 The South African 2011 Census estimates that most of the 2.2 million international 
migrants in the country are from Sub-Saharan Africa, but this figure should be treated with 
caution. Due to poor data gathering by the state, obtaining accurate data on the size and 
composition of the international migrant population is problematic. 




The three primary indexes used to test this study’s hypothesis are: (i) the Perceived Foreign 
Threat Index; (ii) the Perceived Foreign Benefit Index; and (iii) the Multiracial Threat Index. 
The construction of these indexes will be discussed in the following three subsections.  
 
7.3.1 Measuring Attitudes towards Migrants in Post-Apartheid South Africa  
Using 1997 SAMP public opinion data, Mattes et al. (1999) found that a majority of South 
Africans saw immigrants as a threat. Immigrants were seen as spreading disease, causing 
crime and triggering unemployment. This finding was later substantiated using more recent 
(2006 and 2010) SAMP survey data (see Crush et al., 2013). In the SASAS 2013 module on 
immigration, a similar set of questions on the negative consequences of immigration was 
included after the survey item on 'unwanted’ foreign groups58. The responses (not shown) to 
these questions were similar to what was observed in the SAMP surveys. Responses were 
then combined and averaged to produce a single 1-5 Perceived Foreign Threat Index with 5 
indicating the highest level of perceived threat. A set of reliability tests were conducted and 
their results confirmed the validity of the measure. The distribution on the Perceived Threat 
Index amongst the SASAS sample is skewed towards the right suggesting that on aggregate, 
the adult population tended to view immigrants in negative terms. 
 
Indexes similar to the Perceived Foreign Threat Index have been used to measure anti-
immigrant sentiment in European and North American public opinion studies (e.g. Berg, 
2009; Pehrson et al., 2009). Perceived threat (whether tangible or not) from an outgroup has 
been considered a crucial catalyst for the formation of prejudice since the 1950s (Allport, 
1954). The identification of a threat rationalises the exclusion of outgroups from a range of 
political rights and societal entitlements (Messick and Mackie, 1989). Perceived threat can 
also be used to justify legitimate punitive action against the ‘threatening group’(also see 
Tajfel, 1981). No doubt there will be a strong association between the Perceived Foreign 
Threat Index and positive views about the benefits of immigration. Using 2013 SASAS data, 
it is possible to observe how widespread public beliefs are about the positive developmental 
role that foreign immigration can play. In the survey, respondents were asked three questions 
on whether immigrants were beneficial to the national economy and society59. 
 
Responses were then combined and averaged to produce a single 1-5 Perceived Foreign 
Benefit Index60. The distribution on this index tends to be skewed towards the left, indicating 
that the adult population tended not to view immigrants as agents of development. This 
finding is unsurprising given what was found by Mattes et al. (1999) using similar measures 
on the perceived benefits that international immigrants could bring (also see Crush et al., 
2013 who provides an outline of SAMP trend data). When examining the determinants of the 
Perceived Foreign Threat Index, this study will control for perceptions that immigrants have 
                                                          
58 Respondents were asked if they agreed (1 = disagree strongly,5 = agree strongly) with the 
following statements: immigrants: (i) increase crime rates; (ii) take jobs away from people 
who were born in the country; (iii) bring disease to South Africa; and (iv) use up our 
country’s resources. 
59 Respondents were asked if they agreed (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) with the 
following statements: immigrants: (i) are generally good for South Africa's economy; (ii) 
make South Africa more open to new ideas and cultures; and (iii) bring skills that are needed 
in South Africa. 
60 A test of reliability produced a Cronbach alpha (0.74) that suggests that this is a reliable 
index. Further testing, using principal component analysis factor analysis, confirmed that this 
was a valid index. 




developmental value for the nation. It is important to recognise the limitations of these two 
indexes which are based on questions which did not attempt to differentiate international 
migrants by country of origin. It is, therefore, impossible to unpack the public’s attitudes 
towards different types of international migrants.  
 
7.3.2 Measuring Multiracial Sentiment in Post-Apartheid South Africa  
In divided societies (like South Africa), individuals typically develop strong social identities 
and tend to psychologically divide the world into ‘insiders’ and ‘outsiders’. According to 
social identity theory, attitudes and values associated with claiming strong ingroup identities 
are correlated with hostility towards outgroups (Tajfel, 1981). Hostility emerges because 
identification with one’s group is maintained through evaluative comparisons between the 
ingroup and relevant outgroups (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996). What is crucial is the process by 
which the individual arrives at an assessment of her/his group’s position and the value and 
status they acquire through their group membership (also see Bornman, 2010). Social 
identifications in South Africa emerged from within an essentially colonial environment, and 
were (and continue to be) deeply influenced by that period’s legacy (particularly the period’s 
racist and ethnic undertones, see Chipkin, 2007). It is necessary to construct a measure that 
assesses individual fears about other racial groups and feelings of alienation from these 
groups. 
 
The HSRC has long been interested in race relations and there is a module in SASAS 2013 
on racial identity and interracial evaluations. In late 2013, respondents were asked four 
questions61 on whether they thought that other race groups were threats to their economic, 
political and cultural position. The mean results on responses to these items are comparable 
with other public opinion data published on race relations that show that many South 
Africans still hold negative opinions of the racial ‘other’ (e.g. Gibson and Claassen, 2010; 
Bornman, 2011; Durrheim and Tredoux, 2011). Responses were then combined to produce a 
single 1-5 Multiracial Threat Index. Validity testing, via factor analysis, confirmed the 
legitimacy of the measure.  
 
The degree of racial alienation observed should correspond to a race group’s historical 
position in a country’s social structure. Group position is part of how current and historical 
dimensions of group experience are comprehended and recognised at the micro-level (Bobo 
and Hutchings, 1996).  If mean responses on the Multiracial Threat Index are considered by 
race group, it is important to note that relatively low variations were noted between groups. 
Coloured South Africans (M =3.51 SE =0.36) were found to feel moderately more threatened 
than members of the Black African (M =3.47 SE =0.19), Indian/Asian (M =3.45 SE =0.47) 
and White (M =3.33 SE =0.42) population groups. These results suggest that no one race 
group in South Africa feels secure in their relative power and status advantages in the 
country’s social structure. This study will test the relationship between the Multiracial Threat 
Index and the Perceived Foreign Threat Index. In order to adequately conduct this test, a 
                                                          
61 Respondents were asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed (1 = disagree strongly, 5 
= agree strongly) that: (i) other race groups in South Africa are trying to get ahead 
economically at the expense of my group; (ii) other race groups in South Africa tend to 
exclude members of my group from positions of power and responsibility; (iii) the traditions 
and values that are important to people of my race are under threat because of the influence 
of other races in this country; and (iv) other race groups in South Africa will never 
understand what members of my group are like. 




multivariate analysis will control for interracial contact and the perceived quality of 
interracial contact.  
 
7.4 Bivariate and Multivariate Analysis  
 
The relationship between interracial animosity and attitudes towards immigrants will be 
explored using bivariate and multivariate quantitative methods. This section will discuss how 
the models were constructed and then present the results.  
 
7.4.1 Building the Models 
The dependent variable used in the bivariate and multivariate analysis is the Perceived 
Foreign Threat Index which has already been described and discussed. A series of 
independent variables are included in the analysis, some of which have already been outlined 
(such as the Multiracial Threat Index). Others have yet to be described and the remainder of 
this subsection will outline how these variables were created.  
 
Two variables were created to account for contact in the analysis: (i) contact with 
international migrants; and (ii) contact with other race groups. Contact with international 
migrants is using responses to the question: “Of the people you know who have come to live 
in South Africa from another country, how many would you consider to be friends?” 
Responses on this indicator ranged from 1(none) to 5 (very many). In Chapter 6 this form of 
contact (i.e. friendship or intimate) was found to be more closely linked with reducing 
xenophobia in South Africa than mere acquaintance (non-intimate) contact. Interracial 
contact was based on four questions on whether respondents had friends from the four major 
race groups. Responses to these questions were captured on a five-point scale (1, none to 5, 
very many) and then combined to create a single five-point index of interracial contact that 
measures the size of individuals’ interracial friendship networks.  
 
An index on the perceived quality of interracial contact was created to account for how 
individuals feel about the way other race groups treated them. Respondents were asked if 
they agreed or disagreed (1 agree strongly, 5 disagree strongly) that when they come into 
contact with other race groups, contact was (i) equal; and (ii) friendly. These two questions 
were reversed and combined to create a five-point Quality Interracial Contact Index. Two 
variables were created to measure the strength of group identity: (i) racial and (ii) national 
identity. The former was measured using responses from a question on whether the 
respondent agreed or disagreed (1 disagree strongly, 5 agree strongly) that “being a member 
of my race group is an important part of who I am as a person”. Nationalism was controlled 
for by combining two items on national pride into an index62.  
 
The variables described above were used in the bivariate analysis. A number of socio-
economic and demographic variables were created for inclusion in the multivariate analysis. 
Binary dummy variables were used to capture: urbanisation (urban, rural), gender (male, 
female) and marital status (married, not married). Political affiliation was drawn from 
responses to a question on which political party respondents would vote for if there were an 
election tomorrow. Responses were reduced to three dummy variables (ruling party, 
                                                          
62 Respondents were asked if they agreed or disagreed (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree 
strongly) that: (i) “I would rather be a citizen of South Africa than of any other country in the 
world”; and (ii) “Generally speaking, South Africa is a better country than most other 
countries”. 




opposition party and undeclared). Race was measured using a self-reported item where 
respondents categorised themselves into either Black African, Coloured, Indian/Asia, White 
or Other. Those who selected ‘Other’ (N=2) were coded as missing.  
 
To control for socio-economic status, three objective measures were used: (i) labour market 
status; (ii) educational attainment; and (iii) an asset index. Educational attainment was 
measured in completed years of schooling (0-16) and derived from a question on the highest 
level of education a respondent had completed. Labour market status was extrapolated from a 
question on current employment status and reduced to three categories (employed, 
unemployed, and labour inactive). The asset index employed was based on the Living 
Standards Measurement (LSM) designed by the South African Advertising Research 
Foundation to measure economic position63. The LSM is divided into the 10 groups (1 = 
lowest to 10 = highest asset level).  
 
7.4.2 Bivariate Results   
Standard pairwise correlation testing was used to understand the relationship between the key 
independent variables constructed for this study and the dependent (Table 7.1). As this study 
is only interested in the opinion of citizens, the sample in Table 7.1 was restricted to this 
group alone. Four separate pairwise correlations are conducted, one for each of the country’s 
four race groups. A positive coefficient indicates negative attitudes towards immigrants. It is 
important to note that previous public opinion scholarship in South Africa found that there is 
relatively little variation between race groups in terms of anti-immigrant sentiment. This 
observation is confirmed using the 2013 SASAS data. Although interracial differences may 
be low, Mattes et al. (1999) suggest that the factors that predict attitudes towards immigrants 
will differ by race group. 
 






















Nationalism 0.060 † 0.012   0.087   -0.055   
Years of Education 0.006  -0.072  -0.203 * -0.215 ‡ 
Living Standard Measure -0.100 * 0.002  -0.298 ‡ -0.100  
Multiracial Threat Index  0.222 ‡ 0.302 ‡ 0.352 ‡ 0.377 ‡ 
Multiracial Friendship -0.120 ‡ -0.093 
 
-0.259 ‡ -0.104 
 
Quality Interracial Contact -0.162 ‡ -0.096 
 
-0.238 † -0.028 
 








Perceived Foreign Benefit  -0.340 ‡ -0.357 ‡ -0.480 ‡ -0.388 ‡ 
Foreign Friendship -0.264 ‡ -0.205 ‡ -0.257 ‡ -0.200 ‡ 
‡p<0.001, †<0.01,* p<0.05 
Notes: The Bonferroni adjustment was used to calculate significance levels to counteract 
the problem of multiple comparisons and control for the familywise error rate.  
 
A key tenet of intergroup relations research is that frequent social interaction can reduce 
hostilities between groups. Contact Theory, first formulated by Allport (1954), has been 
                                                          
63 A respondent access to services and ownership of assets was established using thirty 
questions. Because responses from these questions are used to discern economic status in a 
South African context, the questions were designed specifically for the South African reality.  




substantiated by a number of quantitative studies on immigration attitudes (Ceobanu and 
Escandell, 2010). The bivariate analysis shows a relatively good correlation between the 
foreign contact variable and the dependents in Table 7.1. Recent quantitative work on 
immigration attitudes has highlighted the role played by the core networks (as well as the 
broader social environment) in the formation of prejudice (see, for example, Berg, 2009; Ha, 
2010). In these studies, the compositions of social networks condition the effects of group 
threat and intergroup contact. Multiracial core networks could, therefore, have an influence 
on attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa. In Table 7.1 multiracial friendship networks 
were found to be associated with reduced prejudice amongst the Black African and 
Indian/Asia population groups.  
 
In the quantitative public opinion literature on immigration, educational attainment is often 
correlated with tolerance and acceptance of migrants and immigration64. However public 
opinion research in South Africa has struggled to establish a similar connection (see, for 
example, Crush et al., 2013). In Table 7.1, the education system seems to be playing the 
expected role as a mediator of the multicultural values and, in this manner, dampening anti-
immigrant attitudes for Indian/Asian and White South Africans. The results seem to indicate 
that educational attainment did not play a significant role in reducing negative attitudes 
among the Coloured and Black African population groups. The results may reflect the unique 
experience of Coloured and Black African learners in the education system65 and suggest the 
need for greater scrutiny of how the current educational system fosters multicultural values. 
 
Strong ingroup identities can play an important role in predicting prejudice (Tajfel, 1981; 
Messick and Mackie, 1989) although the results of this are less conclusive in South Africa 
(Bornman, 2010; 2011). The racial identification variable did not have a statistically 
significant association in any of the pairwise correlations in Table 7.1. Positive perceptions of 
immigration had a negative impact on prejudice in all four correlations. This result highlights 
the importance of information environments on the formation of anti-immigrant opinions. 
More importantly for this paper, feelings of interracial threat and alienation (measured using 
the Multiracial Threat Index) had a comparatively good correlation with the Perceived 
Foreign Threat Index for all four groups. In other words, the findings from the pairwise 
correlations seem to suggest that xenophobia in the country cannot be disassociated from 
attitudes towards multiracialism and the racial ‘other’. 
 
                                                          
64 There has been a degree of debate over why there is a link between educational attainment 
and immigration attitudes. Some have argued that educational attainment affects labour-
market competition. But, using European data, Hainmueller and Hiscox (2007) argue that the 
connection between the education of individuals and attitudes towards immigration and 
migrants has very little to do with fears about labour-market competition. These researchers 
see education as conferring cultural values and beliefs that promote tolerance (also see 
Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). 
65 Apartheid and colonialism left the South African education system with institutions whose 
residual character is 'colonial' in subtle but embedded ways. In one example, Vincent (2008), 
in an examination of different stories of young South Africans, noted how dislocating and 
angering Black African students found entering historically white universities. Such 
experiences seem to strengthen feelings of racial alienation and racialised patterns of 
reasoning. 




7.4.3 Multivariate Results   
I now turn to multivariate modelling. Given the nature of the dependent variable (i.e. 
Perceived Foreign Threat Index), an Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regression analysis was 
conducted. Four regressions were completed one for each race group, and the sample was 
restricted to the citizenship group. In each regression, multicollinearity among the 
independent variables was tested through variance inflation factor post-estimations. No 
variance inflation value surpassed 10. The results are displayed in Table 7.2 and a positive 
coefficient indicates a hostile opinion of foreign immigrants. The findings confirm the 
bivariate results, showing that the Multiracial Threat Index had a robust relationship with the 
Perceived Foreign Threat Index. Even controlling for the strength of racial identification, the 
level of multiracial contact and the quality of interracial contact, this finding held true. The 
size of the beta coefficient on the Multiracial Threat Index was larger for the White (beta= 
0.27) population group compared to the Indian/Asian (beta= 0.23) and Black African groups 
(beta= 0.21) as well as the Coloured (beta= 0.20) group. The Perceived Foreign Benefit 
Index also had a strong relationship with the dependent in Table 7.2. The beta coefficient on 
this index was larger for the Indian/Asian (beta = -0.45) and Coloured (beta = -0.38) groups 
than the Black African (beta =-0.34) and White (beta =-0.31) group. 
 
In Table 7.2 multiracial friendship networks were found to be associated (beta =-0.06) with 
anti-immigrant sentiments for the Black African majority, but not for racial minorities. There 
was a negative (beta = -0.13) correlation between the Quality Interracial Contact Index and 
the dependent for Coloured South Africans. For the three other groups, contact with other 
races had no impact on their attitudes towards international migrants.  Intimate contact with 
foreigners reduced prejudice amongst the Black African (beta =-0.20), Coloured (beta = -
0.17) and Indian/Asian (beta = -0.12) groups. No statistically significant relationship was 
observed for White South Africans. In contrast to what was observed in Table 7.1, the racial 
identity variable had a significant and positive association with the dependent for the White 
(beta = 0.15) group, but not for the other groups. Nationalism was positively associated with 
negative perceptions of foreign immigrants for the Black African (beta = 0.09) group. For 
racial minorities, there was no statistically significant association between nationalism and 
the dependent.  
 
There was a negative and significant association between the LSM asset index and the 
dependent for Indian/Asian South Africans. For the three other race groups, economic 
position (measured in terms of asset accumulation) was not correlated with the Perceived 
Foreign Threat Index. This is not unanticipated, given the findings presented in Table 7.1 and 
the work of other scholars looking at the role of economic status in determining anti-
immigrant attitudes in South Africa (e.g. Facchini et al., 2013). In Table 7.2 educational 
attainment has the predicted significant association (beta = -0.17) with negative perceptions 
of foreigners among the Indian/Asian group. No significant relationship, in contrast, was 
noted for the three other race groups. It is difficult to explain this intriguing finding and more 
South African research on the relationship between educational attainment and anti-
immigrant sentiment is required. 
 
7.5 Discussion and Recommendations  
 
The results of this study support the hypothesis outlined in the introduction. Both the 
bivariate and multivariate analysis showed that feelings of racial alienation were associated 
with greater anti-immigrant sentiment for each of the major race groups in South Africa. The. 




Table 7.2: Multivariate Analysis of the Perceived Foreign Threat Index 
  Black Africans Coloured Indian/Asian White 
  CoEff. Std. Err. Beta CoEff. Std. Err. Beta CoEff. Std. Err. Beta CoEff. Std. Err. Beta 
Female (ref. male) -0.04 0.04 -0.02 -0.31 0.07 -0.18‡ -0.11 0.08 -0.07 -0.29 0.08 -0.18‡ 
Age 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 -0.10 0.00 0.00 0.04 
Married (ref. not married) 0.16 0.05 0.07† 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.13 0.08 0.08 -0.08 0.08 -0.05 
Rural (ref. urban) -0.01 0.06 -0.01 -0.13 0.15 -0.04 omitted -0.06 0.40 -0.01 
Political Affiliation (ref. ruling party) 
         Opposition 0.16 0.07 0.06* -0.03 0.11 -0.02 0.06 0.15 0.04 -0.06 0.63 -0.04 
Undeclared/Unaffiliated -0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.05 0.12 0.03 0.03 0.15 0.02 -0.09 0.63 -0.05 
Labour Market Status (ref. unemployed) 
   
      
Employed  0.20 0.05 0.09‡ -0.09 0.09 -0.05 -0.27 0.14 -0.17 -0.22 0.14 -0.14 
Labour Market Inactive 0.14 0.05 0.06† -0.08 0.09 -0.04 -0.20 0.14 -0.13 -0.11 0.13 -0.07 
Years of Education 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.02 -0.10 -0.04 0.02 -0.17* -0.04 0.02 -0.11 
Living Standard Measure  -0.01 0.02 -0.02 -0.05 0.03 0.08 -0.09 0.04 -0.18* 0.04 0.04 0.06 
Foreign Friendship -0.16 0.03 -0.20‡ -0.18 0.06 -0.17† -0.12 0.06 -0.12* -0.03 0.04 -0.04 
Nationalism 0.09 0.03 0.07† -0.02 0.06 -0.01 0.04 0.05 0.04 -0.08 0.05 -0.09 
Racial Identity 0.04 0.03 0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.11 0.04 0.15† 
Multiracial Threat Index  0.26 0.03 0.21‡ 0.22 0.05 0.20‡ 0.20 0.05 0.23‡ 0.25 0.05 0.27‡ 
Multiracial Friendship  -0.07 0.03 -0.06* 0.06 0.05 0.08 -0.07 0.05 -0.08 -0.01 0.05 0.02 
Quality Interracial Contact -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.13 0.04 -0.13† -0.05 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01 
Perceived Foreign Benefit  -0.35 0.03 -0.34‡ -0.37 0.04 -0.38‡ -0.42 0.05 -0.45‡ -0.28 0.05 -0.31‡ 















  Root MSE 0.78   0.71   0.55   0.64   
‡p<0.001, †<0.01,* p<0.05;  
Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, 2. The data is weighted, 3. Positive coefficients indicate negative sentiments 
towards immigrants while negative coefficients indicate positive sentiments, and 4. All individuals who reported they were not citizens of South 
Africa were excluded.   
 




correlation was significant, even controlling for a range of objective (gender, age, labour 
market status etc.) and attitudinal factors indicating the robustness of this finding. This article 
will conclude by considering the academic implications of the analysis, outlining future areas 
of research, and then make some concluding recommendations 
 
7.5.1 Discussion  
The results of this study have shown that a belief that immigrants were beneficial to the 
development of the state (i.e. favourable to the current nation-building project) is strongly 
(and negatively) correlated with anti-immigrant sentiment. Information about the 
developmental benefits of immigration can be distributed through a variety of channels 
including education, elite rhetoric and, interestingly, the media. Quantitative studies in North 
America have shown how depictions of immigrants in the media —and which immigrants the 
media depict —influences opinion and attitudes (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014). Scholars 
have been critical of the South African media’s depiction of international migrants. 
Nyamnjoh (2006) has argued that credulous and sensationalist reporting has driven mass-
mediated myths about foreigners (also see Comaroff and Comaroff, 2001; Neocosmos, 2010). 
The monitoring of the media discourse on immigrants in the country is, therefore, important 
as is how immigration is discussed by influential national leaders. 
 
The predictive power of the Multiracial Threat Index was almost as powerful as the Perceived 
Foreign Benefit Index. The main finding, consequently, to emerge from subsection 7.4.3 
suggests that feelings of accumulated experiences of racial differentiation, inequality and 
discrimination (whether personal, familial, community or collective) have contributed 
towards anti-immigrant opinion formation in South Africa. This finding sheds further light on 
earlier work by Mattes et al. (1999), as well as others, and has allowed the relationship 
between interracial sentiments and attitudes towards international migrants to be more 
comprehensively examined. Racial alienation has a collective dimension, emerging from a 
historical experience and current socio-economic conditions, and can become culturally 
shared (Bobo and Hutchings, 1996).  The legacy of apartheid, in other words, has a 
significant impact on how attitudes towards international migrants are formed.  
 
A sense of threat to the race group could provoke a desire to guard the boundaries of 
authentic racial identity. In South Africa, mass-mediated myths about how international 
migrants are allegedly different from the autochthonoi tend to focus on the configuration of 
the physical body. In the collective imagination on ‘foreignness’ in the country, the 
‘foreigner’ bears physical features that are distinctively “strange” or “alien”.  Methods to 
identify international migrants are often grounded in objective physical characteristics 
(particularly skin colour66). This suggests the level of value, in a political and social sense, 
that many individuals in the country attach to racial identity markers. Reviewing the physical 
markers used to differentiate autochthonoi from “foreigner”, Matsinhe (2011) argues that the 
strength and development of South African racial group identities appear critical to the 
formation of xenophobia (also see Nyamnjoh, 2006; Neocosmos, 2010). The findings of this 
study seem to suggest a level of support for this assertion.  
 
                                                          
66 An interesting part of the collective South African imagination is the notion that foreigners’ 
skin is darker in complexion than authentic black South Africans. The physical self-
presentations of foreigners as ‘dark skinned’ have been noted in a number of qualitative 
studies (see Nyamnjoh, 2006; Neocosmos, 2010; Matsinhe, 2011). 




The way that individuals understand their racial identity is crucial to how prejudice against 
international immigrants forms. But there is no simple relationship between the strength of a 
social identity (e.g. racial identification) and outgroup animosity in South Africa (Bornman, 
2010; 2011). Unfortunately, this study has been unable (due to data limitations) to discern if 
the collateral attitudes that arise from racial identity formation (e.g. perceived physic benefits 
of group membership or level of group solidarity) are consequential for the formation of 
xenophobia. In addition, the relationship between anti-immigrant sentiment and interracial 
threat and alienation may be mediated by national identifications. The impact of dimensions 
of national identifications and xenophobia depended on how national groups are defined by 
their members (as research by Pehrson et al., 2009 suggests). Due to data limitations, this 
paper also did not distinguish between different dimensions of national belonging. The 
association between xenophobia and multidimensional forms of belonging (in terms of racial 
and national identity) is worthy of additional research using qualitative and quantitative 
methods. Despite these limitations, it is clear that this study has contributed to our 
understanding of the determinants of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa. 
 
7.5.2 Recommendations 
Most North American and European studies have tended to focus on the relationship between 
anti-immigrant sentiment and economic conditions or nationalism (Hainmueller and Hopkins, 
2014). In this study, interracial relations had a stronger impact on public attitudes towards 
international migrants than economic circumstances, national pride or even contact. The 
results of this study should not be categorised as the product of an alleged ‘South African 
exceptionalism’. In other transitional countries emerging from conflict, interethnic or 
interracial tensions may play a large role in shaping anti-immigrant sentiments. I would argue 
that understanding a transitional country’s history of ethnic differentiation and discrimination 
is central to understanding xenophobia in that nation. From a research perspective, therefore, 
I would recommend that public opinion researchers investigating xenophobic attitudes in 
transitional societies explore the explanatory power of interethnic or interracial attitudes.  
 
From a policy and activist perspective, levels of anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa 
should be reduced. The relationship between attitudes and behaviour is not always linear and 
is influenced by environmental conditions. Individuals may hold xenophobic attitudes, for 
instance, but not engage in violence against international migrants. Indeed, violence against a 
group is likely to develop only under very specific circumstances. An extensive study of 
collective interethnic violence by Horowitz (2001) has made clear that there are certain 
structural conditions required for prejudice to transform into violence. A notable study 
conducted by Fauvelle-Aymar and Segatti (2012) on the 2008 anti-immigrant riots using 
ward-level data provides important insights into the structural conditions that characterise 
xenophobic violence in South Africa. Interestingly, the authors did not find an association 
between outbreaks of violence and unemployment and poverty levels. This study focused on 
anti-immigrant attitudes and did not attempt to show a relationship between such attitudes 
and behaviour (such as violence). Although the attitude-behaviour relationship is often not 
linear, reducing anti-immigrant attitudes in South Africa should be a priority because of the 
well-known association between prejudice and discrimination.  
 
The advent of the democratic transition in South Africa has not seen an awareness of racial 
difference, and a sense of interracial threat, vanish (as the attitudinal literature attests, see 
Bornman, 2011; Gibson and Claassen, 2010; Durrheim and Tredoux, 2011). The empirical 
results of this paper suggest that for anti-immigrant sentiments in the country to be addressed, 
race relations need to improve and social cohesion between race groups strengthened. There 




must be greater recognition of the inadequacy of programmes designed by the state to redress 
racial inequality and continued levels of (subtle and overt) racial discrimination that still 
exists in the country. Reducing levels of social and economic racial inequality, and new 
thinking on how power and privilege operate in the country is required. In closing, it should 
be remembered that this recommendation cannot serve as a panacea for xenophobia in South 
Africa since this study has not traced all the possible determinants that could be associated 
with anti-immigrant attitudes.  







South Africa is a regional hub for migration on the African continent and is home to a 
growing documented international migrant community.  Foreigners in the country, 
however, often face violations of their established rights and are the victims of abuse. 
This paper examines public support for policies that would exclude international 
migrants from the country. Data from the 2013 South African Social Attitudes Survey, 
a nationally representative opinion poll (N=2,739) of all adults in the country, is used. 
This paper found that many South Africans favoured restrictive immigration policies 
and opposed granting foreigners the same rights as citizens. Multivariate analysis is 
employed to discern determinants of this opposition.  
 
Respondents' perceptions of the numbers of foreigners in their communities did not 
affect support for inclusion. It can be inferred, therefore, that the growth of the 
immigrant population has not provoked exclusionary attitudes in the country. Rather, 
results revealed that it is national pride (cultural versus political) and fears about the 
consequences of immigration that drive such attitudes. Programmes and policies 
designed to improve public perceptions of how foreigners’ impact society and the 
promotion of a nationalism characterised by inclusive multicultural civic patriotism will 
improve public support for the inclusion of international immigrants. 
 
8.1 Introduction  
 
In Southern Africa, debates over the extension of political and social rights to immigrants 
have a long history of contention and strife. Despite two decades of restrictive immigration 
policies, migrant populations in South Africa have grown larger and more diversified, 
altering the country’s already diverse ethnic fabric. The presence of growing migrant 
populations confronts the South African public with a central question: what sort of 
immigration policy should the country have? And, equally important, what sort of 
membership status should immigrants enjoy in the country? Answering these questions 
means adequately engaging with a public that often displays animosity towards international 
migration. Public hostility to immigrant integration in the country can sometimes turn violent, 
highlighting the academic relevance of studying public opinion towards immigrant inclusion 
in Southern African societies. 
 
The importance of understanding what drives public attitudes towards granting documented 
foreigners rights has been recognised by a number of scholars working in Southern Africa in 
recent decades. This study hopes to contribute towards this emerging body of literature on 
immigration and integration. In this paper, public support for restrictive exclusionary 
immigration policies will be explored, using public opinion research techniques. 
Determinants of such support will be tested using multivariate regression. An investigation of 
this type will shed light on an important layer of the social climate that surrounds migrant 
groups in modern Southern Africa. Specifically, this paper will test the applicability of Group 




Threat Theory and its validity in understanding public attitudes towards immigration in South 
Africa.  
 
Group threat theory is an important area of the public opinion scholarship on immigration 
(see Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010 for a review). This theory suggests that the size of 
immigrant communities in an area will have an influence on how people in that area think 
about foreigners and their social inclusion. There is currently no widespread consensus on 
how immigrant size impacts public opinion on immigration and immigrants. The relationship 
between the number of immigrants in an area and exclusionary attitudes has not been 
adequately tested in a Southern African context using quantitative data.  In order to better 
understand this relationship and, correspondingly better counter xenophobic sentiments, it is 
necessary to quantitatively test for determinants using public opinion data. This study will 
also consider alternatives to the Group Threat Theory thesis, particularly how social 
identification with the nation may better explain exclusionary attitudes.  
 
8.2 The Rainbow Nation as a Case Study  
 
South Africa is a highly diverse country, home to a large number of distinct ethnic groups, 
each with its own interlocking languages, traditions and histories. The pre-democracy 
governments of the country promoted these ethnic divisions and encouraged the development 
of subnational identities67. The country’s pre-transition history was also characterised by the 
implementation of aggressive social engineering projects (which culminated in the apartheid 
system) that sought to favour the white settler minority at the expense of the black indigenous 
majority. This was a complex process, however, and it is not feasible to provide a detailed 
history of it here. The literature review provided below will discuss international immigration 
into South Africa and the emergence of the country’s current international migrant 
community.  
 
8.2.1 Immigration Policy in South Africa 
Immigration into South Africa did not start with the political transition and there is a well-
established literature on migration in Southern Africa. The following subsection will 
summarise briefly the immigration context in the country. During the pre-transition period, 
the country’s growing economy generated substantial demand for both unskilled and skilled 
labour. A significant share of this labour demand was met by international migrants, often 
recruited from other countries on the African continent. During the apartheid period, the 
government refused black foreigner labourers basic rights. Skilled white immigrants were 
much better treated and, particularly after the 1960s, actively recruited (Segatti, 2011b). 
Racial barriers softened with the Aliens Amendment Act of 1986 which allowed skilled 
Black Africans to migrate legally to the country (also see Crush and Dodson, 2007; Peberdy, 
2009). Significant numbers of African refugees were granted entry into South Africa in the 
late 1980s, fleeing conflicts in Zimbabwe and Mozambique. When the last distinctions 
                                                          
67
 The apartheid state attempted to group alleged Black African 'tribes' into national identities 
through mechanisms like the Bantu Authorities.  Neocosmos (2010) discussed this process 
when reviewing the origins of nationalism in South Africa, noting the attempted making of 
'ethnic-national' citizenship (also see Peberdy, 2009; Klotz, 2013). We could classify this 
system within the ambit of Mahmood Mamdani’s ‘ethnic despotism’. The struggle against 
apartheid left many questions relating to the various meanings of non-tribalism and 'ethnic' 
identity. The debate about which groups constitute ‘ethnic minorities’, and how they should 
be defined, has never been resolved.  




between white and black migrants were removed in 1991, as the apartheid system collapsed, 
South Africa had a growing population of international migrants. 
 
Following the end of the apartheid system, the new democratic government began a nation-
building project aimed at moving the country towards a liberal multicultural democratic 
republic. The government has, at least officially, sought to promote national attachment to a 
non-racial multicultural concept of the nation (i.e. the ‘Rainbow Nation’) among the public. 
Regular (or documented) immigrants in South Africa were granted legal protections as well 
as access to social services such as healthcare and education (Peberdy, 2009; Segatti, 2011b). 
However, the rights and protections granted to documented immigrants in South Africa 
depend on their immigration status. There is a significant difference, for instance, in the 
rights granted to asylum-seekers versus those granted to refugees. 
 
Highly varied and speculative estimates of the international immigrant population have been 
offered in the media, although no accurate data on the size of this population exists68. The 
ambiguity presented by this ‘unknowable’ number of international migrants has created a 
certain discomfort among some about just how many immigrants there are in the country. In a 
revealing article, Maré (2011) engages with Arjun Appadurai’s essay on "The Fear of Small 
Numbers" to showcase how South Africa presents us with the 'fear' of numbers, the fear of 
‘how many are there who threaten what is ours'. For Appadurai, counting non-citizens creates 
anxieties in the public because of the implied “relationship of many individuals to state-
provided goods – ranging from housing and health to safety and sanitation – since the 
entitlements are frequently directly tied to who ‘you’ are and thus to who ‘they’ are” (cited in 
Maré, 2011:617). Counting non-citizens serves (perhaps even intentionally) to conceal or 
highlight certain aspects of social division in South African society.  
 
8.2.2 Post-Apartheid Xenophobia  
There is a large and growing literature on xenophobia in South Africa, much of it produced 
by researchers from the African Centre on Migration and Society (ACMS) and the Southern 
African Migration Programme (SAMP). This valuable scholarship has dealt (in great detail) 
with the historical and political context within which xenophobia has emerged in the country. 
In particular large-scale violence directed mostly at foreigners in the country’s townships 
(such as the notorious May 2008 riots69) have drawn academic attention. This article focuses 
on attitudes, however, and attitudes do not have a linear relationship with behaviour. To 
understand xenophobic violence we must instead analyse the circumstances under which 
attitudes may lead to such violent behaviour. Due to the limitations of space, it is not possible 
                                                          
68 A considerable number of South Africans believe that most or many of the foreigners living 
in the country are undocumented. According to Crush et al. (2013: 21), almost half (45%) of 
adult South Africans agreed that many foreigners living in South Africa are undocumented 
and more than a fifth (21%) agree that almost all foreigners living in South Africa are. Due to 
data limitations, I was unable to construct a variable that measured the perceived number of 
documented versus undocumented immigrants in a community.  
69 The May 2008 riots were not the start of a phenomenon of xenophobic violence in the 
country but rather, as Neocosmos (2010) and Landau (2010) point out, the most large-scale 
and shocking example of a general pattern of post-apartheid violence against persons 
identified as foreigners.  The violence of May 2008 may not have recurred on the same scale 
but incidences of xenophobic violence have been frequently observed in the post-2008 period 
(Crush et al., 2013: 52–69 provides a timeline on xenophobic violence and riots for the 
period 2008-2013). 




to review in detail this literature. The remainder of this subsection will argue that public 
attitudes towards immigration have an important relationship to policymaking in South 
Africa.  
 
The new democratic government (particularly in the 1994-2004 period) pursued a restrictive 
immigration policy aggressively seeking to limit the number of foreigners entering the 
country. Peberdy (2009) argues that the policy is linked to the post-apartheid nation-building 
project which involves the construction of new national identities and idioms of exclusion 
(also see Neocosmos, 2010; Segatti, 2011b). Adjai and Lazaridis (2013) examine the 
development of immigration policy in post-apartheid South Africa, as well as ways in which 
it has informed the behaviour of state officials from 1994 to 2008. The authors note that the 
policy-makers have made some strides towards increasing the protections afforded 
documented migrants (also see Pugh, 2014). New 2013 immigration regulation and 
restrictions in South Africa have recently, however, reignited debate about immigrant 
inclusion in the country.  
 
Immigrant communities often face numerous violations of their established rights and are the 
victims of abuse from immigration authorities and the police70. Many poor citizens are 
similarly marginalised but what separates such abuses, as Landau (2010) argues, is the degree 
to which the exclusion of foreigners is socially legitimate (also see Neocosmos, 2010; 
Matsinhe, 2011). Many different categories of documented foreigners find it very difficult to 
regularise their presence or claim the status of ‘inviolable insider’ or resident71. The space 
available for civil society to effectively advocate for greater protection of immigrant 
communities, as well as structural and political change, is constrained by the presence of 
significant anti-foreigner sentiment in the country, as scholars like Pugh (2014) and others 
have argued (also see Adjai and Lazaridis, 2013).  
 
Public attitudes in South Africa have a bearing on the formation of policies towards 
immigrants and their integration. In interviews with parliamentarians, Pugh (2014) noted how 
they felt pressured to respond to their constituents’ fears about immigrants and immigration. 
Interviewing civil society advocates and politicians, Pugh concluded that unpopularity of 
immigrant communities is a substantial obstacle to the advocacy of a progressive immigration 
regime. The social construction of target populations among the public has a strong influence 
on public officials and policy-makers, shaping both the policy agenda as well as the design of 
policy. Schneider and Ingram (1993: 334) identify the construction of target populations as 
"cultural characterisations or popular images of the persons or groups whose behaviour and 
wellbeing are affected by public policy". Groups so constructed are soft 'targets' because 
                                                          
70 The violation of the rights of documented migrants, particularly refugees and asylum-
seekers, has been well-documented in case-study evidence by civil society organisations as 
well as scholars with the African Centre for Migration and Society and elsewhere (see, for 
instance, Landau, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010; Adjai and Lazaridis, 2013; Pugh, 2014).  
71 Due to the limitations of space, it is not possible to review in detail the different 
immigration regulations in the country. A number of scholars, however, have analysed the 
design and implementation of immigration policy in modern South Africa (e.g. Crush and 
Dodson, 2007; Peberdy, 2009; Segatti, 2011b) and have noted that considerable obstacles are 
often placed in the path of regularisation for different categories of documented migrants. 
The groups most obstructed are asylum-seekers and contract workers. It has been suggested 
by Landau (2010) and others that some of this obstructionism could be rooted in illicit 
economies where bribes are exchanged for greater regularisation. 




public officials can inflict punishment on negatively constructed groups who have little 
power to retaliate. Indeed, the general public often responds positively to the punishment for 
groups that have been so constructed. Taking this argument further, Ingram et al. (2007) 
suggested that policy-makers respond to social constructions of target groups in anticipation 
of public feedback (i.e. approval or rejection).  
 
8.3 Hypothesis Building   
 
Drawing on the quantitative research conducted both inside and outside South Africa, this 
paper will outline two hypotheses to be tested. These two hypotheses will be presented and 
discussed in detail in the preceding subsections. 
 
8.3.1 H1: Group Threat Theory  
One of the most influential theories utilised to explain exclusionary attitudes towards 
outgroups (such as immigrants) was crafted by Herbert Blumer (1958). He argued that 
perceived threat (explicit or implicit) from an outgroup to the ingroup's position is the 
catalyst for prejudice towards that outgroup. Prejudice is primed when an outgroup: (i) 
competes with an ingroup for scarce resources (such as jobs) and (ii) challenges the symbolic 
and political power of the ingroup. Building on Blumer's work, Blalock (1967) argued, using 
North American public opinion data, that the size of an outgroup living within a certain 
territory has an impact on the perceived threat felt by the ingroup. Individual exposure to the 
outgroup generated a sense of threat and the larger the outgroup the greater the exposure and, 
consequently, the perceived threat. According to this thesis, contact with, and proximity to, 
an outgroup will heighten perceptions that the outgroup is a threat. By logical extension, 
Blalock (1967) proposes that the larger the size of the outgroup, the more likely the ingroup 
is to feel threatened. 
 
The work of Blalock (1967) has been utilised to understand the relationship between the size 
of an immigrant community within an expansive geographic unit and citizen’s anti-
immigration attitudes. Scholars are concerned with whether exposure to immigrants will 
result in prejudice towards immigrants and support for restrictive exclusionary immigration 
policies (see, for example, Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et al., 2002; Semyonov et al., 2004; 
Hjerm, 2007). Most have examined the relationship between attitudes and the number of 
international immigrants at the national level. Schlueter and Scheepers (2010) have criticised 
this approach, arguing that using this method may mask variation in intergroup relations. 
Immigrants are rarely distributed evenly across a geographic space and may predominate in 
certain neighbourhoods rather than others. The authors, therefore, recommend investigating 
the effect of outgroup size within small local contexts such as neighbourhoods. 
 
There is a well-established relationship between contact and intergroup attitudes. In studies of 
immigration attitudes contact has been found to have a positive impact on prejudice reduction 
(Ceobanu and Escandell, 2010). Critics of Group Threat Theory, like Hjerm (2007), have 
used Contact Theory to offer a counterhypothesis to Blalock (1967) and his interpretation of 
Group Threat Theory. These critics suggest that the presence of outgroups in host 
communities will reduce prejudice towards these groups because contact will breed 
familiarity and acceptance. Consequently, individuals will be less willing to support 
restrictive immigration policies. Constructive contact (as opposed to acquaintanceship 
contact) between citizens and foreigners has, indeed, been found to reduce support immigrant 
exclusion in Europe (see, for instance, Schneider, 2008). In conclusion, therefore, the 
following hypothesis is presented for testing: 





H1. Perceived immigrant population size in a community will have a relationship with 
individual support for restrictive immigration policies.  
 
8.3.2 H2: National Pride  
A possible alternative to the hypothesis outlined above would be the influence of national 
pride on public attitudes towards immigrant and immigration exclusion. Symbolic theorists, 
such as Tajfel and Turner (1979), focus on individual psychological processes in order to 
understand prejudice rather than relations between groups. For many social psychologists 
studying ethnocentrism and prejudice, outgroup prejudice is the result of different forms of 
ingroup pride that act as catalysts for outgroup hostility. Ingroup identification allows 
ingroup members to act in their collective interest but also “provide a fertile ground for 
antagonism and distrust of those outside the ingroup boundaries” (Brewer, 1999: 442). The 
mechanism here is the point of reference –some forms of pride are inherently comparative 
(i.e. other-referential) and tend to encourage ingroup members to view those outside the 
ingroup as inferior. Chauvinism can be defined as the downward comparison of other groups 
combined with a blind attachment to the ingroup. It is the focus on chauvinistic forms of 
ingroup identity that distinguishes scholars utilising Group Threat Theory from those 
employing symbolic theory to explain attitudes towards immigration. 
 
National pride is an important form of ingroup pride and is often cited as a determinant in 
studies of prejudice. But national pride is multidimensional and, according to Viroli (1997: 
6), can be on the one hand “generous, compassionate and intelligent” and “exclusive, deaf 
and blind” on the other. There is no simple relationship between national pride and 
denigration of outgroups and it is necessary, therefore, to distinguish between different forms 
of patriotic solidarity. Most studies looking at the relationship between national pride and 
support for exclusionary immigration policies distinguished between cultural and political 
patriotism (see, for example, Hjerm, 1998; Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Raijman et al., 
2008). The former is often other-referential or ascriptive-objectivist and should be associated 
with the rejection of the 'other' in the name of preserving a sense of national unity. Cultural 
patriotism has been equated with chauvinism or a belief in national superiority —a 
commitment to the rejection of all alternatives to the nation’s culture. Political patriotism, at 
least under democratic conditions, balances ingroup attachment with a common respect for 
all humanity. This form of patriotism is self-referential, non-competitive and takes the form 
of individual commitment to the social system and values of the nation (for a more in-depth 
discussion, see Smith and Kim, 2006). 
 
The democratic transition in South Africa has triggered intense debate on nation-building, 
nationalism and patriotic culture. Officially, the state promotes multiculturalism and rejects 
chauvinistic nationalism (Peberdy, 2009). Support for multiculturalism should be associated 
with a more inclusive (less nativist) national pride. Neocosmos (2010) has argued, however, 
that national pride has played a role in spawning anti-immigration sentiment in South Africa. 
He highlights the alleged exceptionalism that is embedded in some forms of patriotism in the 
country. This discourse of ‘South African exceptionalism’ suggests that, although the country 
is African geographically, it is supposedly incompatible and culturally different from the rest 
of the continent (also see Matsinhe, 2011). For Neocosmos, such nationalism is other-
referential and exerts the superiority of South African culture to the cultures of other African 
nations.  As a result of colonial dispossession, understanding nationalism in South Africa is 
further complicated by public attitudes towards land ownership, an issue of special resonance 




in the country. Based on this brief review of the literature, the subsequent hypothesis is 
offered for testing: 
 
H2. National attachment will have a significant impact on individual opinions towards 
restrictive immigration policies.  
 
8.4 Data Used 
 
I use data from the South African Social Attitudes Survey (SASAS), a repeated cross-
sectional survey that monitors social, economic and political values and attitudes. Using 
proportional to size probability sampling, the sample was drawn and is nationally 
representative of all individuals in South Africa aged 16 and older living in private 
residences. A limitation of this dataset is that it does not include those below 16 and, 
therefore, I cannot adequately judge the attitudes of teenagers. The questionnaire is translated 
into six languages (isiZulu, isiXhosa, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, Setswana, and Afrikaans) as well 
as English, allowing SASAS fieldworkers to effectively gather information on attitudes and 
behaviours across the post-apartheid nation’s diverse multi-cultural communities. The 11
th
 
(2013) round of SASAS included questions on immigration, immigrant communities and 
national identification.  
 
8.4.1 Support for Closing Borders and Excluding Migrants  
This study examines five questions that focus on public support for excluding international 
migrants from South Africa. Responses to each of these five questions were measured on a 
five-point agreement scale. The exact phrasing of the question, as well as the weighted 
distribution of the responses, is depicted in Figure 8.1. The item on illegal migrants suggests 
that the adult public overwhelmingly favour exclusionary measures towards undocumented 
immigrants. Many favoured closing the country’s borders to immigrants and refugees, and a 
majority opposed foreigners owning land in the country. Support amongst the adult 
population for the inclusion of documented migrants was, comparatively, weak. 
 
Five five-point agreement (1 strongly disagree to 5 strongly agree) scales were created based 
on the items in Figure 8.1. Respondents who answered ‘don’t know’ when asked these 
questions were coded as missing. Reliability checks on the five questions, using inter-item 
correlations (co-variances) and Cronbach's alpha, found that they did not load onto a single 
index. This suggests that they are measuring conceptually distinct notions in South Africa 
and, as a result, these five items are not combined into a single indicator. In order to 
understand if the size of the local immigrant community had a relationship with these 
different items, measures would have to be developed that could capture proximity to, and 
contact with, international migrants. 
 
In SASAS 2013 respondents were to indicate how many: (i) immigrants lived in their area?; 
(ii) acquaintances do you know who have come to live in South Africa from another 
country?; and (iii) how many of the people you know who have come to live in South Africa 
from another country? Responses were measured on a five-point scale, ranging from 1(none) 
to 5(very many). Interestingly, almost half (49%) of the adult population described the 
number of international migrants living in their area as either many or very many. Much 
lower shares of the public reported having either many or very many foreign acquaintances 
(28%) or friends (5%). Mean scores on each of these three items (i.e. foreign neighbours, 
acquaintances and friends) are presented in Table 8.1 disaggregated by province or residence.  
 




Figure 8.1: Public Support for International Immigrant Inclusion and Exclusion, 2013  
 
Notes: The data is weighted to be representative of all adult South Africans.  
 
According to the United Nations’ Population Division (2013), there were 2.4 million 
foreigners present in South Africa in 2013 (a seventh of all international migrants on the 
continent were living in the country in that year). The South African National Census 2011 
found that there were about 2.2 million during the survey period. Table 8.1 presents National 
Census data on the number of people living in South Africa but born outside the country (as 
well as the share of international stock as a portion of the total population) alongside self-
reported contact. Table 8.1 results do not suggest a strong correlation between the number of 
international migrants and the perceived number of immigrants. However, the size of the 
immigrant population in South Africa is difficult to measure accurately, due to poor 
migration monitoring by the state, and the Census figures may be inaccurate. 
 
An Analysis of Variance analysis was conducted between the five measures depicted in 
Figure 8.1 and the items of self-reported proximity to international migrants (Table 8.2). The 
bivariate analysis did not reveal a strong relationship between the perceived size of foreigners 
in the area and a desire for exclusion. Not one linear and positive relationship between a 
preference for exclusion and perceived size could be identified in Table 8.2.  Given these 
results, it is probable that alternative hypotheses will be more effective at explaining support 
for restrictive immigration policies in South Africa. As already indicated, this paper will 
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Table 8.1: Contact with International Migrants Disaggregated by Province  
  Neighbours Acquaintances  Friends  Census 2011 
  Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. Mean Std. Err. N % 
Gauteng 3.73 0.10 2.63 0.11 1.66 0.07 1134587 9% 
Western Cape 2.71 0.11 1.75 0.08 1.52 0.07 260952 5% 
KwaZulu-Natal 2.65 0.09 2.30 0.09 1.47 0.05 169377 2% 
Limpopo 3.98 0.09 3.50 0.11 1.64 0.07 165351 3% 
Mpumalanga 3.31 0.11 2.61 0.11 1.96 0.10 153115 4% 
Northern Cape 3.60 0.12 3.00 0.12 1.76 0.08 152504 2% 
Eastern Cape 2.28 0.08 1.99 0.09 1.41 0.06 75319 1% 
Free State 2.43 0.12 2.07 0.10 1.50 0.08 68896 3% 
North West 3.34 0.17 2.55 0.18 1.45 0.07 19770 4% 
Notes: 1. The data is weighted; 2. Mean values (1-5) represent self-reported contact with international migrants from 1(none) to 5(very many).  
 
Table 8.2: Public Support for International Immigrant Inclusion and Exclusion by Self-Reported Exposure with International 
Immigrants  
  How many immigrants would you say live in your area? 
  None Few Some Many Very Many Prob > F 
Land 3.67 3.60 3.32 3.50 3.77 0.000 
Equal Rights 2.86 2.82 2.77 2.90 2.85 0.686 
Undocumented 3.96 3.90 3.86 3.84 4.05 0.008 
Equal Access 3.13 3.07 3.25 3.28 3.23 0.047 
Close Borders 3.89 3.82 3.57 3.74 3.84 0.001 
Notes: 1. The data is weighted; 2. Mean values (1-5) represent individual agreement (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) that: (i) Legal 
immigrants to South Africa who are not citizens should have the same rights as South African citizens (Equal Rights); (ii) South Africa 
should take stronger measures to exclude illegal immigrants (Undocumented); (iii) Legal immigrants should have equal access to public 
education as South African citizens (Equal Access); (iv) Foreigners should not be allowed to buy land in South Africa (Land); and (v) South 
Africa should close its borders to immigrants and refugees (Close Borders); and 3. Prob > F column present results from significant tests 
based on Analysis of Variance analysis –the lower the Prob>F the higher the level of significance.   
  




Table 8.3: Immigration Consequence Index Interitem Correlations (covariances) and Principal Component Analysis 






3.84 0.03 0.30 0.54 
Economy 
b 
3.22 0.03 0.36 0.60 
Job 
a
  3.78 0.04 0.31 0.56 
New Ideas 
b
 3.03 0.03 0.40 0.63 
Culture 
a 
3.29 0.03 0.41 0.64 
Test Scale   0.36 0.65 
a
 1 = disagree strongly,5 = agree strongly 
b
 1 = agree strongly,5 = disagree strongly 
Notes: Respondents were asked if they: agreed with the following statements: immigrants: (i) increase crime rates (crime); (ii) are generally 
good for South Africa’s economy (economy); (iii) take jobs away from people who were born in country (job); (iv) improve South Africa’s 
society by bringing new ideas and cultures (new ideas); and (v) generally undermine South Africa’s culture (culture). 
 
Table 8.4: Cultural and Political Patriotism and Principal Component Analysis 
  
Mean Std. Err. 
Principal Component Analysis 
  Political Cultural 
The way democracy works 2.60 0.03 0.755   
South Africa’s economic achievements 2.66 0.03 0.799 
 Its social security system 2.58 0.03 0.750 
 Its fair and equal treatment of all groups in society 2.71 0.03 0.654 
 Its scientific and technological achievements 3.07 0.03 
 
0.755 
Its achievements in sports 3.24 0.03 
 
0.777 
Its achievements in the arts and literature 3.15 0.03 
 
0.832 
Its history 3.21 0.03   0.540 
Notes: Respondents were asked how proud are you of South Africa in each of the… (4)Very proud; (3) Somewhat proud; (2) Not very proud; 
(1) Not proud at all.  
 





8.4.2 National Pride and Other Alternatives  
Based on a review of the literature, it is clear this paper will need to distinguish cultural 
patriotism in South Africa from its civic counterpart, political patriotism. In order to achieve 
this using public opinion data, eight questions are used from SASAS 2013 on which aspects 
of South Africa individuals are proud of. These aspects are subdivided into two dimensions 
(cultural and political) and two indexes are drawn based on responses to questions in each 
dimension. The processes used to create the indexes are drawn from Hjerm (1998) who 
provides empirical support for the proposed theoretical argument that civic patriotism should 
be separated from ethnic nationalism (also see Coenders and Scheepers, 2003; Raijman et al., 
2008). The validity of these concepts has been established in a number of different country 
contexts (including South Africa) according to Smith and Kim (2006). Adult South Africans 
were found to score highly on sources of cultural pride but less well on sources of political 
patriotism. Statistical tests for validity and reliability, in particular Principal Component 
Analysis, confirmed the cogency of these indexes (Table 8.3).  
 
Using multivariate regression analysis, this paper will examine the influence of cultural and 
political patriotism on individual preferences for restrictive immigration policies. In addition 
to these two dimensions of national pride, the role played by perceived consequences of 
immigration will be assessed. Perceived threats have been shown to influence both 
discriminatory attitudes and prejudices against the outgroup in a divided society (see, for 
example, Raijman et al., 2008; Schneider, 2008; Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). The link 
between perceived threat and discrimination can be observed in one of the most penetrating 
of the quantitative studies on xenophobia in South Africa: Crush et al. (2013). Using public 
opinion data from 2010, Crush and his colleagues investigated attitudes towards xenophobic 
violence. This SAMP study found approximately three-fifths of the respondents thought that 
a primary cause of the 2008 riots was that migrants are involved in crime (64%), cause 
unemployment (62%) and are culturally different (60%). This suggests that is it important to 
understand how public perceptions of immigration impact on individual support for 
restrictive immigration policies. 
 
In exploring the hypotheses proposed, this paper will account for how adult South Africans 
perceive the impact of immigrants on their society. SASAS respondents were asked three 
questions about the consequences of immigration on South African communities, focusing on 
social problems like crime and unemployment (see Table 8.4 for exact order and question 
wording of the individual items). Each variable is a five-point agreement-disagreement scale. 
An Immigration Consequence (IC) Index was created from these five items (Cronbach alpha 
0.65) after testing for the validity of the proposed scale. A high value on the index indicates a 
negative assessment of the consequences of immigration. This paper will assess the 
correlation between IC Index and support for immigration exclusion using multivariate 
regression techniques.  
 
8.5 Multivariate Analysis  
 
In order to accurately refute or prove the two hypotheses outlined this paper, I turn to the 
multivariate analysis. Five regressions were conducted, one for each of the five indicators of 
individual preferences for immigration policies (see Table 8.2 for the exact question wording 
of the individual items). In order to adequately test the two hypotheses, a number of 
background independent variables had to be created. These variables are described and 
discussed below. 





8.5.1 Building the Models  
The background variables created for this study are: age (in years), gender (male, female), 
marital status (married, not married) and geographic type (urban formal, urban informal, rural 
formal and traditional authority area). A question on citizenship allowed a separation to be 
made between those with non-citizen parent(s) and those without. Other control variables are 
education (years of completed education) and labour force position (full-time employed, part-
time employed, unemployed and labour force inactive). Political party affiliation is measured, 
based on who the respondent would vote for if there was an election tomorrow (African 
National Congress, the Democratic Alliance, other opposition party and undeclared).  
 
Economic status was obtained using individual asset accumulation. In order to provide an 
accurate representation of asset accumulation among adult South Africans, an asset index was 
employed. This indicator is the Living Standards Measurement (LSM), an index developed 
by the South African Advertising Research Foundation to gauge social class72.  It is evident 
that the ethnic identity of an individual should be controlled for when examining national 
attachments. Racial categorisation may obscure differences within the heterogeneous black 
majority. In order to avoid this, and to distinguish between racial minorities and the main 
ethnolinguistic subgroups within the racial majority, I constructed eight dummy variables: 
White, Coloured, Indian, Sesotho, Setswana, isiXhosa, isiZulu and other Black African 
minority groups.  
 
8.5.2 Results  
Five regression models are presented in Table 8.5. In Models I-III, a positive coefficient 
indicates support for restrictions on international immigration. In contrast, in Model IV and 
V, a positive coefficient designates a preference for immigrant inclusion. Before the main 
hypotheses outlined in this study are investigated, it is worth commenting on the role played 
by economic factors in predicting support for exclusion and inclusion. The results show that 
educational attainment73 was not associated with the dependent in any of the models. 
Unemployment was found to be positively associated with the dependent in Model I but was 
negatively correlated with the dependent in Model III.  Controlling for a range of socio- 
economic and attitudinal factors, the LSM scale had a negative relationship with a preference 
for closed borders (Model III). Asset wealth also had a significant (and positive) association 
with individual support for granting documented immigrants equal access to public education 
(Model V) although only at a 10% level of significance.  
 
Previous chapters have generally not noted a statistically significant correlation between 
political affiliation and attitudes towards international migrants. In Table 8.5, however, some 
unanticipated results were observed when political affiliation was considered. Supporting the 
Democratic Alliance was positively correlated with the dependent in Model II and negatively   
                                                          
72 Respondents are asked more than thirty questions about their asset ownership access and to 
services to segment the market. The Living Statement Measure divides the population into 10 
groups (1 = lowest to 10 = highest).  
73 Educational attainment has been shown to be a significant determinant of exclusionary 
attitudes in research that focuses on Europe and North America (Quillian, 1995; Scheepers et 
al., 2002; Raijman et al., 2008). In order to establish that this was not an empirical artefact 
related to including multiple measures of class in the model, a pairwise correlation was 
conducted to detect significant correlation between years of schooling and the dependents. 
The results confirm the findings of the multivariate regression.  




Table 8.5: Ordered Logistic Models, Public Support for International Immigrant 






























Ethnic group (ref. White) 






































Geographic Type (ref. urban formal) 
   
Urban informal  -0.041 
 
-0.448 † -0.374 
 











Party support (ref. ANC) 
    
Democratic Alliance -0.127 
 
0.530 * -0.419 † 


















Employment status (ref. employed) 







Unemployed 0.336 * 0.317 
 
-0.327 * 
Labour Inactive 0.238 
 
0.364 * -0.046 
 





Immigration Consequence Index 0.464 *** 0.814 *** 0.773 *** 
Foreign Contact 
     






















Cultural Patriotism 0.330 ** 0.412 ** 0.236 * 



















/cut4 3.355   4.509   2.315   
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05, † p<0.10 
Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, 2. The data is 
weighted to be representative of all adult South Africans; and 3. Positive coefficients 
indicate individual agreement (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) with the relevant 
item.  
  




Table 8.5: Ordered Logistic Models, Public Support for International Immigrant 
Exclusion and Inclusion (continued) 
  Model IV Model V 





Female (ref. male) -0.235 * -0.133 
 




Non-Citizen Parent(s) (ref. none) 0.548 * -0.005 
 






























Geographic Type (ref. urban formal) 
 












Party support (ref. ANC) 
  






























LSM Scale 0.045 
 
0.085 † 
Immigration Consequence Index -0.680 *** -0.547 *** 
Foreign Contact 
   












Political Patriotism  0.179 † 0.215 * 

















/cut4 -0.164   1.485   
*** p<0.001, **p<0.01,* p<0.05, † p<0.10 
Notes: 1. The regressions also control for the province of residence, 2. The data is 
weighted to be representative of all adult South Africans; and 3. Positive coefficients 
indicate individual agreement (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly) with the relevant 
item.  
  




correlated with the dependent in Model III. Some interesting ethnic group differences were 
also noted in Model I and III. These observed differences may be explained by non-economic 
characteristics. Consider for example how groups’ memories of their collective past may 
impact on their assessments of land ownership. It is clear that ethnic group differences on 
immigration exist and such differences should be acknowledged and studied. Further 
quantitative research will be needed, however, to discern the factors that inform these 
differences. 
 
It is evident that perceived outgroup size does not have a negative impact on the dependents 
in any of the models in Table 8.5. This finding builds on the findings from the bivariate 
analysis and refutes the first hypothesis that perceived immigrant population size in a 
community will have a relationship with individual support for restrictive immigration 
policies. Friendship contact had a negative correlation with a preference for a prohibition on 
foreigners owning land (Model I) but was not a significant determinant in Models II-V. As 
could be expected, the political patriotism index is significantly associated with the 
dependent in Models IV and V and the expected relationship is observed. In contrast, a 
negative relationship was found for the cultural patriotism index in Model I-III, suggesting 
that feelings of national superiority are driving support for immigrant exclusion in the 
country. This suggests support for the second hypothesis. The other important finding to 
emerge from Table 8.5 was the significant relationship between the IC Index and the 
dependents (as would be expected). Citizen support for the inclusion or exclusion of 
immigrants is driven by perceptions that this group will negatively impact society. 
 
8.6 Discussion and Conclusion  
 
Group threat theory is based on citizen exposure to immigrant communities –for Blalock 
(1967), citizens must be aware of their proximity to international immigrants to feel 
threatened by them. According to Group Threat Theory, therefore, the perceived size of the 
foreign population in a community should be significantly associated with attitudes towards 
immigration. In South Africa, there is no evidence of an association between perceived 
immigrant group size and attitudes towards immigration. It may be that individuals picked up 
on a national discourse in the media (or elsewhere) about the number of foreigners in the 
country and this influences their support for immigrant exclusion or inclusion. This would 
suggest that their preferences are driven by myths about the number of international migrants, 
not exposure to immigrant communities. The findings of this paper, therefore, cast doubt on 
the often quoted presumption that citizens’ preferences for immigrant exclusion are driven 
primarily by local-level competition from foreigners.  
 
The results of this study suggest that public support for some forms of immigration exclusion 
and inclusion were significantly (but weakly) correlated with economic position. Quantitative 
research on immigration attitudes in South Africa has often been critical of associating 
economic self-interest with citizens’ attitudes towards immigration policies. Public opinion 
studies by Gordon (2016a) on refugee protection74 and Facchini et al. (2013) on migration 
restrictions suggest that in South Africa individual preferences on immigration do not vary 
                                                          
74 A public opinion study by Gordon (2016a) on immigration policy found that many in South 
Africa opposed granting asylum to people persecuted for political reasons in their own 
countries. Though economic deprivation did have an influence on attitudes towards refugee 
protection, other non-economic indicators (such as national identity) were found to play a 
stronger role. 




considerably by economic characteristics (also see Crush et al., 2013). The relationship 
between economic position and xenophobic violence has also been challenged. Fauvelle-
Aymar and Segatti (2012), using ward-level data and multivariate techniques, examined the 
socio-economic characteristics of the areas affected by the 2008 May riots. The findings from 
their research broadly reject explanations for the violence based on unemployment or 
poverty. Economic deprivation as a driver of xenophobia or xenophobic violence has also 
been criticised by scholars such as Neocosmos (2010) who asks why if ordinary South 
Africans feel economically depressed they should blame foreigners.  
 
Often, individuals are unaware of how many immigrants co-exist with them in a certain 
territory –a finding noted in a number of European studies (also see Schneider, 2008; 
Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010).  Is there any relationship between this perceived size 
variable and the actual size of the international migrant population in a given area? National 
public opinion surveys are not the best instrument to obtain an accurate count of immigrants 
in the country as past experience in South Africa has shown75. Although it is not possible to 
draw a relationship between the perceived and actual size of the international migrant 
population, the findings of this study suggest that immigrant group size is not correlated with 
public preferences for immigrant exclusion at the local level.  The policy implications of this 
finding are therefore clear: reducing the number of international migrants in a given 
community in South Africa will not improve public support for immigrant inclusion in that 
community. 
 
How do the results of this study compare with those of other public opinion studies on 
immigration attitudes? The public research in Europe and North America on the link between 
immigrant population size and immigration attitudes has produced mixed evidence. For 
example, Quillian (1995) and Scheepers et al. (2002) have shown that the actual size of the 
foreign population has a significant impact on attitudes towards anti-immigrant prejudice. 
Schneider (2008) has also shown that there is a relationship with perceived immigrant size 
and anti-immigrant sentiment (also see Schlueter and Scheepers, 2010). Scholars, like Hjerm 
(2007), however, have refuted this association, arguing that immigrant population size is not 
a significant predictor of prejudice (also see Semyonov et al., 2004). The results of this paper 
indicate support for this latter position and, in a South African environment, reject the 
relationship between perceived immigrant group size and exclusionary attitudes. As far as the 
author is aware, this is the first time the hypotheses outlined in this paper have been tested in 
a South African context using public opinion data. 
 
Cultural patriotism was found to be positively associated with support for immigrant 
exclusion. This suggests that anti-immigrant sentiment is driven by other-referential forms of 
ingroup identity rather than local-level competition from international migrants.  This study 
                                                          
75 In the mid-1990s, the Human Sciences Research Council (HSRC) asked a nationally 
representative sample of adult South Africans: “How many people who are not South African 
citizens live in the houses around this property?” Respondents’ answers were regarded as 
accurate assessments of the numbers of international migrants in a given community and 
were used by HSRC officials to make estimations about the size of South Africa’s foreign 
population. This method produced numbers that showed enormous levels of immigration in 
and out of the country every few months. Crush and Dodson (2007) pointed out the absurdity 
of this method and, extracting data from these early surveys, showed that the methodology 
was decidedly dubious. In 2001 Mark Orkin admitted that the methodology was inoperative 
and retracted all findings produced using this method. 




has explored pride in certain aspects of South African patriotism but not others. One element 
that this study was unable to adequately capture was the unique imprint of apartheid and 
colonialism on national identification in the country. In a qualitative analysis, Matsinhe 
(2011) argues that the colonial history of group relations needs to be taken into account when 
examining xenophobia in South Africa. What makes South Africa unique is how the racial 
discourses used by the white minority in the pre-transition period have been internalised by 
the black majority and applied to immigrants from Africa in the current period (also see 
Landau, 2010; Neocosmos, 2010).  Data limitations, however, prevented me from 
investigating the complex manner in which colonialism informs the construction boundaries 
and social identities in South Africa.  
 
In this chapter, we noted that educational attainment was a poor predictor of the policy 
preferences under review. The weakness of educational attainment as a correlate of attitudes 
was a common finding in other chapters in this study. This may reflect the interlude between 
a transformation in political regime and the capability of the educational system to socialise 
learners into the transformed political culture. Coenders and Scheepers (2003) argue that 
educational effects on tolerance vary according to the length of liberal-democratic tradition. 
Using survey data from 22 countries, their research showed that the effect of education on 
support for exclusion is smaller in recently established democracies. It may, alternatively, 
reflect that a lack of political correctness on questions of immigration policy in South Africa 
(see Chapter 6, section 5). Janus (2010) has tested this supposition and found that the 
immigration attitudes of the well-educated noted in a number of North American studies may 
be the product of such ‘correctness’. To substantiate this supposition, future research must 
focus on the role of the South African education system in reducing intolerance. 
 
Perceptions that immigration has harmful consequences were correlated with support for 
repressive migration policies. The pervasiveness of such destructive beliefs can be linked to 
the anti-immigrant rhetoric of political leaders in South Africa. As scholars like Neocomos 
(2010) have argued, xenophobia is a political discourse in South Africa. The official 
discourse on immigration from political leaders and government officials has been, and still 
can be, characterised by depictions of immigrants (particularly from other African countries) 
as anachronistic and harmful (also see Peberdy, 2009; Matsinhe, 2011; Adjai and Lazaridis, 
2013). Although international immigrant communities continue to grow, these communities 
are targeted by immigration officials and the police in semi-official crackdowns because of 
the alleged undocumentedness and criminality of these groups (Landau, 2010). The launch of 
Operation Fiela (which can be translated as “sweep the dirt”) against undocumented migrants 
in early 2015 is just another example of this continuing trend.  
 
In the conclusion to this paper, I will outline some areas for future research. Future 
quantitative examinations of the impact of nationalism on anti-immigrant attitudes in South 
Africa must explore the role played by colonialism and globalisation in the formation of 
autochthonic identities. Transnationalism, democratic decentralisation and global economic 
liberalisation have, moreover, transformed social identification in the country. Understanding 
how this new geography impacts public attitudes towards foreigners requires a combined 
approach using public opinion data with more qualitative techniques.  Such an approach 
would generate scholarship that will provide a better understanding of how autochthonic 
attachments intertwine to explain support for immigrant exclusion among the public and 
citizens’ behaviour towards foreigners. 






The aim of this study was to investigate what micro-level sociological indicator factors 
are shaping attitudes towards international migrants and migration in South Africa. In 
the five papers presented in this dissertation, four different types of attitudes were 
examined: (i) general evaluations; (ii) prejudice; (iii) perceived threat; and (iv) policy 
preferences. These five papers expanded on previous public opinion research by using 
quantitative research methods to quantify different determinants of these attitudes. The 
study investigated how adult South African public’s attitudes towards international 
migrants are affected by three key clusters of micro-level sociological indicators: (i) 
socio-economic status; (ii) group identities; and (iii) intergroup contact. Two main 
conclusions were drawn from the findings of these five papers. First, individual socio-
economic status was not a central driver of attitudes towards international migrants and 
immigration. Second, intergroup contact and group identities (and the key factors 
related to group identity) tend to be better drivers of attitudes. These conclusions will 
be discussed in more detail in this concluding chapter.  
 
9.1 Introduction  
 
The aim of this study was to understand what factors drive attitudes towards international 
migrants and migration of the mass public in South Africa. Attitudes also have an important 
impact –if at times an indirect one –on social behaviour. The attitudes of citizens on key 
social and political issues, therefore, be (and should be) an essential concern of policy-makers 
in a democracy. Theorists of democracy, like Dahl (1973), have argued that democratic 
governments should reflect the will of their citizens (also see Soroka and Wlezien, 2010; 
Wilson, 2013). Mass public opinion has the potential to shape the design and the 
implementation of public policy. Beyond these considerations, I consider public opinion 
significant in its own right because of what it tells us about the beliefs of ordinary people on 
issues of importance.  
 
In this thesis, data has been presented to show that many South Africans hold anti-immigrant 
views. On the other hand, there are a significant number of South Africans who hold positive 
tolerant progressive views. Thousands took to the streets of Johannesburg and eThekwini to 
express those views when civil society worked with the government to organised public 
demonstrations to denounce xenophobia in April 2015. Marchers chanted "Down with 
Xenophobia" and "A United Africa". However, not everyone favoured such demonstrations. 
When a large group of anti-immigrant protestors, wielding pangas, tried to disrupt the 
eThekwini march, the police were forced to disperse the protestors with stun grenades, tear 
gas and water cannon (IOL, 17/04/2015b). The success of the march demonstrated the 
plurality of attitudes towards international migrants and immigration in South Africa. The 
march, however, also highlighted clear divisions on the issue of international migration and 
the danger proposed to the country by anti-immigrant prejudice. 
 
During the course of this dissertation, several important findings on the determinants of 
attitudes towards international migrants and immigration in South Africa have been put 
forward. In short, it can be said that xenophobia is not the province of the poor and 
underprivileged. Material concerns are not irrelevant to the formation of xenophobic attitudes 
however. But these concerns are not limited to those on the deprived end of the economic 




spectrum. This has significant inferences for how we understand social cohesion76 in South 
African communities. These findings will be summarised and outlined in section 9.2. This 
part of the chapter will also demonstrate the linkages between the different empirical chapters 
in this thesis. In section 9.3 the contributions of this study to the literature are summed up and 
briefly discussed. A final section sketches out areas for potential future research.  
 
9.2 Summary of the Findings  
 
My study allows us to understand how applicable hypotheses developed in Europe and North 
America are for the South African case. The results show us that many theses that were 
developed using European, Israeli and North American data are not inconsistent with what 
has been found in South Africa. This section will summarise the findings of this dissertation, 
outlining what micro-sociological factors are driving attitudes in the country. The study has 
highlighted how widespread negative South African citizens’ attitudes towards international 
migrants are. The degree of this anti-immigrant sentiment is sketched out in subsection 9.2.1. 
Then the section will focus on the main drivers of attitudes identified in subsection 9.2.2, 
9.2.3 and 9.2.4. These distinct subsections summarise the study’s findings on self-interest, 
intergroup contact and group identity and group interest respectively. 
 
9.2.1 Hostility and Negativity Over Time  
Prior to asking an individual to report on their attitudes toward a subject (especially a 
contested subject such as ‘immigration’) one must be sure that the individual has an 
approximate mental representation of that subject. But public opinion surveys typically do 
not define the term ‘immigrant’ and some scholars (e.g. Blinder, 2013) have raised this as an 
issue of concern. In the SASAS datasets used for this study, respondents were informed that 
they are going to be asked questions about ‘people from other countries coming to live in 
South Africa’. The implicit assumption here is that people in the country have absorbed 
enough information to understand the conceptual difference between an internal (i.e. 
domestic) migrant versus an external (i.e. international) migrant. It could possibly be argued 
that respondents may have misunderstood this instruction. In a recent article, I found that the 
South African public is rather ill-informed about international affairs (Gordon, 2016b).   
 
In SASAS, respondents were asked the open-ended question “[w]hich, if any, group would 
you least want to come and live in South Africa?” Responses to this question are presented in 
Chapter 4 (and then again in Chapter 5 and 7). Respondents’ answers demonstrate an 
understanding of what was meant by the phrase ‘people from other countries’. Respondents 
seemed to have a cogent understanding of the difference between an internal and external 
migrant. In other words, the average South African does seem able to comprehend the 
concept ‘international migrants’. This is perhaps unsurprising. Since the early 2000s, debates 
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 The significance and definition of the term ‘social cohesion’ is innately clear-cut, signifying 
‘solidarity’ and a more harmonious egalitarian society. The consequence given to the term by 
researchers is undermined, nonetheless, by the insufficiency of the ways that academics have 
to describe and measure ‘social cohesion’. In an effort to ground ‘social cohesion’ in the 
South African reality and, consequently, better comprehend the level of social disunity in that 
country, Struwig et al., (2013) conducted a comprehensive study of ‘social cohesion’. The 
researchers brought in numerous stakeholders to weigh on what social cohesion would mean 
in the South African context.  The result was a complex but inclusive multidimensional tool 
for understanding and measuring social cohesion. 




about the status of foreign migrants have been very much in the public domain and in all 
forms of media. 
 
Data on attitudes towards international migrants over the period 2003 and 2012 are presented 
in Chapter 4. Throughout the course of this decade, most of the adult public said that they 
would be prepared to welcome either none or only some international migrants into the 
country. Over the period 2003-2012, the public demonstrated a consistent hierarchy of 
preferences between immigrant groups. A majority of citizens consistently identified foreign 
African nationals as the group they least wanted to come and live in South Africa. The 
hostility towards international migrants identified in Chapter 4 was corroborated in the other 
empirical chapters of this thesis. In Chapter 6 it can be observed that many adult South 
Africans would be dissatisfied to have an international migrant as a neighbour. Chapter 7 
found that a clear majority of the country saw international migrants as having a harmful 
influence on the country. 
 
Chapter 8 presented data, not on attitudes towards international migrants, but citizens’ 
preferences on different immigration policies. As can be observed in that chapter, most South 
Africans in 2013 favoured restrictive immigration policies and opposed granting foreigners 
the same rights as citizens. In summation, this study found that many South Africans hold 
very negative views of international migrants and favour restricting international migration 
into the country. These results verify the high levels of anti-immigrant sentiment found by 
other researchers (e.g. Crush and Pendleton, 2007; Du Toit and Kortze, 2011) in South Africa 
who also have used public opinion surveys to study attitudes towards immigration. These 
findings are also in line with my recent research (e.g. Crush et al., 2013; Gordon, 2016b) on 
foreign policy preferences.  
 
9.2.2 Self-Interest and Economic Status  
Economic competition theory points to the rivalry for limited resources as the main driving 
force behind intergroup conflict. This theory contends that there should be a strong 
relationship between anti-immigrant attitudes and economic status (Hardin, 1995). The notion 
that public opinion is mainly governed by self-interest is a part of political philosophy in 
Western Europe and North America. No less famous a Western philosopher as Thomas 
Hobbes, for instance, viewed self-interest as the first (and foremost motivator) of the 
individual (discussed in Mansbridge, 1990). Given the influence of Western philosophy on 
South African academia, it is understandable that many assume a relationship between 
economic resources and attitudes towards immigrants. Yet, as was discussed in Chapter 2 of 
this dissertation, many scholars of public opinion are increasingly sceptical of self-interest as 
a dominant force in attitude formation. In exploring determinants of public attitudes towards 
international migration and migrants, this thesis has investigated the role played by socio-
economic status. 
 
In Chapters 4 statistically significant variations in attitudes towards international migration 
and migrants by socio-economic status were not found. Using multivariate analysis, Chapters 
5, 6, 7 and 8 found that educational attainment, material wealth and labour market status 
tended to be poor predictors of attitudes. Chapter 7 revealed that an individual’s economic 
resources were not a good predictor of public perceptions about the negative consequences of 
immigration (i.e. perceived threat). Even using a comprehensive measure of household asset 
wealth, a strong correlation between perceived threat and economic status was not observed 
in this chapter (with one exception). Subjective measures of economic status fared no better. 
Chapter 5 presented data showing how subjective personal wellbeing was an inadequate 




predictor of individual evaluations of international migrants. In Chapter 6, self-reported 
economic status did not emerge as an important predictor of attitudes. The results of this 
dissertation do not suggest that economic factors have no influence on public attitudes 
towards international migrants. Rather, the findings suggest that micro-level socio-economic 
factors do not correlate well with such attitudes.  
 
The findings presented in this study suggest that people tend to view foreigners in very 
negative terms if they perceive international migrants as a socio-economic threat. Chapter 5 
highlighted the role played by public perceptions about the consequences of immigration as a 
predictor of attitudes towards international migrants. This relationship holds even when 
multivariate techniques are used to account for socio-economic status.  In Chapter 8, I 
emphasised the influence that such perceptions had on public support for different 
immigration policies. This finding complements one of my recently published works which 
shows that the perceived realistic (or economic) threat posed by immigration influenced 
individual attitudes toward preferred immigration level (Gordon, 2016b). In other words, the 
notion that international migration has harmful impacts on economic and social conditions in 
the country is driving attitudes.  
 
9.2.3 Intergroup Contact  
Since the 1950s, scholars have highlighted the role of intergroup contact as a predictor of 
prejudice. The architect of Contact Theory, Gordon Allport (1954), placed conditions on the 
nature of the interaction if prejudice were to be reduced, making the quality of contact 
important. Friendship is likely to encompass most of the conditions identified by Allport 
(Pettigrew, 1998a; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Based on this assumption, this study 
differentiated the quality of contact by looking separately at acquaintanceship (i.e. casual 
contact) and friendship (i.e. intimate contact). This distinction delineates simple 
desegregation (i.e. the physical mixing of groups) from integration (i.e. situations that meet, 
or come close to meeting, Allport’s key conditions of optimal intergroup contact). Chapters 5, 
6 and 7 highlighted the role played by intergroup contact in predicting different attitudes 
towards international migrants. 
 
The study found that intimate contact tended to have a positive impact on attitudes while 
casual contact was a statistically insignificant predictor of attitudes. Intergroup friendship 
contact enables individuals to empathise with, and consider, the perspective of an outgroup 
(like international migrants). The antithesis of Contact Theory is Group Threat Theory which 
suggests that the size of an outgroup population living near an ingroup population leads the 
ingroup to develop exclusionary attitudes towards the outgroup (Blalock, 1967). This theory 
suggests that citizens’ proximity to international migrants will have an effect on exclusionary 
attitudes towards that outgroup.  Chapter 8 tests this theory and finds that the (perceived) size 
of the immigrant population in a neighbourhood did not have a relationship with individual 
support for restrictive or inclusive immigration policies. However, in the chapter, I did not 
grapple with how the use of a small unit of analysis (i.e. a neighbourhood or area) may affect 
the chapter’s results.  
 
Chapter 8 suggests that negative perceptions about immigration were one of the main drivers 
of exclusionary policy preferences. It could be argued that the South African media projects 
images of ‘foreign swarms of invaders’ around the country and the locally-born do not need 
to interact with international migrants in order to perceive them as a threat. In addition, there 
is a need to consider the fact that prejudicial attitudes may lead individuals to avoid 
heterogeneous contact. To put it more simply, while contact with immigrants could have an 




effect on anti-immigrant sentiment but such sentiments may lead an individual to avoid 
contact. Xenophobic individuals living in immigration-receiving neighbourhoods may opt to 
move out to semi neighbourhoods that are more homogenous77. If a scholar was to study the 
attitudes of the locally-born from a municipal-level perceptive, the relationship between 
immigrant population size and anti-immigrant sentiment would be positive because this 
migration has occurred within a municipality. But from a neighbourhood-level perceptive -
the viewpoint taken by Chapter 8 –then the relationship becomes negative because the 
xenophobes have existed. Due to data limitations, this study was unable to engage with this 
phenomenon and whether it had occurred. 
 
The thesis has followed the literature on intergroup contact and has largely attributed 
intergroup contact to opportunity structures. Consequently, this study has ignored the 
problem of reverse causality as it pertains to Allport’s Contact Theory. Without longitudinal 
public opinion, however, it is difficult to discern the direction of this relationship. Most likely 
attitudes and behaviour are part of a mutually reinforcing cycle, the direction of which is 
difficult to detect. It should be stressed, nonetheless, that the existence of the reverse path 
(from attitudes to contact) does not undermine the value of contact as an intervention to 
reduce prejudice (for more information, see Hewstone and Swart, 2011; Christ and Wagner, 
2012). Regardless of the direction of the relationship, establishing the direction of the 
correlation was important as it allowed me to show that negative stereotypes about 
international migrants are detrimental to the quality of citizens’ relationships with said 
migrants. 
 
9.2.4 Group Identity and Group Interest  
One of the key areas of investigations for this thesis has been the relationship between 
attitudes towards international migrants and South African nationalism. Throughout the 
thesis, the potential role that nationalism could play in determining attitudes has been 
explored. Chapters 5 and 6 made use of a simple measure of national pride and found that 
pride in one’s country was not associated with anti-immigrant sentiment in the country. Many 
scholars have argued that it is necessary to distinguish cultural (or ethno-nationalism) from 
more political (or civic) patriotism in order to properly understand the relationship between 
national pride and anti-immigrant sentiment. We see a relationship emerge between cultural 
patriotism and attitudes towards immigration policy in Chapter 8. The results of this chapter 
suggest the importance of examining and critiquing ethno-nationalism and chauvinistic 
nationalism in South Africa. 
 
In this study, simply being proud of the national collective is not associated with anti-
immigrant sentiment. A number of public opinion researchers point to group interest as a 
strong determinant of intergroup attitudes (see, for example, Brewer and Gardner, 1996; 
Brewer, 1999; Funk, 2000). An individual’s perception that their group is under threat will 
influence their attitudes towards outside groups. This relationship should be salient, 
regardless of whether the group in question is the national collective or the ethnic/racial 
collective. A number of studies (e.g. Mutz and Mondak, 1997; Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 
2000; Sides and Citrin, 2007) have found that people tend to rely on “sociotropic" concerns 
                                                          
77 The exodus of xenophobes to surrounding neighbourhoods could create a ‘halo’ of 
xenophobic areas around a more diverse neighbourhood. These ‘border’ neighbourhoods may 
have contact with foreigners but not intimate contact which tends to have a much more 
positive impact on attitudes. The ‘halo effect’ has been noted in studies of right-wing voting 
(e.g. Rydgren and Ruth, 2013; Valdez, 2014).   




when forming opinions. Most of these studies focus on how individuals consider the health of 
the nation when forming their attitudes. In South Africa, how an individual perceives the 
position of her/his race group may also have a strong influence on attitude formation.  
 
Chapter 5 uses the National Wellbeing Index (NWI) to test the influence of sociotropic 
concerns about the national collective on individual evaluations of international migrants. 
The NWI was a significant determinant of attitudes, which shows that individual 
multidimensional concerns about the national collective are correlated with adult attitudes 
towards international migrants in South Africa.  This seems to confirm the argument, made 
by Wimmer (1997), that xenophobia becomes prolific during times of national crisis as a way 
of reassuring the national ‘self’. The association identified in this study could help us better 
understand why the adult public’s attitudes towards international migrants seem subject to 
cyclic fluctuations. In Chapter 7 individual perceptions that their race/ethnic group was under 
threat were found to be significantly associated with attitudes towards migrants. The chapter 
showed that individuals who perceive their race group as under threat were more likely to 
regard international migrants as threatening. 
 
The absence of a strong group identity can be just as damaging as the presence of an 
aggrieved sense of one. The ‘neighbourhood’ can be thought of as an imagined community –
certainly a ‘neighbourhood identity’ is no more constructed an identity than a ‘racial’ or 
‘national’ identity. In Chapter 6, social bonds between neighbours and a sense of community 
were found to be salient determinants of prejudice against international migrants. If South 
Africans feel that they have strong bonds with their neighbours, they are more tolerant of 
foreign nationals. However, based on the results presented in Chapter 6, many members of 
the adult public appear to feel detached from their communities. It is difficult to ascertain if 
this is a post-apartheid phenomenon, as work by von Holdt et al. (2011) and others would 
suggest. The issue is one of social cohesion at the neighbourhood level, an issue which is 
complemented by the focus on interracial cohesion in Chapter 7.  
 
9.3 Contributions to the Literature  
 
The thesis has demonstrated the utility of studying public opinion about international 
migrants and migration in South Africa. Quantitative methods can map the effect of particular 
variables (e.g. intergroup contact) and have the ability to account for sociodemographic 
characteristics in a way that is not available in qualitative research (where each study may 
represent a unique instance). Quantitative measures can reveal counter-intuitive outcomes and 
produce results that are repeatable and generalisable. The utility of quantitative research to 
understand attitudes towards immigration has been acknowledged in a recent work by 
Whitaker and Giersch (2015). These authors realised that it was necessary to complement 
work on xenophobia in Sub-Saharan Africa by critically investigating the drivers of anti-
immigrant sentiment using quantitative research techniques. Aside from demonstrating the 
utility of quantitative public opinion research, this thesis has made several contributions to 
the existing literature on attitudes towards international migrants and migration.  
 
This study makes a contribution to our understanding of whether economic self-interest 
drives xenophobia in South Africa. If attitudes on international migration were based 
primarily on rational economic self-interest, then we would have seen attitudes vary 
significantly across different economic subgroups. However, as discussed in the previous 
section, non-economic indicators were consistently more important attitudinal correlates than 
economic characteristics. This finding supports non-quantitative scholars like Dodson (2010), 




Neocosmos (2010), Matsinhe (2011) and Crush and Ramachandran (2014) who are critical of 
the economic competition model as an explanatory for xenophobia in South Africa. This 
result also lends credence to other existing quantitative research on South Africa which has 
struggled to detect a link between an individual’s economic position and their attitudes 
towards international immigration (e.g. Facchini et al., 2013; Gordon, 2016b) and granting 
refugee protections (e.g. Gordon, 2016a). 
 
The different chapters presented clear evidence that educational attainment had less of an 
effect on attitudes towards international migrants than may have been imagined. Regardless 
of the reason for this observation, the relationship between educational attainment and anti-
immigrant sentiment in South Africa seems to be more complex than the international 
literature would suggest. Other quantitative public opinion studies on immigration attitudes in 
South Africa discussed throughout this dissertation have also struggled to find a correlation 
between education and immigration attitudes (also see Whitaker & Giersch 2015 who looks 
at a subset of African countries). However, this dissertation presents a more exhaustive 
quantitative test of educational attainment on different types of attitudes on international 
migration.  
 
This thesis has made a number of important contributions to how we can understand key 
potential non-economic drivers. This study provided the most comprehensive test of how 
contact quality may influence prejudice towards international migrants in South Africa. 
Chapter 8 presented the first test of Group Threat Theory and its ability to explain 
exclusionary attitudes towards international migrants in South Africa. Another major 
contribution of this dissertation was to clearly show the relationship between collective 
identity –especially national pride –and anti-immigrant sentiment. The results of this study 
speak well to the emerging qualitative literature on xenophobia which has tended to focus on 
social identity rather than economic factors. The remainder of this subsection will discuss this 
contribution in more detail.   
 
An infamous paper by Putnam (2007) asserts that neighbourhood ethnic diversity results in 
residents ‘hunkering’ down. This ‘hunkering’ leads individuals to distrust their neighbours 
and refrain involvement in institutions. As may be apparent, Putnam's thesis on social trust 
and diversity has important implications for community building and intergroup animosity 
during periods of immigration. The research produced in this thesis did not present a direct 
test of this controversial thesis and there is a growing degree of evidence that has challenged 
the validity of Putnam's claims (see, for instance, Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010; Sturgis et al., 
2010; Abascal and Baldassarri, 2015). Chapter 6 undertook the first investigation of how 
neighbourhood alienation may impact on prejudice towards immigrants in South Africa using 
quantitative public opinion data78. The results show that policies oriented at increasing social 
bonds between neighbours may be more beneficial in promoting pro-immigrant attitudes. 
This has important implications for the study of social cohesion within South African 
communities.  
 
This study provides wide-ranging evidence of how group identity influences individual 
attitudes towards international migrants. Chapter 8 found that cultural patriotism was 
positively associated with support for immigrant exclusion and provided support for the 
                                                          
78 Other forms of alienation may also play a role –in a study (i.e. Gordon, 2016b) on attitudes 
towards preferred immigration level, I found that distrust in political institutions was 
associated with anti-immigration sentiment, for example. 




suppositions of scholars like Neocosmos (2010) on nationalism. This finding builds on a 
recently published work of mine which shows that cultural patriotism was a salient 
determinant of attitudes toward preferred immigration levels in South Africa (Gordon, 
2016b). Chapter 5 provided the most comprehensive test in the country on the relationship 
between societal interest and attitudes towards international migrants, using the NWI to 
measure sociotropic concerns. The NWI is a composite score that provides a more precise 
measurement of sociotropic concerns than is found in most studies of intergroup attitudes. 
The chapter is the first to test the relationship between this important subjective wellbeing 
measure and positive evaluations of international migrants. The results suggest that public 
attitudes towards immigrants in South Africa may vary, depending on changes in subjective 
national wellbeing. My study of the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and 
anti-immigrant sentiment provides important insight into how macro-factors (e.g. national 
unemployment) impact on such sentiments.  
 
The papers presented in this thesis are part of an emerging tradition of quantitative attitudinal 
research in Sub-Saharan Africa on international migrants and immigration. The findings of 
this thesis can help inform the existing findings of this tradition, particularly when trying to 
understand how macro-factors influence attitudes on the continent. For example, Whitaker 
and Giersch (2015) studied public opinion from eleven Sub-Saharan African countries and 
found that public opposition to immigration was significantly higher in countries that are 
more democratic and have higher levels of ethnic diversity. The results of this dissertation 
suggest that it is not so much democracy and diversity that are driving xenophobia, but the 
difficulty of forging social cohesion in such environments. This dissertation provided a 
comprehensive examination of how racial and social alienation may influence attitudes 
towards international migrants. In Chapter 7, in particular, a sense of racial alienation was 
shown to influence individual attitudes towards international migrants. This result, as well as 
the finding on cultural patriotism, suggests that attitudes are affected by a complex politics of 
‘indigeneity’ in South Africa. Ultimately, I would say that is perhaps the most thought-
provoking contribution of this thesis to the existing body of scholarship. 
 
9.4 Areas of Future Research  
 
In this thesis, I have presented a comprehensive positivist study on public attitudes towards 
immigrants in South Africa, looking at both economic and non-economic predictors. During 
the course of this dissertation, I have identified areas of future quantitative research that I 
have unable to undertake due to data limitations and time.   It would be useful to conclude 
this closing chapter by considering some of these future potential research areas. Some of 
these areas I have already started to explore in my recent work, while others remain difficult 
to investigate due to the limitations of existing public opinion datasets. These concluding 
remarks will not be able to outline all available research that might help predict South 
African citizens’ attitudes towards international migrants. Instead, the goal of this final 
subsection is to identify how the gaps in my work can be rectified through new quantitative 
research. 
 
The importance of contact outlined in this thesis suggests that future work on attitudes 
towards international migrants should focus on negative factors that prevent intimate contact. 
I have a chapter in a book project coordinated by Loren Landau and Oliver Bakewell (entitled 
Forging African Communities: Mobility, Integration and Belonging).  In the chapter, I have 
examined which factors best predict citizens’ engagement in social relations with 
international migrants. The focus is on whether political and social alienation, as well as fear, 




are associated with the hosts’ level of contact with foreigners. The results (as yet 
unpublished) suggest that political efficacy and fear of crime, as well as interracial friendship, 
are important determinants of citizens' contact with immigrants. But this chapter did not 
completely address the problem of reverse causality79 however. Further experimentation, 
employing longitudinal data, may resolve the problem of reverse causality that this 
dissertation’s investigation of intergroup contact was unable to resolve. The work produced 
by Binder et al., (2009) presents an interesting example of the direction this research could 
take.  
 
In the previous section, I identified this dissertation’s findings on educational attainment as 
one of the significant contributions of this study. There are multiple mechanisms through 
which exposure to formal education may act on attitudes as a number of scholars have 
pointed out (e.g. (Coenders and Scheepers 2003; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2007; Hainmueller 
and Hopkins 2014). Consequently, it is difficult to know why educational attainment is not 
producing the results which we have anticipated. Further quantitative experimentation might 
be required to improve our understanding of the observed education effect in this study. 
Obtaining additional data on individual’s quality of education may help more accurately 
discern the relationship between exposure to formal education and attitudes for example. 
Another methodology, which could be of substantial value, would be quasi-experimental 
manipulation of education levels in future studies of immigration attitudes.  
 
This thesis made a valuable contribution to the literature by examining the power of national 
identity to influence attitudes towards international migration. The types of nationalism 
looked at in this thesis, however, followed standard constructions used in many surveys 
around the world. A more vibrant critique of chauvinistic nationalism in South Africa may 
require the design of new survey instruments to measure different types of sub- and supra- 
national identifications in the country. In a study on attitudes towards immigration levels, for 
example, I experimented with two types of supranational identifications and found them to be 
salient determinants of attitudes (Gordon, 2016b). The work presented in this thesis suggests 
that the complex role of aggrieved sub-nationalism needs further investigation and such 
explorations may have important consequences for the study of intergroup relations in other 
parts of Africa.  
 
Public opinion studies using macro-level indicators can provide an informative picture of 
how institutional and socio-political macro-level factors can affect the emergence and 
manifestation of attitudes. Traditionally, the inclusion of macro-structural conditions in 
attitudinal studies allowed researchers to test a range of hypotheses while controlling for 
individual-level attributes. In this thesis, the role of self-reported neighbourhood social 
cohesion in predicting attitudes seems to suggest the importance of neighbourhood-level 
factors (such as the level of neighbourhood ethnic diversity, for instance). Moving forward, I 
                                                          
79 I controlled for animosity towards migrants to separate the role of preferences from that of 
structural constraints using multivariate techniques. In the chapter I detected lower frequency 
of contact for certain socio-demographic host subgroups (i.e. the elderly, the unemployed and 
certain racial minorities) even accounting for anti-immigrant preferences. This seems to 
suggest that these groups have no contact with international migrants due to structural 
constraints rather than intentional avoidance. In the chapter, I argued that addressing these 
structural constraints for these host subgroups will lower the ‘cost’ of heterogeneous contact. 
In addition, this will encourage the identified subgroups to pursue solid enduring forms of 
contact with international migrants. 




feel that further study of the relationship between subjective national wellbeing and anti-
immigrant sentiment will provide new insight into how macro-factors impact on attitudes and 
why changes in macro-factors over a long period of time affect attitudes. 
 
Repeated references have been made to collective anti-immigrant violence in this study. 
There is a need to explore the link between anti-immigrant sentiment and anti-immigrant 
behaviour. Crush and Ramachandran (2014) argue that many scholars in South Africa 
investigating anti-immigrant violence eschewed xenophobia as an explanation for the 
violence. They describe a dearth of ‘xenophobic realism’ –the notion that hostile xenophobic 
attitudes translate into violent xenophobic actions –in Southern African academia. I agree 
with Crush and Ramachandran, xenophobic attitudes have a formidable mobilising influence 
on individual action. I plan to test this hypothesis using recently collected data on public 
attitudes towards anti-immigrant violence80.  Using multivariate testing, I will explore the 
predictive influence of anti-immigrant sentiment on the anti-immigrant behaviour.  
 
The quantitative work presented in this dissertation has made a valuable contribution to the 
literature. I acknowledge, however, that the findings of this study have raised questions which 
a quantitative analysis will be unable to answer. There are limitations to the ability of 
positivist data to produce knowledge and I have discussed these limitations in (especially the 
third chapter of) this dissertation. The methodology used in this study tends to allow the 
researcher to act only within a limited analytical context. Respondents’ answers to 
questionnaires are unavoidably contained within a fixed subjectivity and this approach limits 
the researcher’s room for self-understandings and self-discoveries which may be manifold 
and fluctuating. Non-quantitative research may be able to address these problems and help 
the researcher answer questions that quantitative research cannot. A more qualitative 
methodological approach could be used to ‘discover’ new topic areas not initially considered 
by the researcher, bringing new understanding to the complex problem of xenophobia in 
South Africa. 
 
9.5 Conclusion  
 
South African leaders in government have a tradition of condemning violence against 
international migrants, a tradition this thesis has highlighted. Although these leaders should 
be applauded for making such statements, there is a concern that the powerful in South Africa 
will not pursue the fight against xenophobia. This concern is rooted in the belief that many 
politicians seem to deny the seriousness of the problem. Doubting the seriousness of 
xenophobia in South Africa is a mistake. Crush and Ramachandran (2014: 21) put it best 
when they said:  
“Disowning the existence of xenophobia not only flies in the face of a large body of 
quantitative and qualitative research, it illustrates a continuing lack of political will 
(first evident in the mid-1990s) to own the problem and act against one of the most 
destructive and anti-democratic forces in post-apartheid South Africa”.  
The attitudinal analysis presented in this thesis demonstrates that xenophobia is a significant 
problem in South Africa. In doing this, my dissertation is echoing the results of other studies 
on anti-immigrant sentiment in South Africa. The results of this study suggest that the 
underlying problem of widespread anti-immigrant attitudes is not being addressed with the 
                                                          
80 Preliminary data on how willing adult South Africans are to participate in violent attacks on 
foreign nationals were published by the author and his colleagues in a recent article (Roberts 
et al., 2016).  




necessary zeal and political will. I would urge policy-makers (and civil society leaders) not to 
underestimate the size of this problem. 
 
The thesis has been able to identify some of the main correlates of anti-immigrant attitudes in 
the country. The findings of this dissertation have the potential to assist the government in the 
fight against xenophobia. Throughout this study, the author has assumed that the state, acting 
with civil society, can decrease the level of xenophobia amongst the general public in South 
Africa. However, I have been unable to prove that the government can make a difference in 
improving attitudes towards international migrants and reducing prejudice. I believe that it 
would be defeatist, however, to assume that the government cannot fight xenophobia in the 
same way that the state fights against sexism and racism. If the effort and resources devoted 
to combatting xenophobia in society are equal to the problem’s scale, I believe that the state 
can make a positive difference in reducing the level of xenophobia within the adult South 
African public.  
 






Table A.1: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 5.5 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female (ref. male) 2450 0.61 0.49 0 1 
Age 2447 41.81 17.15 16 95 
Married (ref. not married) 2453 0.35 0.48 0 1 
Population Group (ref. Black Africans) 
  Coloured 2449 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Indian 2449 0.09 0.28 0 1 
White 2449 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Labour Market Status (ref. employed) 
  Unemployed 2390 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Part-time Employed 2390 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Labour Inactive 2390 0.36 0.48 0 1 
Years of Education 2285 9.63 3.68 0 16 
National Pride 2441 4.10 0.82 1 5 
Past Five Years Evaluation  2387 5.00 2.23 0 10 
National Wellbeing Index 2304 49.36 16.51 1.67 98.33 
Foreign Contact (ref. no contact) 
  Acquaintances 2453 0.18 0.39 0 1 
Friends 2453 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Foreign Threat 2437 3.71 0.89 1 5 
Party support (ref. ANC) 
     Democratic Alliance 2453 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Other Opposition 2453 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Uncertain/Refused 2453 0.29 0.45 0 1 
Geographic Type (ref. urban formal) 
     Urban informal  2453 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Rural, traditional areas 2453 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Commercial farms 2453 0.08 0.28 0 1 
Province (ref. Western Cape) 
   




Eastern Cape 2453 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Northern Cape 2453 0.06 0.23 0 1 
Free State 2453 0.07 0.26 0 1 
KwaZulu-Natal 2453 0.23 0.42 0 1 
North West 2453 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Gauteng 2453 0.16 0.36 0 1 
Mpumalanga 2453 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Limpopo 2453 0.08 0.28 0 1 
 
Table A.2: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 6.1 
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female (ref. male) 2953 0.57 0.49 0 1 
Age 2953 40.91 16.58 16 93 
Married (ref. not married) 2945 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Race group (ref. Black African) 
     Coloured  2954 0.16 0.37 0 1 
Indian 2954 0.09 0.29 0 1 
White 2954 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Geographic type (ref. Urban formal) 
     Urban informal  2954 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Rural, traditional areas 2954 0.21 0.41 0 1 
Commercial farms 2954 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Employment status (ref. full-time employed) 
     Part-time employed 2842 0.27 0.44 0 1 
Unemployed  2842 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Student 2842 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Retired  2842 0.32 0.47 0 1 
Other labour Inactive  2842 0.09 0.28 0 1 
Self-reported poverty status (ref. wealthy) 
     Comfortable  2949 0.28 0.45 0 1 
Just getting by 2949 0.34 0.47 0 1 
Poor 2949 0.18 0.38 0 1 




Very Poor 2949 0.04 0.20 0 1 
Educational attainment (ref. junior primary and below) 
     Senior Primary 2927 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Incomplete Secondary  2927 0.38 0.49 0 1 
Completed Secondary  2927 0.30 0.46 0 1 
Tertiary 2927 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Immigrant Contact (ref. no friends) 
     Few friends 2948 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Some or many friends 2948 0.10 0.31 0 1 
Racial attachment 2947 4.26 0.82 1 5 
National pride 2950 4.05 0.96 1 5 
Political intolerance 2938 2.35 0.98 1 5 
Social trust 2919 4.51 2.17 0 10 
Neighbourhood bonding 2874 5.67 3.45 0 10 
SCA 2950 6.73 1.97 0 10 
Party support (ref. ANC) 
     Democratic Alliance 2940 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Other Opposition 2940 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Uncertain/Refused 2940 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Province (ref. Western Cape) 
   Eastern Cape 2954 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Northern Cape 2954 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Free State 2954 0.07 0.25 0 1 
KwaZulu-Natal 2954 0.20 0.40 0 1 
North West 2954 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Gauteng 2954 0.19 0.39 0 1 
Mpumalanga 2954 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Limpopo 2954 0.09 0.29 0 1 
 
  




Table A.3: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 7.2 
  Black African Coloured 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female (ref. male) 1665 0.65 0.48 0 1 510 0.65 0.48 0 1 
Age 1665 38.42 16.47 16 92 510 42.40 17.04 16 90 
Married (ref. not married) 1642 0.30 0.46 0 1 502 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Rural (ref. urban) 1665 0.41 0.49 0 1 510 0.10 0.29 0 1 
Political Affiliation (ref. ruling party) 
  
   
  Opposition 1665 0.11 0.31 0 1 510 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Undeclared/Unaffiliated 1665 0.32 0.47 0 1 510 0.41 0.49 0 1 
Labour Market Status (ref. unemployed) 
  
   
  Employed  1645 0.27 0.44 0 1 501 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Labour Market Inactive 1645 0.30 0.46 0 1 501 0.39 0.49 0 1 
Years of Education 1643 9.10 3.77 0 16 502 9.65 3.05 0 16 
Living Standard Measure  1528 5.31 1.68 1 10 450 6.85 1.60 2 10 
Foreign Friendship 1640 1.59 0.93 1 5 504 1.38 0.74 1 5 
Nationalism 1660 4.26 0.71 1 5 507 4.16 0.71 1 5 
Racial Identity 1657 4.31 0.74 1 5 505 4.15 0.80 1 5 
Multiracial Threat Index  1657 3.45 0.81 1 5 506 3.48 0.84 1 5 
Multiracial Friendship  1608 1.54 0.80 1 5 471 1.98 0.91 1 5 
Quality Interracial Contact 1656 3.43 0.96 1 5 506 3.65 0.83 1 5 
Perceived Foreign Benefit  1652 3.02 0.93 1 5 505 2.98 0.83 1 5 
Province (ref. Western Cape) 
   
  
   Eastern Cape 1665 0.16 0.36 0 1 510 0.15 0.36 0 1 
Northern Cape 1665 0.05 0.21 0 1 510 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Free State 1665 0.10 0.30 0 1 510 0.03 0.17 0 1 
KwaZulu-Natal 1665 0.17 0.38 0 1 510 0.09 0.29 0 1 
North West 1665 0.10 0.31 0 1 510 0.02 0.13 0 1 
Gauteng 1665 0.12 0.32 0 1 510 0.10 0.30 0 1 
Mpumalanga 1665 0.11 0.31 0 1 510 0.00 0.06 0 1 
Limpopo 1665 0.16 0.36 0 1 510 0.00 0.04 0 1 
 




Table A.3: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 7.2 (continues)  
  Indian/Asian White 
  Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Female (ref. male) 310 0.67 0.47 0 1 388 0.57 0.50 0 1 
Age 310 46.76 17.46 16 86 388 51.43 18.32 16 92 
Married (ref. not married) 303 0.58 0.49 0 1 376 0.63 0.48 0 1 
Rural (ref. urban) 310 0.00 0.06 0 1 388 0.03 0.16 0 1 
Political Affiliation (ref. ruling party) 
  
   
  Opposition 310 0.34 0.47 0 1 388 0.68 0.47 0 1 
Undeclared/Unaffiliated 310 0.56 0.50 0 1 388 0.31 0.46 0 1 
Labour Market Status (ref. unemployed) 
  
   
  Employed  306 0.27 0.45 0 1 372 0.40 0.49 0 1 
Labour Market Inactive 306 0.60 0.49 0 1 372 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Years of Education 302 10.53 3.07 0 16 363 12.15 2.35 2 16 
Living Standard Measure  279 8.26 1.41 5 10 343 8.99 1.22 3 10 
Foreign Friendship 306 1.48 0.69 1 4 370 1.56 0.89 1 5 
Nationalism 308 3.90 0.79 1 5 387 3.84 0.95 1 5 
Racial Identity 307 4.25 0.73 1 5 383 3.81 1.07 1 5 
Multiracial Threat Index  306 3.55 0.85 1 5 382 3.35 0.85 1 5 
Multiracial Friendship  288 2.11 0.85 1 5 365 2.02 0.89 1 5 
Quality Interracial Contact 307 3.56 0.87 1 5 377 3.91 0.73 1 5 
Perceived Foreign Benefit  305 2.89 0.82 1 5 380 2.97 0.86 1 5 
Province (ref. Western Cape) 
   
  
   Eastern Cape 310 0.01 0.11 0 1 388 0.07 0.25 0 1 
Northern Cape n/a 388 0.11 0.31 0 1 
Free State 310 0.01 0.08 0 1 388 0.11 0.31 0 1 
KwaZulu-Natal 310 0.64 0.48 0 1 388 0.15 0.36 0 1 
North West 310 0.01 0.08 0 1 388 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Gauteng 310 0.29 0.45 0 1 388 0.22 0.42 0 1 
Mpumalanga 310 0.01 0.10 0 1 388 0.12 0.33 0 1 
Limpopo 310 0.00 0.06 0 1 388 0.02 0.15 0 1 
 




Table A.4: Summary Statistics on the Dummy and Continuous Variables used in Multivariate Analysis in Table 8.5  
 
Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Age 2735 41.73 17.68 16 95 
Female (ref. male) 2738 0.60 0.49 0 1 
Married (ref. not married) 2739 0.42 0.49 0 1 
Non-Citizen Parent(s) (ref. none) 2685 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Ethnic group (ref. White) 
 
  Coloured 2739 0.17 0.38 0 1 
Indian 2739 0.12 0.32 0 1 
Sesotho 2739 0.14 0.35 0 1 
Setswana 2739 0.08 0.27 0 1 
isiXhosa 2739 0.14 0.34 0 1 
isiZulu 2739 0.13 0.34 0 1 
African Minority 2739 0.11 0.32 0 1 
Geographic Type (ref. urban formal) 
  Urban informal  2739 0.05 0.22 0 1 
Rural, traditional areas 2739 0.22 0.41 0 1 
Commercial farms 2739 0.05 0.21 0 1 
Party support (ref. ANC) 
 
  Democratic Alliance 2739 0.18 0.38 0 1 
Other Opposition 2739 0.09 0.29 0 1 
Uncertain/Refused 2739 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Years of Education 2664 9.60 3.60 0 16 
Employment status (ref. employed) 
  Part-time 2617 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Unemployed 2617 0.33 0.47 0 1 
Labour Inactive 2617 0.35 0.48 0 1 
LSM Scale 2544 6.32 2.09 1 10 
Immigration Consequence Index 2698 3.42 0.74 1 5 
Foreign Contact 
  
  Perceived Immigrant Size 2729 2.96 1.42 1 5 
Foreign Acquaintances 2734 2.32 1.36 1 5 




Foreign Friends 2728 1.59 0.91 1 5 
Political Patriotism  2686 2.49 0.75 1 4 
Cultural Patriotism 2675 3.12 0.62 1 4 
Province (ref. Western Cape) 
   Eastern Cape 2739 0.13 0.34 0 1 
Northern Cape 2739 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Free State 2739 0.08 0.26 0 1 
KwaZulu-Natal 2739 0.20 0.40 0 1 
North West 2739 0.07 0.26 0 1 
Gauteng 2739 0.15 0.35 0 1 
Mpumalanga 2739 0.08 0.27 0 1 
Limpopo 2739 0.10 0.30 0 1 
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